WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations



Volume XX, Number 2 January 1968

Price $7.50 per year

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD

KLAUS KNORR, *Chairman*

MORROE BERGER
CYRIL E. BLACK
ROBERT A. DAHL
HARRY ECKSTEIN
RICHARD A. FALK
WILLIAM T. R. FOX
MORTON A. KAPLAN
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER
ARNO J. MAYER
THOMAS C. SCHELLING
EDWARD SHILS
MARSHALL D. SHULMAN
HAROLD SPROUT

Editors: CYRIL E. BLACK, RICHARD A. FALK (*review articles*), KLAUS KNORR

Associate Editors: HENRY BIENEN, TED GURR, ORAN R. YOUNG

Managing Editor: MARY COX

The editors invite the submission of articles bearing upon problems in international relations. Editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to WORLD POLITICS, Corwin Hall, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540. Rates: $7.50 per year; $12.50 for two years; foreign postage, 25 cents additional per year.

Back volumes: I-XIII are available from the Johnson Reprint Corporation, 111 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003, at $20.00 per volume. Back issues of volumes XIV-XIX are available from Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540, at $2.50 per issue.

Advertising: Advertising Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by the *Social Sciences & Humanities Index* and the *Book Review Index*. Abstracts of its articles appear in *Historical Abstracts* and *International Political Science Abstracts*.

Statements of fact and opinion appearing in WORLD POLITICS are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publishers.

Copyright © 1968, by Princeton University Press

WORLD POLITICS. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. January 1968. Vol. XX, No. 2. Second-Class postage paid at Princeton, N.J. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

VOL. XX JANUARY 1968 No. 2

CONTENTS

Military Coups and Political Development: Some Lessons From Ghana and Nigeria — *Edward Feit* 179

Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-building in the New States — *Guenther Roth* 194

Hans Morgenthau and the World State — *James P. Speer II* 207

Capital Markets and the Unification of Europe — *Hans O. Schmitt* 228

Psychological Factors in Civil Violence — *Ted Gurr* 245

REVIEW ARTICLES

The German Problem: 1945-1950 — *Klaus Epstein* 279

Science, Government, and the Case of RAND: A Singular Pluralism — *Philip Green* 301

Two Books on Soviet Historiography — *George Enteen* 327

Commitment to Responsibility — *C. P. Kindleberger* 357

The Contributors ii

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONTRIBUTORS

EDWARD FEIT is Assistant Professor of Government at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and is this year a Fellow at the Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, where he is at work on a study of insurgency in South Africa and on a comparative study of military regimes.

GUENTHER ROTH is presently Visiting Professor at the Free University of Berlin. This spring he will publish the first complete English edition of Max Weber's *Economy and Society*, which, with Claus Wittich, he has edited and partly translated.

JAMES P. SPEER II is Associate Professor of Political Science at Temple Buell College in Denver. He has also taught comparative and international politics at the University of Colorado and at Colorado State University. Before he began his teaching career, he was a Foreign Service Officer in Mexico, Chile, India, and China.

HANS O. SCHMITT is Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin. During the period 1965-1967 he served in Washington as an economist with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

TED GURR is Assistant Professor of Politics and Associate Director of the Workshop in Comparative Politics at Princeton University. He is conducting a series of comparative studies of the sources of political instability and is the author of the Center of International Studies monograph *The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model* (1967).

KLAUS EPSTEIN died on June 26, 1967, as a result of an automobile accident that cut short a distinguished career of scholarship and teaching. At the time of his death, Professor Epstein was Chairman of the History Department at Brown University. He had recently published, as the first volume of a major work, *The Genesis of German Conservatism* (1966). He was on a number of occasions a valued contributor to *World Politics*.

PHILIP GREEN is Assistant Professor of Government at Smith College and the author of *Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence* (1966).

GEORGE ENTEEN, Assistant Professor of History at The Pennsylvania State University, spent the fall of 1966 in Moscow and Leningrad doing research for a work to be entitled *M. N. Pokrovskii and the Society of Marxist Historians.*

C. P. KINDLEBERGER is Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, on leave as Visiting Professor of Economics, Atlanta University Center. His latest book is *Europe's Postwar Growth: The Role of the Labor Supply*, which appeared in 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MILITARY COUPS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Some Lessons From Ghana and Nigeria

By EDWARD FEIT*

I

ARE the military coups that have shaken Africa recently simply a working-out of personal animosities, are they due to chance, or are they the result of something inherent in the very nature of present-day African political systems? It is to questions such as these that this article is addressed, and to which it seeks to provide tentative answers. Further, if, as will be argued here, the African coups result from something inherently systemic, what conclusions can be drawn at present about Africa's future political development?

Before the coups, students of armies in the "third world" did not rate the political potential of African armies very highly.[1] The reasons varied from the small size of the armies to such matters as the politicization (or lack of politicization) of the officer corps. The military revolts in former French Africa and in the Congo did not seriously shake expert opinion because the revolts took place in countries barely viable and of little political importance or, in the case of the Congo, in a country ravaged by rebellions. The coups in Ghana and Nigeria have given the problem different dimensions; they have, in fact, necessitated fresh thinking about African politics as a whole.

Ghana had been built up by Ghanaian "agitprop," by foreign publicists, and by some academics who should have known better as the epitome of the thrusting "single-party state." With a "party of mobilization" headed by a "charismatic" leader, Kwame Nkrumah, it was setting the pace in creating entirely new "African" forms of government based on African socialism. Its teething troubles over, it was said, Ghana would be the model for much of Africa. Nigeria too lacked neither publicists nor academic supporters. It was represented as Africa's showcase

* A draft of this article was read by Professor Henry L. Bretton of the University of Michigan, who made some helpful suggestions and gave some valuable advice. The author is, of course, alone responsible for all opinions and analyses in the article.

[1] James S. Coleman and Belmont Price, Jr., "The Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa," in John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton 1962), 359; William F. Gutteridge, *Military Institutions and Power in the New States* (New York 1965), 141-44; S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (London 1962), 228.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

democracy and as an alternative to the "single-party state." Because of its size and potential resources it was pointed out as a potential African world power.

Myths such as these were rudely exploded, first, by the Nigerian coup of January 15, 1966, and then by the Ghanaian coup that followed some six weeks later when, on February 24, 1966, the Ghanaian army toppled the Nkrumah regime while Nkrumah was out of the country on a fatuous mission to end the Vietnam war. Both coups, the Ghanaian and the Nigerian, swept aside the civilian governments and all instruments by which those governments had been conducted without meeting serious resistance or protest. That small armies were able, with so little difficulty, to set aside the regimes that had ruled their countries must indicate that these regimes had little substance to them, that they were little more than shadows. But if this is indeed so, then where were the substantive institutions? What are, in truth, the political *institutions* of Africa?

With the question put in this way, a pause to examine the meaning of the term "institutions" is surely called for. Institutions are defined by Samuel P. Huntington as "stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior," and this definition is accepted here. Huntington goes on to say that the extent to which an institution is established can be measured by its complexity, adaptability, autonomy, and the coherence of its organizations and procedures.[2] Institutions thus embrace a continuum of codes and practices that, as Lucian Pye has suggested, fit together as parts of a meaningful web of relations.[3]

The only institutions in Africa that meet this definition are the traditional African systems, the tribes, and the administrative institutions introduced by the colonial powers. The significance of the coups can therefore be made clear only if institutional interaction with other forms of political organizations, both before and after independence, are outlined.

Thus the most significant political fact in present-day Africa could well be the way in which traditional African institutions complemented the institutions of colonial administrations. The significance of this institutional relationship has often been lost sight of because of the attractive power of the myth of "African nationalism."

The successful working together of colonial officers and tribal rulers was facilitated by their mutual commitment to order and stability.

[2] "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), 394.
[3] Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton 1965), 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Colonial officers and tribal rulers alike wanted to preserve what was, for different reasons, a mutually beneficial status quo. In this joint effort each could provide something that the other could not—always an ideal basis for cooperation.

By the grid they imposed which held the tribes together without integrating them, the colonial power ensured intertribal peace. Once the fear of external attack was removed, tribal rulers could concentrate on building power and influence within the tribes. Fear that their own followers might overthrow them was alleviated for chiefs who satisfied the colonial officers, for they could count on the full weight of colonial authority behind them. Canny politicians then as now, the chiefs realized that it was best to join a system that they could not beat. They could preserve a fair measure of tribal authority, providing that they stuck to the sphere that the colonial power assigned them. Colonial officers, always thin on the ground, could do little more than divide their labors with the chiefs. Detailed supervision was, in any case, out of the question. Local administration thus remained with the traditional ruler who, like most of his people, considered little other than local affairs important. As a result there was little friction between colonial rulers and their African subjects.

So by their common working the administrative and the traditional system served to legitimize each other. The administrators protected traditional systems from change and made their preservation acceptable to the governments at home. The traditional rulers, in turn, helped to make colonial practices institutional among their followers.

The political system so made institutional was a combination of administrative and traditional rule, and we shall therefore term it an administrative-traditional system. Given its objectives, the system succeeded quite well. It was generally accepted and understood. There was, in any case, little to oppose it. Nationalism and democracy were not African conceptions, although to those Africans who assimilated them, there was much in the working of the colonial system to cause them distress. But the opposite must also be borne in mind. Conor Cruise O'Brien, hardly a friend of colonialism, wrote in the fall of 1965 of the almost mawkish sentiment for Britain he found among Ghanaians to whom he spoke.[4] But in speaking of the administrative-traditional system of the colonial period, it is important not to romanticize. The colonial system fell far short of the Western ideals. It was not democratic and was intended to benefit mainly the colonial power. Empha-

[4] "Contemporary Forms of Imperialism," *Studies on the Left* (Fall 1965), quoted in *Current*, LXIX (March 1966), 15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sizing the status quo as it did, it tended to ossify African society at the Iron Age. Perpetual backwardness is, perhaps, too high a price even for peace and stability, but this point will not be debated here. What matters for the moment is that the colonial system worked well, that it was understood, and that it secured the objectives of its sponsors at low cost in life and treasure.

Although the European powers came to Africa to promote their own benefit, ironically in seeking this benefit they brought into being the very classes who were to challenge their rule. New classes were the result of encouraging Africans to leave their villages and come to the workplaces in the towns, in the factories, in the mines, and in the offices. But it was these very men who could be accommodated only with greatest difficulty in the colonial system, if they could be accommodated at all. The colonial system was based on the working of an administrative-traditional regime, a regime poorly adapted to integrating Africans outside their own tribal environments. The colonial system, although complex and coherent, was not flexible enough to provide places that would satisfy large numbers of Africans neither sufficiently "Westernized" to fit the one set of institutions nor sufficiently traditional to fit the other. The colonial officers were, again to borrow a phrase of Huntington's, "the victims of their past successes." The successes of the system of "indirect rule" led to its hardening into dogma. Resting as it did on the continued authority of tribal rulers, the system was to be confronted with the need for increasing participation of men among whom this authority was eroding. This was the basic contradiction of colonialism.

Under the impetus of expanding the "modern" sector in their African colonies, the colonial governments created "available masses," to use William Kornhauser's terms, who were soon to find "accessible elites" to lead them in the persons of the post–World War II political entrepreneurs.[5]

In bridging the years before and after the Second World War, it is important to distinguish the earlier politicos from the new and different group that came to the fore after the war. The earlier politicos will be called the "old politicals" to distinguish them from the later leaders, already referred to as political entrepreneurs. The old politicals were a congeries of notables or relatives of traditional rulers. They had received some education, often higher education in the colonial country. Although they claimed to speak for all Africans they represented little more than themselves, a fact that colonial administrators were never

[5] *The Politics of Mass Society* (London 1960), 51-68.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

loath to put before them. Their political activity was marginal, if not trivial, and concerned either grandiose schemes for "West African union" or the role of some chiefly house, such as the controversy over the House of Docemo in Lagos. Committed to legality and to constitutional change, they represented no danger to the colonial power. They could be satisfied with seats in the legislative and executive councils, which, having only advisory functions, did not interfere much in the running of the administrative-traditional system. Those for whom such places could not be found could be committed to the system by incorporation in the administration itself. Indeed the Gold Coast, as Ghana was then called, was the first to have such appointments made and had the largest proportion of African civil servants when the recruitment of Africans was extended elsewhere.[6]

Thus the British gave the old politicals, whose numbers were anyway small, a sense of participation in politics without relinquishing much control. In fact, the assignment of seats in the councils to old politicals was a useful lever in forcing their accommodation to the administrative-traditional regime. The richest prizes fell to the parties that gave preference to the traditional and conservative elements, ensuring that these and other parties were soon under traditional control.

In fine, against the background of an expanding class of people who could not be easily fitted into the system, the administrative-traditional regime seemed to be working well before the Second World War. It was only in the aftermath of the war that problems that had been in the background moved to the forefront.

II

After the Second World War, Britain, like all of Europe, was exhausted and impoverished. The center of world power had shifted away from Europe and the mantle of world leadership had fallen on the United States and the Soviet Union—powers traditionally hostile to colonialism. Within the colonies themselves large numbers of Africans had been mobilized and had seen and learned much of the outside world. Even in colonies untouched directly by war a new spirit seemed abroad. Colonial powers were made aware that restoration of the status quo that had existed before the war could be reestablished and maintained only at enormous cost, a cost few were willing, let alone able, to pay. Rebuilding Europe itself would involve massive assistance from the United States whose goodwill was therefore essential. Handing over power to what seemed to be "popular rule" in the colonies might win

[6] Dennis Austin, *Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960* (London 1964), 8 n.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this goodwill, and as the so-called popular parties had extremely narrow bases, their leaders would in turn, it was thought, be forced to maintain the administrative-traditional system by the simple logic of circumstances. The only popular support would be that obtainable through the tribes, and lack of training among the entrepreneurs and their following would ensure the retention of expatriate administrators, in whose hands would rest all crucial decision-making powers. Hostility between the new entrepreneurs and the traditional rulers would assure the British government of an arbitrative role, and this, together with expatriate administration, would mean that the trappings of power, rather than its substance, would be handed over to the new rulers. Their weakness would entrap the political entrepreneurs in the administrative-traditional system just as their old political predecessors had been.

The new political entrepreneurs were supported not, as believed abroad, by "mass parties" but, as Henry Bretton and others have convincingly demonstrated, by political machines.[7] The distinction is that a political party aggregates demands and converts them into legislative policy, whereas a political machine exists almost exclusively to stay in power. To this end its main concern is to offer rewards and bribes to anyone who can contribute to keeping it in power. Office alone is its reason for existence, and with office comes the opportunity of enrichment at public expense. But the personal political machine was, in Africa, subject to pressure from the African institutions. To many of the traditional rulers, the parties being created by the new politicals were another vehicle for carrying on tribal conflict at a new level. So, as political entrepreneurs competed in building their machines, they had to decide between two alternatives: whether to tie the machine closely to a tribe or whether to "go it alone" without specific tribal support. The Nigerian parties were, in general, personal-tribal machines, and the Ghanaian opposition parties were similar. Largely preempted from obtaining the support of the main Ghanaian tribes, Nkrumah's machine was of the second type.

The first attempt at a political machine in Nigeria was Nnamdi Azikiwe's NCNC.[8] It sought to represent itself as encompassing all Nigerians, but this machine splintered as independence neared and other entrepreneurs combined with ethnic interests to bring into being po-

[7] Bretton, *Power and Stability in Nigeria* (New York 1962) and *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York 1966).

[8] The NCNC was formed in 1944 as the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons; the name was changed in 1961 to the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

litical machines based on Nigeria's core tribes. The NCNC itself became an Ibo party backed by the Ibo Union. The political machine of Obafemi Awolowo and the Yoruba tribe, the Action Group, was founded largely on the initiative of the Egbe Omo Oduduwe, a powerful tribal association in Western Nigeria. Surely not much needs to be added about the connection between the political machine of Sir Ahmadu Bello, the late Sardauna of Sokoto, which, as the Northern People's Congress, drew support largely from the Hausa-Fulani peoples. Nigeria became independent with a combination of personal-tribal machines heavily infused with traditional elements dominating each of her regions. Because such "parties" would from the outset be committed to the status quo, the power structure in Nigeria, the British believed, would be kept intact after independence.

In Ghana, smaller and relatively more homogeneous, a clash of ambitions among the old and new politicals turned events in a different direction. Nkrumah, brought into Gold Coast politics to convert the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) into a machine, split it instead and, taking most of its activists with him, began to construct a machine of his own, the Convention People's party (CPP). The old politicals were, as indicated earlier, closely tied to the Ashanti chiefdoms, and so Nkrumah was preempted from forming a tribal party even if he had wished to do so, which is in itself doubtful. But the wealth of Ashanti and the importance of its cocoa production in Ghana's economy posed a threat to the power Nkrumah sought to secure for himself. He met this threat by cutting down the legal powers of the chiefs and also by financial pressure and by destooling the chiefs who were recalcitrant. These actions, and the replacement of traditional rulers by others of his own choice after the legitimate chiefs had been destooled, antagonized not only the chiefs themselves but also many of their followers.

By placing their supporters in lucrative administrative posts the political machines of both Ghana and Nigeria burdened the administration and antagonized the administrators who patterned themselves after British models. But the machines were, nevertheless, compelled to make such appointments, as the "parties" they represented had virtually no base of support in the country, unless, as in Nigeria, this support came from tribal chiefs or political organizers who could deliver the votes. The chiefs and the organizers had to be rewarded by bribes, among which were appointment to administrative boards. A recent paper of the Northern Nigerian government, for instance, points out that the Northern Nigerian Marketing Board, which handled about

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

$180 million worth of produce per annum, did not have one qualified person in charge.[9] The multiplication of useless office holders not only burdened the budget and opened the path of corruption, but also was frustrating to administrators who had gone the painful path of training and who found themselves under political appointees who were illiterate or semiliterate.

There was, in addition, friction between the machine politicians and administrators similar to that which Lucian Pye describes in Burma.[10] In Africa, as in Asia, administrators had come to politics with clear models of their careers and a view of government taken over from the days of British rule. Government, to them, was government by administration without political interference. The administrators felt themselves competent and believed that they could run the country as well as the British administrators had done. The politicians, on the other hand, had come to politics without any clear conception of what it is that a politician does, other than to wield power. Lacking knowledge of how power was to be wielded, the politicians tried to make up for lack of role conception by constant aggression and to blame failures on "sabotage" by the civil service. The administrators, on the other hand, were immobilized by the political appointees and by their own lack of security. In addition, they resented those slurs on their prized competence which often were made by politicians for whom the African administrator had nothing more than contempt.

The results of such "nation-building" are not hard to trace. In Nigeria they led to fresh entrepreneurial attempts at party-building, as each region sought to erect such structures in the other regions as to gain control of the country as a whole. The more populous, albeit more backward, North, for instance, sought to perpetuate its rule and protect itself against the more advanced South by sponsoring political entrepreneurs who would build "parties" that would be entirely dependent on the North for their financing and continuance in office. The most notable and, in a sense, successful of these machines was the Nigerian National Democratic party (NNDP) of Chief Samuel Akintola who, in a complex political play, split the Action Group when its leader, Chief Awolowo, was arrested on various charges of treason and peculation. In a patently rigged election the NNDP was able to secure "victory," but could not reap its fruits as the announcement of its having won the election sparked violent rioting in the West, rioting that

[9] "60m Without Safeguards," *West Africa* (March 4, 1967), 305.

[10] *Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven 1962), chap. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

threatened the stability of the region and indeed of the entire federation. The situation was worsened by rumors that another political machine was to be established in the Middle Western region as well. Instead of each remaining in its own region, therefore, the Nigerian machines tried to extend themselves to the other regions, endangering the entire federal balance.

What happened in Ghana can best be described, in Chalmers Johnson's term, as a "power deflation," a loss of power accompanied by an attempt to use increased force to retain control.[11] In his effort to keep his machine in power Nkrumah sought, on the one hand, to play different factions in the country against one another and, on the other hand, to build his own sources of support, an army and police of his own. It was undoubtedly this threat to their arms monopoly that prodded the regular army into action against Nkrumah, rather than objections to "one-party rule," which African officers have sometimes represented as the cause of their revolt.[12]

In short, the political machines, whether in combination with a tribal core or just on their own, were unable to replace the British government at the head of an administrative-traditional system or to offer anything else that could take its place. The result was not only the decay of the organizations that the British had left behind, accompanied by instability, but also the "fissiparous tendencies" so much described by British political scientists. With the disappearance of the central administrative grid that had created a nonintegrative unity among the tribes, the African states were showing signs of coming apart. An analogy drawn from political theory may make matters plainer, although like all analogies it is not perfect. The British government acted as Hobbes's Leviathan. The social compact was that of the chiefs and the British government and had secured protection in exchange for independence. Once this compact was dissolved and no new Leviathan appeared, the tribes began to revert to a "state of nature" with each against the other.

III

If the African states were not to dissolve into their component tribes a new Leviathan would have to be created, and this was to be the role, whether foreseen or not, of the new military governments. It is this aspect of the coups, and not the coups themselves, that will occupy attention.

As the apotheosis of administration, armies would appear to have ob-

[11] *Revolutionary Change* (Boston 1962), 27-33.
[12] A. A. Afrifa, *The Ghana Coup, 24 February 1966* (London 1966), 85-86.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vious advantages in reconstructing an administrative-traditional order. With their chains of command, allocation of functions, specification of rank, and unity of purpose, everything is structured to ensure centralized control and coordinated action. In Africa this has even greater significance, for the army is often the *only* well-organized and coherent arm of government—the only arm that can make its writ run throughout the country. However poorly it may compare with the armies of developed countries by objective military standards, its organization is superior to any other that the government commands. Then, again, armies enjoy certain moral advantages over civilian branches of government: the moral force associated with self-sacrifice, discipline, and courage; freedom from the taint of corruption; and the conception of representing something over and above the passing regimes. Lastly, and perhaps most significant, armies have a monopoly of the most modern and lethal arms.[13]

But because countries are so much more complex than armies, administration of countries is more difficult than administration of armies, and soldiers make poor governors of countries. When, in addition, the country has been brought to a sorry pass by a corrupt civilian government that has preceded the military, the problems are compounded. Officers who assume power under these conditions have to make good on at least some of the politicians' promises while repairing the damage done to the body politic, and they have to do this while preserving the impression of a more just rule. In these matters their military experience is a poor guide. In each country where a military putsch has taken place the officers find a similar solution. In Ghana and Nigeria the officers seem to have chosen the same alternative as was chosen by the British in their time: to abrogate all political activity, to rule by administrative fiat on the central level, and to reconstruct the alliance with the chiefs on the local level—in other words, to rebuild the administrative-traditional system with the officers assuming the role of the British government. The pattern seems, by the logic of the situation, to involve much the same institutions in much the same way.

The military leaders of Ghana and Nigeria, in their attempts at reconstituting the administrative-traditional alliance, followed similar courses. The military commanders made themselves the equivalent of the colonial governors and lieutenant-governors. They appointed themselves and some of the administrators from the civil sector to posts on the virtual equivalent of the executive councils, although the new or-

[13] Finer, 228-29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ganizations had obviously greater powers than the old councils had had. Thus the alliance with the civil servants was rebuilt. As part of the compact, it seems, civil servants may have obtained immunity for acts committed under the old dispensation, for in both Ghana and Nigeria administrators were notably absent from the inquisitions that followed the coups. Although it would be too much to hope that administrators had been the incorruptible servants of the public in the face of so much corruption, it is only the politicians' records that have been scrutinized.

Another factor has, however, entered the picture. Although administrators now have greater freedom of decision than they had in the past, freedom from the political interference that they so resented, they do not seem to know how to use this newfound freedom yet. Indecision rather than administrative firmness seems the rule. Again one could turn to Pye's Burma study, which describes a similar phenomenon there.[14] Basing their claims to power on competence but lacking confidence, administrators, by remaining inactive, avoid putting their competence to the test.

Some similarities between Ghana and Nigeria have been pointed up, yet the Ghanaian coup seems successful so far, whereas the Nigerian coup failed. In Nigeria, the initial military takeover of January 1966 was followed by another in July, leading to consequences that cannot even now be assessed. Some reasons for these different outcomes can, however, be suggested.

Both administrators and traditional rulers were strongly regional in sentiment in Nigeria, a fact that must always be borne in mind. Before the coup the regional governments had tended to overshadow the federal government in importance. Holding Nigeria together—given the complex arrangements of core tribes and minority tribes, central and regional administrations, as well as conflicts of personality—might have been possible for a disinterested outsider whose disinterest was generally recognized by all. Such had, in fact, been the position of the British in colonial times. The army officers, however genuine their dedication to Nigeria, clearly did not fit this description. Whatever their protestations, tribal and regional interests were of overwhelming importance to them. The military coup itself could, indeed, be described in tribal and regional terms. It has been argued that it was either a Southern attempt to preempt a planned Northern takeover of the country as a whole or a direct attempt by Southern officers to take over the entire country. Those who perished in the coup in January, officers and pol-

[14] Chap. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

iticians alike, were both Northerners and Southerners who had supported the puppet NNDP. The July coup, on the other hand, seems to have claimed the lives mainly of Southern officers.

Events were apparently set in train by a meeting of the Northern People's Congress leaders, who ruled at the federal level, and a group of army officers who agreed to use the military to put down the rioting in the West. Southern fears were aroused that the North would invoke military power to keep its puppets in office. If the South feared a Northern takeover before the coup, the shoe was on the other foot after it, and the military government tried, by concessions to the sensibilities of other regions, to set at rest fears that the coups presaged a Southern takeover, particularly by the Ibo of the East. To that end, for instance, Major (later Lieutenant-Colonel) Hassan Katsina, a scion of the Northern ruling elite, was made military governor of the North, similar steps being taken to appoint military governors in other regions from the same core tribes as dominated the regions. Actions such as these may have softened the effects of the coup, especially in the North, but did not allay suspicions.

The military regime in Nigeria won over the administrative cadres by favoring them over the traditional elites who had been involved in machine politics. Attached as the administrators may have been to the institution of tribalism, they were not necessarily equally well disposed toward the administrative interference of tribal political machines or of their appointees to administrative posts. As it was, the traditional rulers were reduced in power. Customary courts were stripped of judicial functions, tribal appointees were dismissed from various specialized boards, and the "elected" members of the local councils were dismissed. In every case civil servants replaced the former incumbents. But in doing these things the officers revealed the fatal flaw in their arrangements. Even with administrative support, the military were in no position to administer the country without traditional support any more than the British had been. Although the administration was the main base of military support, this support was also alienated when General Agyui-Ironsi, the supreme commander, tried to centralize the country.

The reasons for General Ironsi's decision are obscure and, as the General himself has been killed, may never be brought to light. One can speculate that, having only administrative support and, as an officer, favoring central control, Ironsi may have believed that centralizing the country and creating a unified civil service would consolidate both administrative support and administrative control. But, whatever his motive, General Ironsi put himself and his supporters into the same posi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion as the CPP had in Ghana—as a "party of unification" alienated from the primary institutions of the country.

The decree to centralize the civil service and do away with the regions crystallized out all the suspicions about the military regime. The threat to abandon regional division set off immediate rioting in the North. Attempts by Colonel Katsina to placate the traditional rulers by promises that the "people"—a euphemism for the rulers themselves—would be consulted before any step was taken seem to have satisfied them only partly. Even though the most violent response was that of the North, other regions were equally apprehensive. The administrators, on the other hand, on whom the military government relied, were also opposed to unification. Once again it was the North that was the principal source of this opposition. Because of its educational backwardness, a backwardness that had suited the Northern rulers for a time, the North had the smallest cadre of trained administrators. Thus, if qualification were the only basis for civil service appointments, which Ironsi had stated would be the case, the North would fall under the control of the other regions in an administrative system of rule. Northern fears were further reinforced by such provisions as the dropping of Hausa as a language requirement for civil service officers. In other regions, administrators felt that tribal affiliation secured their more rapid promotion, a matter of importance of them. Even deeper ran the fear that, should a central civil service be set up, the tribe with the most men at the top would be able to give continuous preference to fellow tribesmen and make the civil service its preserve. For these and doubtless for other reasons, the administrators wanted the existing system to remain.

Beset on all sides by troubles, the military government could do little. The Northern riots, directed mainly against Ibos in the towns, riots in which troops participated, showed that the officers had lost control of their men. Food shortages, which, it was bruited about, were caused by tribal associations, added to the problems confronting the military government. The shortages were met mainly by exhortations by the military governors against hoarding. The actions of the military were becoming as futile as had been those of the Nkrumah political machine.

The July coup, in a tragic manner, settled the problem of unification, if it settled little else. Southern, mainly Eastern, officers were killed in the coup, which was, it seems, the Northern revenge for the January coup. The July coup and the violence that preceded and followed it have brought the continued existence of the Nigerian state into question. Each region is, as far as can be ascertained, becoming more like a tribal state. Whether anything can be saved of unity or whether a tra-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ditional and administrative system as had existed before can be rebuilt remains a moot question.

That the Ghanaian coup succeeded better is perhaps because the Ghanaian officers not only had ready-made allies to hand, but also because they have so far been astute enough not to lose them. The National Liberation Council, as the military government was styled, could count on the intelligentsia and on the traditional rulers, both of which groups had been alienated from the Nkrumah regime. The intelligentsia had been driven into exile, sent to prison, or reduced to silence. Administrators had been confused by the maze of organizations the political machine had conjured up, to which more were constantly being added. The traditional rulers had been displaced and now looked to the National Liberation Council for a restoration of their positions. The military government acted promptly to set up councils that would engage the energies of the intelligentsia and promised to displace chiefs wrongly enstooled by Nkrumah. The military government was, it therefore seems, taking realistic steps to restore the administrative-traditional system that had succeeded in the past.

The broader question of the survival of the National Liberation Council is, however, still problematic. The administrators are not, as mentioned earlier, proving equal to the task of decision-making without strong direction from a political sector, and the Council does not seem able to give such directly political leads. Already rumors of plots are in the air, and these usually precede trouble. The lives of the members of the National Liberation Council have been threatened, and even a comic opera plot was mounted by some former supporters of Dr. Nkrumah and two junior officers. As in Africa the comic has only too often become deadly serious, even these manifestations cannot be taken lightly. There is evidence that the army officers are not off their guard. Yet in spite of such threats to its position the Council has released from prison many of the major cogs of Nkrumah's political machine, and the fact that it can do so at a time like this indicates the absence of any real support for the machine itself.

IV

"Men," a cynic once wrote, "make their mistakes in order to repeat them." If this *mot* be applied to political development, men can be said to knock down their political structures just to replace them with ones essentially similar. And it is this tendency of political forms to reappear that has been a major theme of this article. The reason why structures keep emerging is, it has been suggested, the absence of change in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

institutions that underlie the structures. Given certain institutions, one could argue, only certain structures are appropriate. If the most appropriate structures are removed and replaced by others less appropriate, men will seek to change back to the most appropriate. Such efforts need not, of course, succeed. Nor is it likely that the original structures, the organizations and procedures, will be reestablished as they were. But the efforts to return to what was most appropriate will be persisted in.

The arrangements made in the colonial era were, it now seems, the most appropriate for Africa given its stage of development. So appropriate were they that much of what has happened in Ghana and Nigeria can be interpreted as an attempt to return to these institutions after the failure of the newer forms, dominated by political machines, became manifest. The political machines could not replace the British government at the head of the existing institutional structure and could not offer an alternative of their own.

Although nothing is more dangerous than prophecy in African politics, it may well be that the African governments of tomorrow will be neither democratic nor Communist. Nor, let it be added, will these take on any especially "African" form of either. The system that will prevail will, most likely, be an adaptation of administrative and traditional rule along the lines of former colonial government with legislative and executive councils providing the forums for a largely empty political activity. The system will, thus, divide political labors much as they were divided before. Systems of this sort are likely in Ghana and in the regions of Nigeria, whether the latter remain federated or not. Events alone can, in the last resort, give the final answer.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSONAL RULERSHIP, PATRIMONIALISM, AND EMPIRE-BUILDING IN THE NEW STATES

By GUENTHER ROTH*

THE concrete lessons of recent history have helped us to appreciate the paramount importance of the political preconditions of social and economic development in the new states. The basic problem of political stability must be solved before all others—or everything else may be in vain. For this reason, some of the scholarly attention that used to be focused on social and economic development has shifted to political organization and has given prominence to terms such as "nation-building," "political culture," and "democratization." At the same time efforts have been made to modify the usual evolutionary and dichotomous conceptions of social and political development. The two-faced nature of tradition and modernity has come under scrutiny again.

Two basic theoretical choices have been made in the face of the complexity of the subject matter: one choice has been to resort to a relatively novel terminology that is intended to transcend Western historical connotations—witness the attempt by Gabriel Almond and his collaborators to adapt the Parsonian scheme; the other has been to reexamine older terms for their contemporary usefulness and to work with historically more specific concepts—an approach prominently pursued by Reinhard Bendix.[1]

I shall follow the latter path because I should like to reconsider a neglected part of Max Weber's typology of *Herrschaft*, the notion of patrimonial rule, for it seems to me that many of the features of legal-rational modernity may not appear in the new states and that certain basic modes of administration persist, even though traditionalist legitimacy has disintegrated in most cases. From the beginning, it should be clearly understood that Weber's sociology of *Herrschaft* deals not only with

* This article was first presented at the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, International Sociological Association, Evian, France, September 6, 1966, Session I, "Approaches to Comparative Politics." I greatly appreciate the helpful comments of Juan Linz and Reinhard Bendix.

[1] See, for example, Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics* (Boston 1966). For Bendix, see his *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (New York 1964), 2, and "Modernization and Inequality," a paper prepared for Session I, Sixth World Congress of Sociology, ISA, mimeographed, 52ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

beliefs in legitimacy but also with the actual operating modes and administrative arrangements by which rulers "govern," not just "rule" (to paraphrase Adolphe Thiers's constitutional theory). This is made abundantly clear in his historical analyses of patrimonialism, sultanism, feudalism, the routinization of charismatic rule, hierocracy, and the city-state. If you wish, Weber tried to find out "how systems really work." It is true that he organized his great opus *Economy and Society* around a typology of social action and of legitimacy, but both in the terminological exposition (in Part I) and in the more descriptive analyses (in the older Part II) he always dealt with *Herrschaft* in terms of both legitimacy and the typical staff arrangements of the various kinds of rulers.[2] Here lies the great difficulty of translating *Herrschaft*, which in English is usually rendered either as "authority" (Parsons) or "domination" (Bendix, Rheinstein, Shils). Patrimonial rulers, for example, endeavor to maximize their personal control. Like all rulers, they are continually engaged in a struggle with their staff over ultimate control. In this regard, traditionalist legitimacy may be a burden as well as a help for them (as both Weber and Eisenstadt have shown).[3] Such legitimation may fetter them and prevent them from mobilizing the resources needed for empire-building, a handicap that Eisenstadt has considered the fatal flaw of the "historical bureaucratic societies." Rulers, then, avail themselves of various political and administrative devices that transcend the bases of their legitimacy. Patrimonial rulers resort to "extrapatrimonial" recruitment, which may retain the fiction of patriarchal subordination but may in fact be based on a feudal-contractual, bureaucratic-contractual, or merely personal relationship.

Traditionalist Patrimonialism and Personal Rulership

Lately, some attempts, primarily in the field of African studies, have been made to remember the meaning of patrimonialism, yet by and large Weber's broad typology of *Herrschaft* has been underutilized and, in fact, reduced to the dichotomy of bureaucracy and charisma. Not only patrimonialism but also collegial government and rule by notables have been disregarded.

I wish to distinguish two kinds of patrimonialism. One is the historical survival of traditionalist patrimonial regimes; the foremost example is Ethiopia, where the researcher, if he gains access at all, can al-

[2] See Part I, chap. 3, and Part II, chaps. 10-16, of my forthcoming variorum edition of *Economy and Society* (New York 1968).

[3] See S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires: The Rise and Fall of the Historical Bureaucratic Societies* (New York 1963).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

most perform the feat of travelling into the past.[4] The second type of patrimonialism is personal rulership on the basis of loyalties that do not require any belief in the ruler's unique personal qualification, but are inextricably linked to material incentives and rewards. This second variant has been submerged in much of the literature through the indiscriminate use of the term "charismatic." As long as patrimonialism is considered to rest exclusively on traditionalist legitimation and hereditary succession, the category obviously loses applicability to the extent that these phenomena decline. Personal rulership, however, is an ineradicable component of the public and private bureaucracies of highly industrialized countries; some of the newer states lack the institutional matrix (whether pluralist or totalitarian) of these countries to such an extent that personal rulership becomes the dominant form of government. In terms of traditional political theory, some of these new states may not be states at all but merely private governments of those powerful enough to rule; however, this only enhances the applicability of the notion of personal rulership (in the sense of detraditionalized, personalized patrimonialism). Such personal governance easily evokes notions of opportunism and corruption from the perspective of charismatic or legal-rational legitimation.[5] Traditionalist as well as personal patrimonial regimes differ from charismatic rulership in that the patrimonial ruler need have neither personal charismatic appeal nor a sense of mission; they differ from legal-rational bureaucracies in that neither constitutionally regulated legislation nor advancement on the basis of training and efficiency need be predominant in public administration.

Also, personal rulership should not be mistaken for "authoritarianism," which has little to do with "authority" as such. After the First World War, the doctrine of authoritarianism was developed by right-wing nationalists, who championed the autonomy of the state apparatus as against parliament with its parties and interest groups and even as

[4] See Donald N. Levine, "Ethiopa: Identity, Authority, and Realism," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton 1965), 245-81; also Levine, *Wax and Gold: Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian Culture* (Chicago 1965). Levine's fascinating accounts disregard the literature on patrimonialism. For a detailed description of personal rulership and palace intrigues, see Richard Greenfield, *Ethiopia* (London 1965). On the much more precarious Iranian case, see Leonard Binder, *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society* (Berkeley 1962); and now also Norman Jacobs, *The Sociology of Development: Iran as an Asian Case Study* (New York 1966).

[5] For one of the latest examples, see Conor Cruise O'Brien, former member of the Irish delegation to the United Nations and vice-chancellor of the University of Ghana from 1962 to 1965, "The Counter-revolutionary Reflex," *Columbia Forum*, IX (Spring 1966), 21f.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

against the dynastic families and their loyalist supporters. Nowadays, however, the term is usually applied to the many political regimes that lie between democratic and totalitarian ones. These regimes base themselves on a limited structural pluralism, which admits of some interest-group articulation; strategies of *divide et impera* are usually more important than legitimation or ideological integration, and for that reason authoritarian regimes may be less stable and have less "authority" than democratic and totalitarian states.

Many authoritarian regimes have features of traditional and personal patrimonialism, which may be more important than charismatic appeals, the belief in legal rationality, and bureaucratic practices. Typologically, however, it would be inadvisable to equate "patrimonial" with "authoritarian." The latter term has been useful in establishing a continuum ranging from pluralist democracy to totalitarianism; the former category properly belongs to a typology of beliefs *and* organizational practices that can be found at any point of such a continuum.[6]

Personal Rulership in Industrialized Countries

In order to emphasize that personal rulership transcends the dichotomy of tradition and modernity, I shall first illustrate its continued functioning in industrialized countries, before turning to some African and Asian regimes. In the older political science literature the phenomenon has been subsumed under terms such as "machine" and "apparatus," or even "clique" and "faction"; organization analysts have rediscovered some aspects under the names "primary groups" and "informal relations," and they customarily contrast these with the formal structure of bureaucracy, which is usually and misleadingly called the Weberian model (as if Weber had not scrutinized patrimonial bu-

[6] For an excellent discussion of authoritarianism, see Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen, eds., *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems* (Helsinki 1964), 291-341. Linz argues that "Max Weber's categories can and should be used independently of the distinction between democracy, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism. Within each of these systems the legitimacy of the ruler, for the population or his staff, can be based on one or another of these types of belief. . . . While we want to stress the conceptual difference between authoritarian regimes and traditional rule, we also want to suggest that they sometimes have elements in common and that the students of such regimes could gain as many insights from Weber's analysis of patrimonial rule and bureaucracy as those of totalitarianism have gained from his thinking about charisma" (pp. 319, 321). My approach differs from Linz's suggestion in that it treats patrimonialism not only as a type of traditional belief but also as a strategy of rulership.

For another treatment of authoritarianism, which does not emphasize the issue of personal rulership, see Lewis A. Coser, "Prospects for the New Nations: Totalitarianism, Authoritarianism, or Democracy?" in Coser, ed., *Political Sociology* (New York 1966), 247-71.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reaucracies and modern higher civil servants as status groups and vested interests).

The old urban machines are a familiar example. They had, of course, some kind of traditionalist legitimation because of the immigrants' Old World ties, but they functioned primarily on the basis of personal loyalty—plebeian, not feudal—and material reward; offices were distributed by a noncharismatic and nonbureaucratic ruler, and occupying them amounted to holding a benefice. The boss might have had great power, but his legitimacy was precarious; thus he had little authority and had to envelop his "clients" in an intricate web of reciprocities.[7]

The old machines have largely disappeared, but personal rulership has not. Instead of the Irish bosses of yesteryear there is the Kennedy "clan" with its charismatic appeals to the electorate. However, the organizational power of the Kennedys has been based on an apparatus that only recently brought its patrimonial character to public attention during the Judge Morrissey affair in Boston.[8] For that matter, every American President, in order to be effective, cannot merely rely on his constitutional (legal-rational) powers, the institutionalized charismatic aura of his office, or any personal charismatic appeals to the public, but must build his own personal apparatus out of the so-called in-and-outers, who efficiently take the place of a permanent civil service of the British kind (as Richard E. Neustadt showed in his comparison of cabinet and presidential government, much of which reads like a description of personal governance).[9] Even the authority of the presidential office does not suffice to hold this apparatus together, and "authoritarian" imposition easily misfires.

The phenomenon of personal rulership is no less important in a totalitarian state than in a pluralist one. Nikita Khrushchev's fabled personal apparatus, which he took from Moscow to the Ukraine and back, served him well until defection eroded it. In the spring of 1966,

[7] In his discussion of patriarchalism and patrimonialism, Weber pointed out that traditionalist authority is not sufficient to ensure conformity with the directives of a patriarchal head; the ruler must be particularly responsive to his group as long as he does not have an efficient staff; once he has it, he must be responsive to his staff, lest he risk his power or even his position. In the language of the pattern variables, patrimonial organizations are particularist, but I shall show below that this is not necessarily so; on the other hand, Parsons himself long ago stressed the inherent instability of universalist orientation within legal-rational bureaucracy (*The Social System* [New York 1951], 268).

[8] Almost forgotten are the charges of liberal Democrats in 1960 that J. F. Kennedy "bought" the nomination of his party, meaning that he had such great financial resources that he could build an overpowering nationwide machine.

[9] "White House and Whitehall," *The Public Interest*, 1 (Winter 1966), 55-69.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his successor, Leonid I. Brezhnev, managed to enlarge to thirteen full members and seven candidates the number of Central Committee members who hailed from, or had connections with, the Ukrainian Dnepropetrovsk region, where he was born and began his career. Some of these are said to have been old friends from before World War II. At the same time, Kremlinologists identified another ascending group made up of Byelorussians and headed by Politburo member Kirill T. Mazurov, which is alleged to have made unusual gains on the Central Committee and to have taken over important positions.[10]

Far from being a vanishing phenomenon, personal rulership in public bureaucracies is apparently enlarged by the extension of government functions in industrialized countries. Both in Western Europe and in the United States, there are an increasing number of semipublic agencies and corporations in which such patrimonial relationships emerge and officials tend to become "benefice-holders." In the literature on industrial bureaucracies, this development is referred to by the wholly imprecise term of "industrial feudalism," which indicates the appropriation of managerial functions and prerogatives. Such prerogatives include the use of expense accounts, representation funds, official residences, limousines, and first-class tickets. The contractual character of the civil-service relationship may be changed because some officials cannot be dismissed *de jure* or *de facto*. Such officials may also be able to co-opt candidates and thus displace universalist criteria of formalized recruitment. However, along another universalist dimension, the hiring of highly qualified friends (from law school or graduate school days) can be very efficient. Finally, such patrimonial organizations may even be able to levy indirect taxes.

Revolutionary Legitimacy and Patrimonial Practice

It is my contention that in some of the new states patrimonial features in the detraditionalized, personalized sense are more important than bureaucratic and charismatic ones, and hence that it is too simplified a typology to contrast, for example, "the charisma of party" with "the bureaucracy of the military."[11] Neglect of the patrimonial dimension of government has also led to a tendency to interpret all political leadership as charismatic. Both analytical trends usually ignore Weber's point that bureaucracy and charisma are not necessarily exclusive of each

[10] See Harry Schwartz, "Brezhnev Favors Old Colleagues," *New York Times*, July 15, 1966.

[11] See Irving Louis Horowitz, *Three Worlds of Development* (New York 1966), 263.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other and that, in fact, bureaucracies can be superior instruments for charismatic leaders.[12] Moreover, the treatment of almost all political leaders in the new states as "charismatic" has been misleading on at least two counts: it has obscured the difference between "charismatic authority" and "charismatic leadership,"[13] and it has taken at face value the international propaganda claims of some of the new leaders. Most heads of government in the new states do not have the magic of personal charisma for many groups in the society, nor do they have the kind of impersonal, institutional charisma that Edward Shils has stressed as a basic requirement for organizational stability.[14] The political situation in many African and Asian countries is so fluid exactly because leadership is merely personal and lacking in both charismatic qualities, that is, personal as well as office charisma.

For an outside observer it is very hard to gauge to what extent the international charismatic imagery of men like Nkrumah, Sukarno, Ben Bella, and Nasser has had substance for the various strata in their countries. At any rate, the sudden downfall of such men or slow attrition of their leadership shows that they lose power in the same way in which patrimonial rulers have often lost it: by a palace coup, especially by intervention of the army.[15] For reasons of legitimation some of them may be retained as figureheads; this is perhaps a good measure of charismatic efficacy, although in the case of Sukarno in 1966 the military's calculated "neutralization" of the head of state may have been as important a motive for his retention as his charismatic halo in the eyes of millions of Indonesians. At any rate, the successors of these charismatic leaders tend to have a more pragmatic bent—another patrimonial feature.

Much has been written about armies in underdeveloped countries as a major, and sometimes the only, modern bureaucracy and force for modernization. They certainly are hierarchical organizations, and some of them indeed approach the bureaucratic realities of a Western army,

[12] Weber's example was Gladstone and Chamberlain's Liberal party machine, to which he gave much attention. See Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber* (New York 1958), 106; on the relation of Weber's position to Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy," see Guenther Roth, *The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany* (Totowa 1963), 255f.

[13] The distinction between charismatic authority and leadership is embedded in Weber's work, but was made explicit in Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber* (New York 1960), 301, and was elaborated independently in Robert Bierstedt, "The Problem of Authority," in Morroe Berger and others, eds., *Freedom and Control in Modern Society* (New York 1954), 71f.

[14] "Charisma, Order, and Status," *American Sociological Review*, xxx (April 1965), 199-213.

[15] For the first major study of Nkrumah's downfall, see Henry L. Bretton, *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah: A Study of Personal Rule in Africa* (New York 1966).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but most of them have personal patrimonial traits that facilitate the takeover of government; that is, the troops are more loyal to their immediate commanders than to the governmental leaders. Significantly, some of the more stable countries (Morocco, Iran, Ethiopia, Thailand) still have armies in which the belief in traditionalist legitimacy is alive. However, such legitimation has never been sufficient insurance against the overthrow of the ruler, partly because of the administrative strategies of patrimonial regimes. One such strategy has been the creation of a military force that differed in social, ethnic, or tribal composition from the population, so that the social distance between apparatus and subjects would be maximized. However, this strategy could easily put the ruler at the mercy of his troops. (Weber took his major historical examples for this double-edged role from the Near Eastern armies, particularly the Mamelukes and Janissaries.)[16]

There seems to be a parallel here to the dilemma of present-day nationalist leaders, who want to have a "national" army free from regional and tribal ties. The course of events has proved that they can quickly lose control over their own instrument, either because regional or tribal elements in the army resist or because a "nationalized" army becomes the only nationally effective force in an otherwise fragmented state. In the Near East as well as in Africa the pattern of military takeover that was typical of traditional regimes is repeating itself. Some sub-Sahara kingdoms, for example, used to be unstable because army units tended to be more loyal to their immediate commanders (princes or other members of the ruling families) than to the king. In some of these areas political instability is part of the precolonial tradition, not just a phenomenon of transition and modernization.

It should be clearly understood that such patrimonial loyalties are compatible with universalist components. Among the Bantu, where interregnum wars and princely usurpations were frequent, patrons selected their clients among commoners according to administrative and military ability. Conversely, under British control the modern Bantu bureaucracy, which had been modeled after the British civil service, at times had to be "corrupt" (i.e., particularist) in order to reconcile conflicting values.[17]

Once in power, army leaders tend to become personal rulers: we can think of the extremely precarious position of the South Vietnamese

[16] *Economy and Society*, Part II, chap. 12: 5.

[17] See Lloyd Fallers, *Bantu Bureaucracy* (Chicago 1965, first published 1956), 241f., 248f. In spite of his recognition of universalist elements in traditional relationships, Fallers continues to think in terms of the dichotomy of bureaucracy and charisma (p. 250).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

corps commanders ("Baby Turks"), with their practices of appointment by loyalty and taxation by discretion, or of their much more entrenched neighbors in Thailand.[18] Several years ago Edgar L. Shor considered Thailand an unusual case, but actually the overall pattern he pictured has frequently been repeated. Shor perceived a transitional corruption of the civil service model, which had been borrowed from England in the 1880's, a corruption that would eventually be overcome. Like many others, his standard was the "classic Weberian model"; however, his description of the "aberrations" in the administrative realities of Thailand amounted to what I mean here by "personal governance":

> Deprived of the traditional deference accorded the morally legitimized monarchy, governments have relied upon the disposition of offices and shared material rewards to obtain the support of key leaders. . . . In the Thai bureaucracy, patterns of authority relationship are habitually hierarchical, predominantly personal, and inherently unstable. . . . The personal clique, based on a feudal-like system of personal obligation, provides the principal focus of bureaucratic loyalty and identification. Bonds of reciprocal obligation, reminiscent of earlier patron-client structures in the traditional social system, informally align a number of dependent subordinates with individual political and administrative leaders in more or less cohesive informal structures. In contrast to primary group ties in some other Asian countries, the clique groupings in Thailand are substantially independent of family or kinship relations. . . . Since the clique generally consists of a ranking superior and his subordinates within the organization, it usually coincides with the legal structures. . . . The dependence of careers on political and personal favor apparently dictates an entrepreneurial career strategy for the ambitious.[19]

The importance of personal loyalties and of material rewards does not exclude a peculiar mixture of reform-mindedness and "corruption" in such regimes. In his vivid description of the Young Turks' patrimonialism—which he never called by this name—Dankwart Rustow pointed to the "uninterrupted chain that links the Kemalists to the Young Turks, to the men of the Tanzimat, and to the classical Ottoman Empire—the sponsors of modernity in the twentieth century with the

[18] See Denis Warner's account of the practices of the South Vietnamese commanders in *The Reporter* (May 5, 1966), 11f.

[19] "The Thai Bureaucracy," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* v (June 1960), 70, 77, 80. See also Fred W. Riggs, *Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity* (Honolulu 1966).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

founders of tradition in the thirteenth." If the Ottoman Empire was "in essence a military camp and an educational institution," it is still true that "the sentiments persist among younger military officers that only an authoritarian regime under military aegis can accomplish the necessary tasks of social, cultural, and economic reform."[20] Rustow's portrayal of Turkish bureaucracy reveals a patrimonial administration that has not changed much since the Ottoman Empire adopted a formal French pattern; then as now there exists what is imprecisely known as "corruption": "connections" count, favoritism prevails, and for the few there is abundant profit in real-estate dealings. Corruption in the conventional sense varies with the strength of puritanical sentiment among reformist or revolutionary functionaries—office-holders or aspirants. However, reforms do not seem to change the largely personal character of loyalty patterns.

In sum, nowadays the nationalist leaders of the new states claim revolutionary legitimacy. Most of them embrace some variation of national socialism, which in the 1930's often came close to Nazism and Japanese fascism and later moved toward communism. Frequently, the same men have made the switch without drastically changing their outlook, whether they were Indonesian or Arab nationalists. Behind the ideological veneer lie goals and means that are closer to native traditions of government than tends to be apparent to the leaders themselves and to many an outside observer. Europeanization, Americanization, Westernization, and simply modernization—there is no similarly accepted term for the influence of Russian or Chinese communism—provide so many influential ideological and institutional models, but are not necessarily dominant in administrative practice.

Personal Rulership and Empire-Building

One of the major reasons for the predominance of personal rulership over legal-rational legislation and administration in the new states seems to lie in a social, cultural, and political heterogeneity of such magnitude that a more or less viable complementary and countervailing pluralism of the Western type, with its strong but not exclusive components of universality, does not appear feasible. Even the total victory of a totalitarian minority merely leads to a highly centralized variant of personal governance under which the ruler has maximum discretion (what Weber called "sultanism"). The foremost task of these states is the political integration of greatly disparate elements—ethnic, tribal, religious, linguistic, or even economic. Structurally, much of what is today called

[20] "Turkey: The Modernity of Tradition," in Pye and Verba, 172f., 187.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nation-building should perhaps be called, more precisely, empire-building, if the political connotations of the term do not make it too difficult to use it in a strictly sociological, value-neutral sense. The problem of empire is the problem of establishing political order in the face of social and cultural heterogeneity. By contrast, nation-building finds its historical matrix in the European nation-state, which aimed at the integration of a population with a common culture, especially a common language and common historical legacies shared by various strata. It is no accident that pluralist democracy has been successful, on a larger scale, only in fairly homogeneous countries.[21]

An empire in the sense meant here was the Austro-Hungarian Double Monarchy, which introduced parliamentary government only for each of its halves and not for the whole realm. Even Imperial Germany faced a substantial problem of integrating diverse cultural and political elements, but because of compensating homogeneous forces this task was ideologically perceived as that of building a nation.[22]

The problem of empire is not one of bigness as such, and the absolute number of people is not decisive. China is commonly called an empire by virtue of a combination of sheer size, historical longevity, military power, and expansionist ideology, but smaller African countries, for instance, face "empire problems" similar to those of India and Indonesia, because they have more tribal fragmentation on a smaller geographical scale and perhaps because they have a smaller "critical mass" of elites. In fact, Weber used his model of patrimonialism for African petty kingdoms as well as for the great empires of history.[23]

[21] The term "state-building" can perhaps substitute for "empire-building," but it does not imply equally well the integration of disparate elements. In Weber's terminology, which is applied here, the state is defined as a group that asserts an effective monopoly of legitimate force over a given territory; this definition does not specify the cultural and social aspects of the problem of political integration. The United States and the Soviet Union, which face tasks of international integration, can be called great or global empires (*Weltreiche*); expansionist states may be called "imperialist" in the conventional sense.

[22] It should not be forgotten, however, that Imperial Germany remained a federation of states under the hegemony of Prussian constitutional monarchism (or monarchic constitutionalism), which combined dominant features of traditionalist patrimonialism with subordinate legal-rational (constitutional and bureaucratic) arrangements.

[23] Weber and Eisenstadt have been almost alone among sociologists in giving systematic attention to the phenomenon of empire. Weber dealt with it throughout his career: in his book *Roman Agrarian History and Its Importance for Public and Civil Law* (1891), in his essay "The Social Causes of the Decline of Ancient Civilization" (1896), in his book *The Agrarian Conditions of Antiquity* (1909), in the major body of *Economy and Society* (1911-1913), and in the collected *Essays in the Sociology of Religion*. Eisenstadt applied structural functionalism to the great "patrimonial-bureaucratic" empires, as Weber called them. Both writers have been particularly concerned with the reasons for the empires' ultimate failure, the causes of stagnation and disintegration.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Despite technological progress—in particular, vastly increased communication facilities—many of the problems that troubled the patrimonial states of the past persist or recur. The agonies of Indonesia provide a stark example: Sukarno adhered to a rhetoric of the nation-state and of racial unity that simply denied the facts of an exceedingly complex pluralism and particularism. In a well-focused community study of social change and economic modernization in Indonesia, Clifford Geertz recognized several years ago what I call the problem of empire and stated it succinctly: "The ideologies of modern nationalism, arising as they do out of intense concern with massive social reconstruction, show a strong tendency toward a neglect, even an outright denial, of important variations in domestic cultural patterns and of internal social discontinuities. . . . With regard to national economic planning this leads to a failure to cast proposals in a form which attempts to take maximum advantage of the peculiarities of various local traditions, to an unwillingness even to consider differentiated plans for different cultural and social groups. . . . In the over-concern with national integration, conceived in a wholly monistic sense, the very construction of such integration . . . may be undermined."[24]

Personal rulerships can be more responsive to cultural and social diversity than intensely ideological leaders are willing to be. But this does not imply that such regimes are much more likely to solve the "problem of empire" in the direction of faster economic growth and modernization. A country's diversity may amount to an inflexible pluralism that is not amenable to integration through the compromise strategies of personal rulers. Moreover, radical intellectuals deny legitimacy to ideologically uninspiring forms of personal rulership and in the long run can undermine them in both domestic and international politics. Since such intellectuals have taken over from traditional ones the role of legitimizers, personal rulerships are likely to have precarious legitimacy, and this is one reason for the pattern of frequent coups and countercoups. If self-proclaimed charismatic leadership with its ideological preoccupations fails to achieve the necessary amount of economic growth, personal rulership may fail to sustain political stability despite its pragmatic tendencies, and hence may also retard economic growth. This vicious circle may make it impossible for many of the new states to solve urgent problems of modernization, not to speak of catch-

[24] *Peddlers and Princes* (Chicago 1963), 155f. For an informative analysis of neotraditionalism in Indonesia, see Ann Ruth Willner, *The Neotraditional Accommodation to Political Independence: The Case of Indonesia*, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 26 (Princeton 1966).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing up with the highly industrialized countries in the foreseeable future.

This skeptical conclusion is intentionally set in opposition to the predictions of those who, like Clark Kerr, envisage "the age of total industrialization" and anticipate that "by the middle of the twenty-first century, industrialization will have swept away most pre-industrial forms of society, except possibly a few odd backwaters."[25] It is equally possible to foresee a century in which the past will repeat itself and issues of personal rulership and empire-building will persist.

[25] Clark Kerr and others, *Industrialism and Industrial Man* (New York 1964), 3, 221.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HANS MORGENTHAU AND THE WORLD STATE

By JAMES P. SPEER II

HANS Morgenthau's political realism has led him to the conclusion that there can be no permanent peace without a world state. But, he says, there can be no world government until there is world community, and a sense of world community cannot form unless national decision-makers resolve or ameliorate world tensions through a return to a wise diplomacy.

Morgenthau's entire treatment of world politics thus centers upon the requirements for the world state; hence, it is curious indeed that scholars who have felt the need to respond to Morgenthau's thought have usually dealt with the periphery rather than with the main purport of that thought. It is almost as though a doctrine of power realism can be permitted to lead anywhere except to a conclusion that, by common and perhaps *a priori* judgment, seems the most extreme example of normative macrotheory, namely, to the world state.

It is the purpose of this article to help mend this rather considerable gap in the consideration of Morgenthau's influence upon the scholarly enterprise. As will appear, I disagree with Professor Morgenthau quite as much as I agree, and the disagreements will, if validly argued, call into question methodological assumptions and theoretical anomalies and inadequacies that are widespread today rather than peculiar to Morgenthau.

Already mature when he began to make an impression on the American scene, Morgenthau edited the proceedings of a symposium held in July 1945 on "The United Nations and the Organization of Peace and Security"; he announced in the Preface his war upon the old formal-legalism, saying that during the interwar period most scholars and practitioners of international affairs had "approached the legal and political problems in the same spirit in which the legal practitioner would approach a private contract or a piece of domestic legislation," leading "of necessity to an optimistic approach to the problems of international politics; for, since it takes the stipulations of rights and duties contained in international legal documents at their face value, it cannot fail to attribute maximum efficacy to them and, conversely, to minimize the importance of autonomous political factors."[1]

[1] *Peace, Security, and the United Nations* (Chicago 1946), 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus Morgenthau, himself a lawyer, said in effect that a legalistic approach to international relations leads to idealism, whereas a political approach induces realism. He was, of course, to become in the post-war period the principal spokesman for the latter school of thought (usually described, in terms of its key concept, as the "power" school), even though E. H. Carr and Frederick L. Schuman had led the scholarly inquiry away from optimistic formal-legal assumptions long before Morgenthau wrote his Preface. Indeed, the Covenant of the League had become moribund, along with the constitution of the Weimar Republic, some fifteen years earlier.

The first edition of Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations*, published in 1947, was written for the "polemic purpose" of launching a frontal attack upon the "false and pernicious" apolitical approach to foreign policy, according to the Preface to the second edition, published in 1954.[2] The first edition "emphasized the obsolescence of the sovereign national state" and warned against the "illusory hopes" for the United Nations, while the second edition takes note of "the attempts to create novel supranational institutions," such as the European Coal and Steel Community and NATO, as well as of "the actual accomplishments of the United Nations, accomplishments which in the political sphere are fundamentally different from those the United Nations was intended and expected to achieve."[3] Morgenthau refers here to the role of the UN, especially under the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950, in organizing the Western bloc against the Soviet bloc, while continuing to provide an arena for diplomatic negotiations between East and West.

In a new first chapter in the second edition, Morgenthau introduces a theory of international politics, in which his realism replaces idealism's assumption of harmony with an assumption of conflict; its view of human nature as good, rational, and susceptible of improvement with a darker view; and its emphasis upon social institutions built upon abstract principle with a dependence upon pluralistic countervailing power as seen in actual historical processes. He describes six tenets of political realism, including an emphasis upon morality and the possibility of peaceful adjustment—an emphasis he may have thought lacking in a first edition that perhaps lent itself too readily to the cold-war psychology.

While saying that politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature, Morgenthau does not here provide a theory of human nature itself out of which "political man"—whom he some-

[2] P. vii.
[3] *Ibid.*, viii.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

how sees as acting in international politics in the same way he acts in the intranational struggle for power—derives his characteristics. But in another book, written in 1946, he decries the reliance upon scientific rationalism for the solution of social problems, saying that such reliance "actually contributed to the decadence of the art of politics" and that "our age was destined to experience a decisive change in the proportional part which reason, on the one hand, and interests and emotions, on the other, have in determining social action."[4] Thus Morgenthau's political man acts upon the basis of "interest defined in terms of power" because the wellsprings of man's activity reside rather more in his essentially irrational emotions and his short-term self-interest than in his reason. Morgenthau elaborates this theory of human nature in a later writing.

But the central thrust of *Politics Among Nations* is indicated in these words: "While at all times the promotion of the national interests of the United States as a power among powers has been the main concern of American foreign policy, in an age that has seen two world wars and has learned how to wage total war the preservation of peace has become the prime concern of all nations. It yields in importance only to the most elemental considerations of national defense and security."[5] It must be noted in passing that Morgenthau here seems to permit the subordination of peace to "national defense and security" and thus to endorse that preoccupation of students and practitioners of international power realism with the day-to-day emergencies of the situation which not only rules out thought of what ought to be, but actually carries with it the unconscious assumption of no change in the international system,[6] despite the fact that the press of technology upon today's truncated balance-of-power system produces such disequilibria as to seem to ensure that some new system is to emerge.

Nevertheless, it is largely with a view to the conditions and requirements of international peace that Morgenthau proceeds to elaborate and to apply his concepts in the *Politics*, noting that the wars and economic crises of the twentieth century have wrought nationalistic fervor into a "secular religion" ready to fight wars as "crusades" to bring the "true political religion" to the rest of the world. Morgenthau's commitment to peace is underlined by his warning that if the trend toward "ever increasing instability in domestic and international affairs is not

[4] *Scientific Man and Power Politics* (Chicago 1946), 217.
[5] P. 20.
[6] See Stanley H. Hoffmann's "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory," *World Politics*, XI (April 1959), 349-54, for a criticism of Morgenthau on this point.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reversed, the United States is likely to partake to a growing extent in those tendencies in modern culture which have found their most extreme manifestations in Soviet Russia and National Socialist Germany, tendencies that make for an ever more complete and intensive identification of the individual with the nation."[7]

As limitations upon national power which might be expected to make for peace, Morgenthau lists and discusses (1) the traditional balance-of-power system,[8] which is the international equivalent of the pluralistic struggle for power which "political man" carries on within national societies, but which is inadequate to keep the peace because nations seek a superiority rather than an equilibrium of power and because the old European moral consensus no longer prevails; (2) international morality and world public opinion, which are ineffective because of that lack of moral consensus and because, as Reinhold Niebuhr would point out, morality is an attribute of individuals which nations rarely display, especially in times of stress; and (3) international law, which is unenforceable precisely in those important instances when the relative power of nations is at stake, and collective security, which, whether in the League or the UN version, has left major powers free to comply or not to comply with its requirements.

Thus, national power remains the naked reality of international politics, and it is subject to little effective limitation except that which the nature of modern weaponry may impose upon national decision-makers.

At this point, Morgenthau's theory of sovereignty must be introduced, for it is important to his conclusions regarding federalism and the world state. Sovereignty, he asserts, is "the supreme legal authority of the state to give and enforce the law within a certain territory," and, consequently, it means "independence from the authority of any other state."[9] Moreover, since sovereignty means supreme authority, it follows that sovereignty is indivisible. Thus, in federal states, "political practice develops a whole system of constitutional flatteries which bestows upon the officials and symbols of the individual states the honors due the officials and symbols of sovereign states." It is "constitutionally and politically impossible to deny that the federal government is sovereign," but it is "psychologically impossible to admit that the individual states

[7] *Politics Among Nations*, 100. This is Morgenthau's version of what would seem to be one of the laws of politics, namely, that in times of stress the political Center gives way to the extremes of Right and Left.

[8] Morgenthau's views on the balance of power have been commented upon by John Herz, Inis Claude, and many others. Probably only his catchphrase "the national interest defined in terms of power" has received as much attention.

[9] *Politics Among Nations*, 293.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are no longer sovereign"; therefore "constitutional theory simply divides sovereignty between the federal government and the states, thus trying to reconcile political realities with political preferences."[10] Thus, to Morgenthau as to Rousseau, it is a logical absurdity to hold that sovereignty is divisible; and federalism is to Morgenthau a quaint fraud. "Far from expressing a theoretical truth or reflecting the actuality of political experience," he says with reference to a proposal for an international police force, "the advice to give up 'a part of national sovereignty' for the sake of the preservation of peace is tantamount to the advice to close one's eyes and dream that one can eat one's cake and have it, too."[11]

Looking further into the possibility of world peace, Morgenthau notes that there has been a feeling for the moral unity of mankind since the Stoics, as well as an "increase in the humaneness and civilized character of human relations which the last centuries have witnessed in the Western world."[12] This has issued in the quest for disarmament, which, however, is based on the erroneous assumption that men fight because they have arms, whereas the truth is, "Take away their arms, and they will either fight with their bare fists or get themselves new arms with which to fight."[13]

As for the alternative to the use of violence to bring about social change, Morgenthau gives the requirements for peaceful change in the following significant passage: "The vital function of peaceful change within the state is performed not by any particular agency acting in isolation but by domestic society as an integrated whole. The moral consensus of society, supported by the authority and material power of the government, will avail itself of all social and political agencies to bring about a state of affairs in conformity with its conception of justice."[14] Three attempts to provide for peaceful change in interstate relations have failed, he says, presumably because they lacked all the qualities he has just stipulated. These three efforts at "international government," as he calls it, have been the Holy Alliance, the League of Nations, and the United Nations (the Security Council of the UN being the modern "Holy Alliance"). The new UN is a "child of the Cold War, intended to wage rather than terminate it," the old UN having been rent asunder by the East-West conflict, even as the League was ruined by the conflict between Britain and France, and the Holy Alliance by the Anglo-Russian conflict.

Morgenthau thus clears the way, in his search for the prevention of war, for a consideration of the "world state." Writing during the earlier

[10] *Ibid.*, 306. [11] *Ibid.*, 308. [12] *Ibid.*, 366. [13] *Ibid.*, 384. [14] *Ibid.*, 414.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

postwar period, he says that propaganda for a world state reached broad masses of the people who were told that "what is needed in order to save the world from self-destruction is not the limitation of the exercise of national sovereignty through international obligations and institutions, but the transference of the sovereignties of individual states to a world authority, which would be as sovereign over the individual nations as the individual nations are sovereign within their respective territories";[15] that because "reforms within the international society have failed and were bound to fail," there must be a "radical transformation of the existing international society of sovereign nations into a supranational community of individuals." But, says Morgenthau, since "the argument rests upon an analogy with national societies," the first task is "to find out how peace and order are preserved in national societies."[16]

To Morgenthau, the argument for world government thus rests upon a rather thorough parallelism between the world state and the nation-state. Then, in an elaboration of the mind-set that underlies his notion of how peaceful change is brought about, which we have already noted, he writes these passages, which must be given in full if we are to understand how his theories of society and of polity serve to control his conclusions concerning world government:

> The state is indispensable for the maintenance of domestic peace. Such is the true message of Hobbes's philosophy. Yet the state by itself cannot maintain domestic peace. Such is the great omission of Hobbes's philosophy. That the power of the state is essential, but not sufficient, to keep the peace of national societies is demonstrated by the historic experience of civil wars. . . .
>
> The reason is to be sought in the nature of the state itself. *The state is not a thing apart from society, but is a product of society. The state is not the artificial creation of a constitutional convention, conceived in the image of some abstract principles of government and superimposed upon whatever society there might exist. On the contrary, the state is part of the society from which it has sprung, and prospers and decays as society prospers and decays.*
>
> The peace of a society whose intergroup conflicts are no longer limited, restrained, and neutralized by overriding loyalties, whose

[15] Be it noted that a "government over governments," as Madison pointed out in Federalist No. 20, would be very different from the "supranational community of individuals" to which Morgenthau shortly adverts—a further evidence of his weakness in the theory of federalism.

[16] *Politics Among Nations*, 469-70.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> processes of social change no longer sustain the expectation of justice in all the major groups, and whose unorganized forces of compulsion are no longer sufficient to impose conformity upon those groups—the peace of such a society cannot be saved by the state, however strong. The forces of destruction arising within society in the form of class, racial, religious, regional, or purely political struggles will erupt in revolution, coups d'etat, and civil wars.[17]

Morgenthau's view that the state is the product of society rather than of constitutional contrivance is essentially that of continental sociology. The second paragraph just quoted is pregnant with Hegelian and Spenglerian societal determinism and is as consonant with German Romantic Nationalism as it is opposed to the cooler-headed definitions of community—and estimates of its relation to government—found, for example, in MacIver and some of the more recent Anglo-American sociologists.

Government, to Morgenthau, is an outline either formed by, or drawn to conform to, the peculiarities of the sociological morphology. Justice is not seen as a series of functions, some of which are separable from others, as in a federal structure. Most particularly, the function of order is not seen as separable from the functions of justice more specifically construed. Instead, all these functions are seen as being performed not primarily by government, as an overarching framework encompassing society, but somewhere within the body of a society whose moral consensus permits intergroup conflicts but contains and reconciles them. Nevertheless, in contrast to the more extreme exponents of organic social theory or of intergroup bargaining theory, Morgenthau views government as itself indispensable for world peace: "There can be no permanent international peace without a state coextensive with the confines of the political world. The question to which we now must direct our attention concerns the manner in which a world state can be created."[18]

Morgenthau then asks whether the peoples of the world are willing to accept world government, erecting no insurmountable obstacle to its

[17] *Ibid.*, 476-77, italics added. Not only Morgenthau but Inis Claude and Frederick Hartmann, who are among the few scholars who have bothered to comment on world government in recent years, have made much of the risk of civil war in connection with schemes for supranational integration. The American Civil War has been cited as a prime case, as though it invalidated the American experiment rather than recording an important step in its constitutional development. Indeed, a more apposite example of the ultimate power of governmental coercion to unify where the organic factors divide could hardly be imagined.

[18] *Ibid.*, 477.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

establishment and doing what is necessary to keep it standing,[19] and he derives negative answers from what he has already written concerning nationalism's strength and the corresponding weakness of international morality and world public opinion. "No society exists coextensive with the presumed range of a world state. . . . The most extensive society in which most men live and act in our times is the national society."[20]

In order to maintain world peace, he asserts, a world state would have to (1) give the unity of mankind a legal personality, (2) create and keep in motion agencies for worldwide social change, and (3) establish enforcement agencies to meet any threat to the peace with overwhelming strength. But, Morgenthau says, drawing upon the results of a poll of American public opinion in 1947,[21] although people might support task (1), they would not give up control over, for example, trade and immigration, as required by task (2), nor would they accept, in the pinch, the performance of function (3). There is, he writes, no shirking the conclusion that "a world state cannot be established under the present moral, social, and political conditions of the world."[22]

Morgenthau goes on to reject the Swiss and American federalisms as solutions to the dilemma of how to establish a world state, saying that the former is the product of peculiar and unique circumstances while "the United States was founded upon a moral and political community the Constitution did not create but found already in existence."[23]

Morgenthau then describes the efforts of UNESCO and the functional agencies affiliated with the UN to create world community, pointing out that cultural unity—as in ancient Greece and in medieval and modern Europe—has been no guarantor of peace. He stipulates that the problem of world community is not an intellectual and aesthetic one but a moral and political one and that the work of the functional

[19] This is the triple test, to determine whether a new form of government will work, put by J. S. Mill in his *On Representative Government.* Mill discusses the mechanical versus the organic view of the state, and it may be doubted whether he would have accepted Morgenthau's negative answers to the test. Mill required a simple answer to his three questions, not a finding that a full-blown society exists.

[20] *Politics Among Nations*, 477.

[21] Students may wish to refer to *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Volumes 10, 13, 15, 17, and 25, for the results of polls that throw some light on public attitudes toward world government in the United States and other Western nations; also to William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, *How Nations See Each Other* (Urbana 1953); and to the Minnesota Poll, *Minneapolis Sunday Tribune*, June 9, 1963. The evidence is that somewhere between a large minority and a substantial majority, depending upon how the questions are phrased and upon the images associated with the poll, favors a world government strong enough to keep the peace.

[22] *Politics Among Nations*, 481.

[23] *Ibid.*, 485.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agencies touches upon the lives of people too remotely to build a loyalty that transcends identification with the nation.[24]

Thus Morgenthau works his way to his conclusion concerning the world community that must precede the world state: "We find that the creation of an international community presupposes at least the mitigation and minimization of international conflicts so that the interests uniting members of different nations may outweigh the interests separating them. How can international conflicts be mitigated and minimized? This is the final question which calls for examination."[25] With this indication of the degree of world community that must preexist the establishment of the world state—the interests that unite must outweigh the interests that separate—Morgenthau goes on to find the way to world community in "the mitigation and minimization of international conflicts" through the revival of a diplomacy of compromise.

Morgenthau's plea for the restoration of diplomacy to the eminence of its high days in old Europe, when its coolness of head and its clarity of sight prevailed over a public opinion not yet made unruly by mass ideologies, is too well known to require a recounting here of his four rules of attitude and his five conditions of a diplomacy of compromise. What may not be so well remembered, however, is the caveat that "diplomacy is the best means of preserving peace which a society of sovereign nations has to offer, but, especially under the conditions of modern world politics and of modern war, it is not good enough. It is only when nations have surrendered to a higher authority the means of destruction which modern technology has put in their hands—when they have given up their sovereignty—that international peace can be made as secure as domestic peace."[26]

Nevertheless, it is in the hands of diplomacy that Morgenthau feels obliged to leave the problem of peace and war, because "as there can be no permanent peace without a world state, there can be no world state without the peace-preserving and community-building processes of diplomacy. For the world state to be more than a dim vision, the accommodating processes of diplomacy, mitigating and minimizing conflicts, must be revived."[27]

Leaving *Politics Among Nations*, as revised in 1954, and turning to Morgenthau's other works, we may note in passing his extolling of the "moral dignity of the national interest" in his *In Defense of the Na-*

[24] Ernst Haas's *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford 1964) reaches conclusions that tend to confirm this estimate of the functional approach to peace.
[25] *Politics Among Nations*, 502.
[26] *Ibid.*, 534.
[27] *Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional Interest, published in 1951, which is a continuation of his rather lonely crusade for a revival of diplomacy. Then, in *Dilemmas of Politics*, a collection of old essays "brought up to date and partly rewritten" for publication in 1958, there is an indictment of "Wilsonian Utopianism" and of world-government advocacy, which is curious inasmuch as Wilsonianism allegedly denies the reality of power in politics[28] while world government accepts and seeks to employ that reality. There is also the assertion that world government cannot do very much about the "lust for power," the struggle for power, and the "mastery of one man over the other," as if world government must reconcile the whole power complex in human psychology, and then this highly important statement:

> World government as such cannot resolve, for instance, the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States by peaceful means. Regardless of constitutional changes on the international scene, this problem will continue to exist as it exists today, and, hence, the question of war or peace will continue to demand an answer. The answer to this question, under present world conditions, does not lie in world government but in facing squarely concrete problems which, if they are not solved peacefully, could lead to war—concrete problems such as American security as against Russian security, the unification of Germany, peace in the Middle East.[29]

This baffling passage-at-words is difficult to unravel, but the effort must be made because we are getting close, here, to the essence of Morgenthau's theoretical confusion. Unfortunately, there are several elements in this essence, and we shall have to get at them one at a time. Let us note that Morgenthau has suddenly abandoned the rationality that informed most of his discussion in *Politics Among Nations* of the world state, world community, and the return to diplomacy. Of a sudden, world government, which was claimed to be the means to lasting peace, has very little at all to do with the power struggle; it does not even touch upon the problem of American security as against Russian security. Moreover, this problem is termed a "concrete" problem, as though substantive national interests other than the mere drive for security were involved, and—to compound the confusion—there are commingled with this problem two others in which substantive German

[28] Inis L. Claude, Jr., in his *Swords Into Plowshares* (New York 1964), argues that Wilson was realistic about power but not about the policy unanimity required by the collective-security principle.

[29] P. 243.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Arab-Israeli interests could be said to be involved, as well as the security interests of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The suspicion arises, which scholars have long since noted, that Morgenthau has no clear conception of the components of the national interest, even in his own thought, and that this explains why he has come up with the immensely popular and essentially meaningless phrase "the national interest defined in terms of power."

However, an explanation may be provided by Morgenthau's theory of human nature, which is stated rather fully in his article for *Commentary* in 1962:

> Power tries to break down the barrier of individuality which love, because it is love, must leave intact. Yet in the measure that power tries to do the work love cannot do, it puts love in jeopardy. An irreducible element of power is requisite to make a stable relationship of love, which without it would be nothing more than a succession of precarious exaltations. Thus without power love cannot persist; but through power it is corrupted and threatened with destruction. . . .
>
> Thus the lust for power is, as it were, the twin of despairing love. Power becomes a substitute for love. What man cannot achieve for any length of time through love he tries to achieve through power: to fulfill himself, to make himself whole by overcoming his loneliness, his isolation. . . .
>
> The master of all men is also the loneliest of all men. . . . Thus the Genghis Khans, Hitlers, and Stalins lash out with unreasoning fury at their subjects whom they can dominate but whose love they cannot command and, hence, whom they cannot afford to love.[30]

And thus we see the origin, the philosophical wellspring, of Morgenthau's emphasis upon power. Let us be clear: this lust for power applies, in Morgenthau's thought, equally to relations among individuals, relations among groups within a national society, and relations among nation-states at the world level. Given this manic thrust of power throughout his thought, it is small wonder that his followers remember about power but forget, to his regret, his occasional admonitions to morality: "The moral corruption of power blinds nations to the distinc-

[30] From Morgenthau's essay entitled "Love and Power," republished in his *The Rediscovery of Politics* (Chicago 1962), 10-13. Morgenthau's full acceptance of the tragic view of the human venture, together with the cultural pessimism typical of pre-World War I German philosophy, is evidenced also in his *Scientific Man and Power Politics* (cited above, n. 4), especially in the final chapter.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion between truth and error. Dazzled by the pride of power, they take truth for error, and vice versa, and make ready with unsuspecting confidence to jump into the abyss as if it were the consummation of their dreams."[31]

So, when Morgenthau says that the national interest is defined in terms of power, he means simply, perhaps, that human nature defines it that way: the national interest can have no intellectual or rational content; it is indeed essentially meaningless and mindless, for it is the expression at the international level of the lust for power that is the dynamic of the intergroup struggle within the nation, as well as of the individual's struggle in his interpersonal relationships.

Thus Morgenthau's theory of international politics is ex-Adler, ex-Nietzsche, ex-Schopenhauer, ex nihilo. It is nineteenth-century continental pessimistic irrationalism raised to the international level to explain twentieth-century world politics.

I believe he is subtly yet profoundly wrong in his identification of the true dynamic in international politics today, as will be made clear shortly. I think also that he does violence to his own theory of politics as the lust for power when he prescribes world community and a revival of diplomacy as prerequisites of world government. It is the incongruence between his theory of society and his theory of politics that has led him into a hopeless theoretical cul-de-sac. First, however, we must consider some late developments in Morgenthau's intellectual enterprise.

To him, society is organism, not artifact, and the barriers to the growth of the phyla of world community must be removed by diplomacy in order that the organism may develop. Yet Morgenthau appears less content with the organismic assumptions of German Romantic Nationalism as time goes on. In an article written for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* in 1961 he speaks of "the unity of mankind underlying the inevitable fragmentation of international relations. However inarticulate and submerged, this awareness has never completely disappeared even in the heyday of nationalism, and it has been sharpened by the threat of nuclear destruction facing all mankind. These solutions [the UN and the world state] are also supported by the longing to give that unity a viable political form. . . . This longing, in times past mainly a spiritual or humanitarian impulse, in the nuclear age has been greatly strengthened by the desire, innate in all men, for self-preservation."[32]

[31] *The Decline of Democratic Politics* (Chicago 1962), 326.

[32] Reprinted in Morgenthau's *The Restoration of American Politics* (Chicago 1962), 174-75.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Granted that this article was written for a possibly less sophisticated audience than that to which Morgenthau usually addresses himself, it nevertheless strikes a new note in leaving open the inference that the world state might be artificed upon the twin bases that (1) the most significant function of the world state would be the control of the weapons of mass destruction, thus implying a federal arrangement in which the world government would have severely limited authority, and that (2) the sense of self-preservation may serve to activate the latent sense of a common humanity to the extent that a world community of a sort adequate to support a limited world government may be said to exist, without prejudice to the leaving of the more organic factors of community in national hands.

The Purpose of American Politics, completed in 1960, is also a late writing and evinces somewhat the same vein as the article for the *Britannica*. Moreover, it contains a new appreciation of the elements of purposeful political artifact which went into the American polity, thus calling into question the universal applicability of continental sociological theory: "In all nations but one the awareness of the national purpose in conscious thought . . . followed upon its achievement in action. . . . Greece and Rome, Great Britain and France became aware of the national purpose and developed a philosophy of it only after it had been achieved. . . . The United States is the only nation that has reversed the sequence by reflecting upon its purpose before it had come into existence. The awareness of its purpose was not an afterthought. The United States was founded as a nation with a particular purpose in mind."[33]

Morgenthau then quotes statements made by Charles Pinckney and Alexander Hamilton at the Federal Convention, the one emphasizing domestic happiness and security under a republican system, the other the need for a strong central government in order to enjoy domestic tranquillity. The first represents the revolutionary liberalism, as Morgenthau terms it, in the American tradition, and the latter the liberal conservatism, the two combining to form the purpose of American politics, which is "the establishment of equality in freedom." The American purpose, Morgenthau says, transcends the national boundaries. "By pursuing its own purpose and in the measure that it achieves it, America gives meaning to the aspirations of other nations and furthers the awakening and achievement of their purpose."[34]

This last statement hints at the full truth, perhaps still obscure to Morgenthau: that for a long while now a conscious purposefulness

[33] *The Purpose of American Politics* (New York 1960), 10-11.
[34] *Ibid.*, 34.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has entered into the contrivance of new forms of government all over the world—in the First and subsequent French Republics, in the nineteenth-century reforms of England, in Meiji and postwar Japan, in the unification of Italy, in all Communist states, in many of the emerging nations of today, and even in the Second Reich and the two republics of Morgenthau's native Germany. Morgenthau is embarked upon an inquiry that tends to invalidate the sociological premise upon which he based his theory that governmental institutions either do not count for very much or (and this varies, depending upon which of his writings one is reading) do count for something, but that world government, even if it is indispensable to peace, must be preceded by a greater "moral and political" world community.

Morgenthau's further conclusions in *The Purpose of American Politics* are even more surprising. What America must do, now that the territorial frontier has lost its significance for the expansion of equality in freedom, he says, it can no longer do in isolation or by traditional alliances, for the world has left the sovereign nation-state behind as a viable principle of organization, not only for the performance of new supranational tasks but also for the performance of the primary task of any political organization—to safeguard the biological survival of its people:

> Thus, it becomes the task of all governments to make themselves superfluous as the guardians of their respective territorial frontiers by transferring their nuclear weapons to an agency whose powers are commensurate with the world-wide destructive potentialities of these new weapons. . . . Without it, what we are saying here about the purpose of America may well turn out to be an exercise in futility, like designing a house for the top of a volcano that, barring a miracle, cannot fail to erupt.
>
> America would perhaps not be quite so perplexed in the face of these new and world-wide tasks if it were aware of the connection that ties these tasks to its traditional purpose. That purpose has always sought the expansion of equality in freedom either by pushing the territorial frontiers outward or by offering America as a model for other nations to emulate. . . .
>
> The uncommitted nations seek first of all equality; the Communist ones, freedom. America, in a more direct and vital fashion than ever before, can offer a model for both. . . . This plausibility of the American purpose . . . must again become the foundation upon which, supported by the modern techniques of propaganda

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and foreign aid, the world-wide influence of America must rest. . . .

Thus it will be as it was at the beginning: what America does for itself it also does for mankind, and political experimentation on a world-wide scale in order to save mankind will be in direct line of succession to the political experiment as which at its inception America offered itself to the world.[35]

Thus the difficulties standing in the way of the building of supranational political institutions, such as the lack of a well-developed world community, are no longer to be emphasized, but rather the urgency of building those institutions. The Americans, from very early on, have consciously built a political framework that has permitted equality in freedom to become real. It is this that is natural to them—and not a Talleyrand style of diplomacy—and this is what they have to offer to the world. Morgenthau therefore calls on the Americans to take the lead in establishing a world government, using propaganda and foreign aid to that end in order that the volcano may be defused. Morgenthau, in effect, equates the American national interest not with power but with a governed world in which "equality in freedom" may flourish.

However, the year after *The Purpose of American Politics* was prepared for publication,[36] Morgenthau brought out the third, revised, edition of his *Politics Among Nations*. In this revision he seeks to show that power is not to be equated with military power alone; he recognizes a novelty in the obsolescence of all-out violence under the nuclear balance of terror; and he deals with the European Economic Community and Euratom as well as with the earlier Coal and Steel Community. But the point of view demonstrated in *The Purpose of American Politics* is quite lacking. Diplomacy is still the key to the mitigation and minimization of international conflicts so that such a degree of world community may be developed as will furnish the foundation for the world state. A world state is still the goal, but the federal principle, so visible by implication in the article for the *Britannica* and in *The Purpose of American Politics*, is as weakly articulated as in the earlier editions.

And Morgenthau's *Vietnam and the United States*, a collection of essays published in 1965, contains only a passage on the new, isolationist globalism, which is worth noting here:

The isolationist's moralism is naturally negative, abstentionist, and

[35] *Ibid.*, 308-10.

[36] This book "grew out of" Morgenthau's Albert Shaw lectures at the Johns Hopkins University in April 1959, so presumably the text was worked over later that year for a publication date in early 1960.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> domestically oriented; it seeks to protect the virtue of the United States from contamination by the power politics of evil nations. Wilsonian globalism endeavored to bring the virtue of American democracy to the rest of the world. Contemporary globalism tries to protect the virtue of the "free world" from contamination by Communism and to create a world order in which that virtue has a chance to flourish. The anti-Communist crusade has become both the moral principle of contemporary globalism and the rationale of our global foreign policy.[37]

This could be an insight into what happens as a population lives for twenty years with the deep-seated frustrations and fears implicit in the nuclear balance of terror, as well as a testimony to the unlikelihood that a wise diplomacy will come to the fore in crisis situations and will so mitigate and minimize international conflicts that community may come upon the earth. But Morgenthau seems not to have interpreted the situation in these terms; instead, in these essays he is seen still tilting at the windmill of an unwise diplomacy which first engaged his valor nearly twenty years earlier.

Nor does the fourth, revised, edition of *Politics Among Nations*, published in early 1967, reflect at all the new insights that seemed to come to Morgenthau in *The Purpose of American Politics*. The section on the United Nations has been rewritten, to show the decline of the General Assembly from its promise under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. There is a new treatment of arms control, and certain other sections have been expanded. But the consideration of the world state proceeds in the same fashion. Only a wise diplomacy, which recognizes the need to compromise on nonvital issues and avoids the restrictions of ideology and public opinion, can perform the peace-preserving and community-building processes that will prepare the way to the world state.

Morgenthau still does not see that such a return to diplomacy is impossible without, first, the repeal of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which have witnessed the rise of popular sovereignty and of ideology, and, second, the nullification of what Lasswell calls the self-confirming expectation of violence, as well as of the modern weaponry that makes that expectation crucial. This prescriptive inadequacy serves to point up the theoretical anomalies that lead Morgenthau to make so erroneous a prescription.

Morgenthau's theory of national and international politics is con-

[37] *Vietnam and the United States* (Washington 1965), 82. This passage is consonant with Morgenthau's writings throughout the cold-war period; he has little cause to apologize for imbalances topical to that era.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sistent with his theory of human nature. The lust for power, which storms through interpersonal relationships, is also the most marked characteristic of relationships among classes and interest groups within national societies, and the same dynamic holds true at the international level where states are seen much as interest groups locked in a struggle for power.

It is significant that at each of these levels the element of interest is weak in Morgenthau's thought in relation to the element of power. At the interpersonal level, the interest that power seeks to protect is love, but this end is destroyed by the power used to secure it. At the national level, intergroup conflict is motivated by the desire to defend substantive interests of an economic or social nature, but these are obscured in Morgenthau's political realism by the struggle for power itself. Then, at the international level, interest and power are utterly commingled in the infinitely mischievous phrase "the national interest defined in terms of power." Morgenthau again and again intimates that there are substantive interests at stake between the Soviet Union and the United States, other than the mere maximization of national power, but he does not say what they are. One suspects that the phrase might be restated as "power defined as interest" without any loss in rational content or explanatory efficacy.

However confused Morgenthau may be about the relationship between power and interest at the international level, his basic methodological error is to raise his power-and-interest conceptual framework from the domestic or national level to the world level, overlooking the possibility that the critical difference between the ecology of national politics and the ecology of international politics might invalidate his explanatory apparatus. After correctly identifying and emphasizing the ecology of international politics as one of anarchy, in contrast to the governance that usually prevails within national states, he does not go on to perceive that the primary psychological phenomenon within an ecology of anarchy is not the lust for power but simply fear. In such a milieu the precisely Hobbesian passion is fear, and the power thrust ought properly to be seen as a secondary phenomenon, that is, as a reaction to fear. Substantive interests, economic or otherwise, may be at stake, but they need not be, and this is especially true when the anarchic environment is marked by a technology that has first drawn all peoples into close proximity and then threatened them with imminent and total mutual destruction. In such an ecology, fear becomes paranoiac,[38] and any acre upon the earth must be denied the presumptive enemy, for

[38] See Erich Fromm's discussion of American cold-war attitudes in his *May Man Prevail?* (Garden City 1961).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

any aggrandizement of him is a diminution of oneself. Power becomes a means whereby fear may be allayed, but all the power there is is not enough.

The states of sub-Saharan Africa may interpret the national interest largely in terms of racial equality; all emerging nations desire economic development, wanting to pay less for imports and get more for exports; and even the developed nations are interested in the terms of trade and the balance of payments. Yet, as between Washington and Peking, or between Moscow and Washington, or between Peking and Moscow, the national interest is not defined in terms of substantive economic or social interests. Instead, the modern ecology of international politics ensures that each of the great national actors defines the national interest in terms of national security—security as the opposite of insecurity, as the answer to fear. Fear, not power, is the true dynamic of the international system today. That a Hitler or a Napoleon has occasionally arisen gives a color of credibility to Morgenthau's power-lust theory. That none such is currently active on the world scene and that today's worried national decision-makers bear little resemblance to either of them or to the glory-seeking princes of old Europe indicate the explanatory poverty of his theory—a theory whose error derives from taking a methodology devised for interpersonal and domestic relationships and thrusting it up into a qualitatively different environment made even more strange by the technological developments since 1945.

Substantive national interest is at stake here and there. But fear is pervasive. Because each sovereign nation-state entity contains its own political institutions, its own economic practices, its own ideology, its linguistic and cultural aspects that are in some measure different from those of any other, all these together are perceived as being at stake along with the perception of national insecurity. Moreover, fear tends to drive out reason. Hence, if the fear be great, as under the nuclear terror, a rational diplomacy will have but intermittent opportunities at best, and its accomplishments will tend to dissipate in the next crisis when fear again reaches climax. There is scant comfort in the notion that the fear of nuclear war establishes a kind of ceiling beyond which national decisions based upon lesser fears will not go, for it is precisely in the fact that the American venture in Vietnam penetrates this ceiling that one sees how fear may drive out reason.

But the great theoretical anomaly in Morgenthau's thought becomes apparent when, after he has identified war as being rooted in international anarchy and has reached the logical conclusion that world gov-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ernment is the cure for anarchy, he then introduces his organicist theory of society and makes world community the prerequisite of world government. This theory, which holds that a society becomes viable and orderly only as it develops among its members over the years a common sense or sentiment of community, is altogether at odds with Morgenthau's own theory of politics and human nature. His theory of society requires that the overweening lust for power be tamed in the main by the natural growth of common mores and societal consciousness that make possible a tolerable balance of power among individuals or interest groups. Morgenthau posits at the international level a super-Hobbesian predicament, in which the actors on the world scene are motivated by the lust for power, yet he proposes a gradualist Lockean solution whereby the international system will move, through a resurrected diplomacy, out of a precarious equilibrium of balance-of-power anarchy by a "revaluation of all values" into the "moral and political" bonds of world community, a process whose capstone will be the formal-legal institutions of world government.

This movement from super-Hobbesian assumptions concerning the nature of man to Lockean assumptions about the state of nature is a solecism to which Morgenthau is susceptible because of his commitment to the organismic mystique that comes out of German Romantic Nationalism but belongs to the whole nexus of German philosophy and sociology in the nineteenth century.[39] His theory of politics makes assumptions about the nature of man contrary to those that underlie his theory of society. Affectionate and empathetic man, who would submit his ego to the warm bonds of community, is quite the opposite of Morgenthau's power-lusting egoist who will kill love for power. Both theories cannot be right; one cannot abstract Dr. Jekyll for sociological purposes and Mr. Hyde for political purposes and still expect the two to congrue when they are brought together into a theory of the state.

Morgenthau's reaching toward a MacIver-like definition of world community (that community is present wherever there is a common interest and is susceptible to "coordination" by government) in his *The Purpose of American Politics* in 1960 and in his article for the *Britan-*

[39] It may be objected that what is said here and elsewhere in this article concerning the intellectual sources of Morgenthau's theories is mere speculation. And while it is true that he has not cited, so far as I know, the writers who most influenced him, one may speculate with a high expectation of accuracy upon the writings that a German university student of Morgenthau's generation would have studied. It has also been suggested that Morgenthau has been heavily influenced by the American social philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr, but it is probably enough to say that both have drunk from the same founts of German theology and philosophy and continental sociology. See my article on Niebuhr in the March 15, 1967, issue of *The Christian Century*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nica in 1961, taken together with his continuing adherence to the organic definition in the 1961 and 1967 revisions of his masterwork, points up the principal lacuna in his conceptual approach as it is brought to bear upon the world state. He nowhere deals adequately with the principle of federalism; the whole concept seems alien to his thought. As we have seen, in *Politics Among Nations*, he dismisses the Swiss and American federations as patterns suitable for a world state, and even in his consideration of the early days of America in *The Purpose of American Politics* there is much appreciation of the Federalist Papers but none of federalism.

Morgenthau's attitude toward federalism is rigidified by his theory of sovereignty. He defines sovereignty as supremacy and draws the ostensibly logical conclusion that therefore it is not divisible. Yet his logical nicety does not bear close examination. If sovereignty means supremacy, then one must ask, Supremacy as to what? If it means supremacy as to all things, then sovereignty logically is present only in the totalitarian state.[40] If it means less than all things, then sovereignty logically is present where there is supremacy as to only some things. And if this is true, then one government can be supreme as to some things while another government is supreme as to other things. It is the essence of the federal principle that different things are done by different governments as to the same body politic, each government acting within its own sphere of authority upon the same individual human beings.

If there appears to be an anomaly in extant federal arrangements, whereby the federal government possesses greater military force than the states, provinces, or *Länder* that make up the federal state, it is an anomaly that would tend to disappear in a federalism coextensive with the planet and possessing such a monopoly of the great weapons that force would no longer play its present role in human affairs. For example, the trend in the United States toward a unitary state cannot be understood outside the context of two world wars and the cold war. Also, Morgenthau's great faith in custom as an element in society should prompt him to examine the federal states in history and thus to see that custom has sometimes not permitted the superior military force of a

[40] Germany's unhappy experience with confederal arrangements that were too loose, as well as with quasi-federal governments that were too tight (thus mocking the idea of a divided sovereignty), may have clouded Morgenthau's consideration of the more precisely federal principle; or the fact that, in Germany, federalist theory seems to have grown out of feudal theory (cf. Gierke) may help to explain Morgenthau's attitude toward Western federalism. Certainly the American experience as a whole baffles yet intrigues him.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

federal government to prevail over the authority vested in the member states or provinces. Canada would be an example.

Federalism quite apart, Morgenthau's view that "the state is created by society" precludes his giving any weight at all to any government's reciprocal action upon the society it governs, building community through providing order and permitting—even fostering—the development of common economic, social, and cultural institutions. That he maintains this attitude despite the myriad of examples throughout history that community forms in time even where dominion has been imposed by force is curious indeed. Even sociology today, as for example in the writings of Talcott Parsons, awards a priority to a "framework of jurisdiction" in providing social order. But, to Morgenthau, "the state is not the artificial creation of a constitutional convention"—that is, of a framework of jurisdiction.

This, then, is the final inadequacy in Morgenthau's theory of the world state: that he depends upon the slender reed of diplomacy, rather than upon government, to create the order out of which a sense of community can grow. The better thesis would appear to be that, whether men and states are seen as power-lusting or as fearful, they are to be tamed or reassured only by government and that only within a governed ecology can the phyla of empathetic community grow and prosper. In short, world government is the beginning of community in its fuller sense, rather than its culmination.

Such a government, drawing upon the almost universal experience with republican forms of government and widespread experimentation with the varieties of federalism, can be republican and federal, answering to the present degree of world community by providing order and perhaps ministering in some measure to the needs of the underdeveloped and hungry nations, while permitting such peculiarities of national institutions to persist as can do so within an environment of world security.

This is not to say that any such government will be established; quite possibly it will not, this side of a liquidating third world war. But it is to say that if Morgenthau's theory of world government, as amended in this article, is theoretically valid in relation to empirical reality, then the theory deserves attention, especially inasmuch as its validity would raise the presumption that other theories of peace may not be similarly valid and thus will prove worthless, even if tried, in that their prescriptive component is not adequate to break the cycle of self-confirming fear and, hence, of continuing violence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE

By HANS O. SCHMITT*

THE expectation that a customs union in Europe will ultimately lead to political unification is based on the so-called spillover effect.[1] This effect operates whenever any step toward integration creates new needs and fresh demands to proceed further in the same direction. Thus a customs union may create pressures to integrate not only commodity markets but capital markets as well. An integration of capital markets in turn may necessitate currency unification for its effective functioning, and a unified currency finally may imply a pooling of sovereignties sufficiently complete to destroy the separate identities of the participating nation-states. The process could also work in the opposite direction: from an insistence on the integrity of the nation-state to an ultimate rejection of the customs union itself.

The Logic

The postulated spillover need not, of course, be the only one. Other sequences that bypass capital markets can certainly be identified. Thus a growing interest in a common currency may come from labor also—as greater mobility exposes workers to exchange risks on home remittances. Or it may come from agriculture—insofar as defining administered prices in units of account makes currency adjustments more awkward than before. These pressures are unlikely to be decisive, however, unless a similar interest arises within the business community itself. Hence the special focus here on capital markets.

The existence of a customs union creates an interest in unified capital markets in a number of ways.[2] First, the free movement of goods, services, and persons in a customs union would remain incomplete if the capital movements immediately associated with them were still to be restricted. Second, a unified capital market would reduce inequalities

* The author is indebted to Benjamin J. Cohen, Allen C. Kelley, Charles P. Kindleberger, Theodore Morgan, and Seiji Naya for comments and criticism, and to the U. S. Agency for International Development for financial support during the academic year 1964-1965.

[1] See Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," *International Organization*, XV (Summer 1961), 366-92; and Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford 1963), 10-13.

[2] See Hans O. Lundstrom, *Capital Movements and Economic Integration* (Leyden 1961), 139.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the conditions of competition by giving enterprises access to sources of finance on equal terms throughout the region. Last, freedom of capital movements would contribute to the allocative efficiency that freedom of trade alone cannot be relied upon to achieve.[3] The liberalization of capital movements is therefore a precondition for the optimal operation of a customs union.[4]

But in view of the checkered history of European exchange relations, the European private investor is said to prefer investing in his own currency.[5] Thus a thorough intermingling of financial assets among several member countries is feasible only if each nation commits itself irrevocably to rigid exchange rates, that is, to a common currency.[6] Part of the essential rationale of having separate currencies at all is certainly the ability to alter rates of exchange and thereby to control the terms of access to national markets.[7] Uncertainty about rates, by keeping national capital markets distinct, maximizes interdependence within national economies and minimizes dependence on others. A capital market is not fully integrated, therefore, until it is based on a single currency.

The Treaty of Rome envisions, in addition to a customs union, "the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and capital."[8] In the course of the transitional period,[9] member states are progressively to abolish restrictions on the movement of capital belonging to residents of the Community and to eliminate any discrimination based on nationality, at least "to the extent necessary for the proper functioning of the Common Market."[10] To this end, the authorities are to "endeavor to avoid" introducing new exchange restrictions[11] and are to grant exchange permits "in the most liberal manner possible."[12] Restrictions on the right of establishment

[3] See, for example, James E. Meade, *Problems of Economic Union* (London 1953), 56ff.

[4] See Bela Balassa, *The Theory of Economic Integration* (Homewood 1961), 92.

[5] Hermann J. Abs, "Parallel Loans to Mobilize Continental Funds," *The Times* (London), March 11, 1964, 18. See also Tibor Scitovsky, *Economic Theory and Western European Integration* (London 1958), 79.

[6] But see James C. Ingram, "A Proposal for Financial Integration in the Atlantic Community," U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Factors Affecting the United States Balance of Payments*, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington 1962), 175-208.

[7] But see Charles P. Kindleberger, "European Economic Integration and the Development of a Single Financial Center for Long-Term Capital," *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, XC, No. 2 (1963), 192-93.

[8] *Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community and Related Documents* (Brussels 1957), Article 3(2).

[9] The transitional period is expected to take twelve years, from 1958 to 1970, divided into three stages of four years each (*ibid.*, Article 8[1]).

[10] *Ibid.*, Article 67(1).

[11] *Ibid.*, Article 71.

[12] *Ibid.*, Article 68(1).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

anywhere in the Community must finally be abolished by the end of the transition period.[13]

The Treaty also requires that member countries treat exchange rate policy as "a matter of common interest."[14] The particular concern of those drafting the Treaty was that exchange depreciation should not restore for any member country the protection that tariff cuts were intended to reduce—hence the sensitivity to exchange variations that "distort competitive conditions" and that may therefore trigger retaliatory action within the terms of the Treaty itself.[15] With increasingly open markets, however, fixed rates of exchange can permanently be maintained only on the basis of effectively coordinated monetary policies. As with the freeing of capital movements, therefore, coordination of policy on monetary matters is required "to the full extent necessary for the functioning of the Common Market."[16]

The wording in both cases is characteristically cautious. The Treaty nowhere explicitly advocates a monetary union. Independent currencies were thought too closely interwoven with issues of sovereignty, and no direct challenge to sovereignty was intended.[17] The political significance of a monetary union lies in the fact that a disciplined surrender of command over its own resource base is required of each member state if the monetary authority's currency issues are to have unchallenged purchasing power in the territories of all. In the context of a single nation-state this issue does not arise, for the central bank is rooted there in a single business community, serves its interest, and is therefore backed by its resources.

Within national boundaries, money derives its character as a generally accepted means of payment from being a claim not on any individual debtor alone but on the business community collectively.[18] By requiring its collective resources for backing, the establishment of a single currency may in fact be looked upon as the constitutive act whereby such a business community formally comes into existence. The question posed in this article, therefore, concerns the extent to which progress toward integrating capital markets has in fact led to pressures for a common currency in the European Economic Community, and the ex-

[13] *Ibid.*, Article 52.
[14] *Ibid.*, Article 107(2).
[15] *Ibid.*, Article 107(1).
[16] *Ibid.*, Article 105(2).
[17] "The power of decision in monetary matters is one of the traditional attributes of sovereignty" (Robert Marjolin, "Monetary and Financial Cooperation in the E.E.C.," *Bulletin of the European Economic Community* [November 1963], 8).
[18] See Robert A. Mundell, "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas," *American Economic Review*, L (September 1961), 657-65.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tent to which such pressures have in turn inhibited further progress in unifying capital markets there.

The ambiguity arises from the fact that financial integration turns out to be a nuclear process.[19] Contemporary European experience in this respect follows an established pattern: political communities in the past have tended to crystallize around economic core areas that served as centers of credit and currency as well.[20] No inevitability can therefore be ascribed to the spillover effect. Unless the periphery chooses to identify itself with such a center and to accept its leadership, the integrative process can certainly be stalled and possibly also reversed.

The Process

The coordination of measures to implement the Common Market Treaty is entrusted to a Council of Ministers, acting on proposals from the European Economic Commission in Brussels. To the Commission, and particularly to its Monetary Committee, a minimum definition of integrated capital markets requires that firms in each member country have access on equal terms to the savings of all.[21] More than a spilling-over of marginal demands and supplies between capital markets is therefore necessary. Only a single set of financial institutions in close communication with one another can ensure that the whole spectrum of investment demand is brought in correspondence with the full range of long-term funds available.[22]

The European Commission began by having two Directives approved by the Council of Ministers, one on May 11, 1960, the other on December 18, 1962.[23] Both focused on the reduction of exchange restrictions alone. Capital movements were classified into four categories for the purpose, to each of which different provisions were applied. Transactions in the first category, comprising primarily direct investments, were liberalized unconditionally. The fourth category included mainly short-term capital movements, for which by contrast no obligation to liberalize was imposed at all.

The two intermediate categories separated trading in securities listed

[19] This is denied in Commission Européenne, *Le Développement d'un marché européen des capitaux* (Brussels 1966), 17.

[20] Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York 1953), 33.

[21] European Economic Community, *Fifth Report on the Activities of the Monetary Committee* (Brussels, April 5, 1963), 8.

[22] Kindleberger, 191.

[23] *Journal officiel des communautés européennes* (July 12, 1960), 921-32, and (January 22, 1963), 62-75. See also Claudio Segre, "Capital Movements in the European Economic Community," *Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review*, No. 60 (March 1962), 78-89.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on stock exchanges from the issue and placement of new foreign securities in national markets, dealings in unquoted securities, and long- and medium-term loans. Transactions in the first of these were also liberalized "unconditionally," but can still be channeled through "free" exchange markets, as long as governments "endeavor to avoid" excessive discrepancies between free and official exchange rates. For transactions in the latter category, only a conditional liberalization was foreseen. Controls can be retained or reimposed on new issues in the interest of national economic policy.

For Germany and Belgium the new rules brought only a consolidation of previous liberalization measures, in the sense that henceforth there was to be no unilateral reversal beyond the limits newly set for the Community as a whole.[24] Table I shows both countries to have been steady capital importers at the time. Elsewhere some alignment to new Community standards was required. The Italians and Dutch worried over persistent capital outflows, and the French over the possibility of similar drains if controls were to be relaxed.

TABLE I. NET OVERALL PRIVATE LONG-TERM CAPITAL IMPORTS
(in millions of dollars)

	*1960-1962**	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*
Germany	242	286	780	112	526
Belgium	5	24	40	168	134
France	359	402	516	527	361
Netherlands	−65	−35	−16	121	2
Italy	0	−319	−523	264	−122

* Annual averages.
SOURCE: European Monetary Agreement, *Annual Reports* (Paris 1964, 1965, 1966).

At the beginning of 1962 also, following Community advice, separate exchange markets for capital transactions were abolished in France and Italy.[25] Germany never had any. And in Belgium and Holland, where such markets continued, exchange rates were rarely permitted to fluctuate beyond margins applicable also to the official rate.[26] By contrast, however, the right to maintain restrictions on new foreign issues continued to be exercised in France and the Netherlands as well as in Italy,

[24] G. Dermitzel, W. Damm, and K. Richebächer, *Das Bankwesen im Gemeinsamen Markt* (Baden-Baden 1962), 49.
[25] International Monetary Fund, *Fourteenth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions* (Washington 1963), 128, 205.
[26] EEC, *Fifth Report*, 16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

though, as Table II shows, intermittent flotations have now been allowed in all of them.[27]

TABLE II. NET FOREIGN ISSUES IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
(in billions of current dollars)

	*1956-1958**	*1959-1961**	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*
United States	0.70	0.70	1.00	1.10	0.93	1.24
Germany	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.22	0.34
Belgium	0.02	0.01	0.01	—	—	n.a.
France	—	—	—	0.01	0.03	0.02
Netherlands	−0.01	0.03	0.04	−0.03	−0.01	0.01
Italy	—	0.01	0.05	0.02	—	0.02
United Kingdom	0.03	0.03	—	0.06	0.17	0.06

* Annual averages.
SOURCE: Computed from Bank for International Settlements, *Annual Reports* (Basel 1964, 1965, 1966) and National Bank of Belgium, private communication.

The reluctance to open capital markets to new issues, while at the same time permitting transactions in outstanding securities, may seem inconsistent at first. Barriers other than exchange restrictions were, however, relied upon to keep securities transactions within bounds. In a third draft Directive the Commission therefore linked proposals to free the issue and placement of foreign shares on national markets with the removal of technical and administrative obstacles to (1) the acquisition by financial institutions of shares from other member states when payable in the national currency of the purchaser and (2) quotations on national stock exchanges of stocks and shares from all member states, which was thought essential to attract buyers unfamiliar with conditions abroad.[28]

Exchange risks would continue to be a barrier. Still, the expected effect of the Directive on securities arbitrage was sufficient to arouse French concern. To minimize the risk of losing savings abroad, the French wanted to limit the quotation of securities to those actually floated on the French market and therefore, like domestic issues, subject to rationing by the Treasury. The Germans and the Belgians, by

[27] See also Jean O. M. van der Mensbrugghe, "Foreign Issues in Europe," *International Monetary Fund Staff Papers* (July 1964), 329.
[28] Communauté Économique Européenne, *Proposition de troisième directive pour la mise en œuvre de l'article 67 du traité* (Brussels, April 9, 1964), mimeographed; and Roberta M. Weil, "International Capital Movements," *The Banker*, CXVI (October 1966), 671.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contrast, showed themselves anxious to ensure expected gains. They insisted that the abolition of exchange restrictions should at the same time be made unconditional in the categories affected by the Directive.[29]

The common expectation appears to have been that, on laissez-faire principles, the supply of capital would concentrate in Germany.[30] This France could not permit if, as the French Minister of Finance stated in June 1964, it was the deliberate aim of French policy to make Paris the financial center of the European Community.[31] The French unwillingness to yield on this point, however, exposed the Community to the threat of financial domination by established centers outside the Common Market altogether. Though restrictions continued at the short end of the market, for example, excess supplies and demands for short-term funds were able to spill over into the Euro-dollar market that centers on London.[32]

By taking deposits and making loans in dollars, at margins between the low American and high European lending rates, European banks had taken the lead in developing an efficient international market in short-term funds, absorbing liquidity from European surplus countries and extending it to those in temporary deficit. According to one estimate, dollar deposits came from at least twenty-five countries and final users resided in at least thirty-five countries.[33] Among the approximately four hundred banks that participated in the market at the time, the dollar went some distance in offsetting the usual localization of financial assets and was therefore said to have assumed some of the functions of a common currency.[34]

The attraction of the dollar was evident in the market for new issues also. As Table III indicates, substantial European issues were drawn to New York, to be taken up again in large part by European buyers, at least until the middle of 1963. The scale of the New York market may have been its chief attraction: wide ownership and active trading offered excellent marketability, as well as liquidity to investors in a cur-

[29] Europress report, Brussels, January 16, 1965.

[30] American and British investors on the European continent tended to favor Germany as the "industrial heartland" of the Common Market. See Val Schur, "Investment in the Continent of Western Europe: Some Long-Term Considerations," *Moorgate and Wall Street* (Spring 1964) 56.

[31] *The Economist* (July 4, 1964), 73.

[32] See Paul Einzig, *The Euro-Dollar System* (New York 1964); and Bank for International Settlements, *Thirty-fourth Annual Report* (Basel 1964), 128-42.

[33] Oscar L. Altman, "Euro-Dollars: Some Further Comments," *International Monetary Fund Staff Papers* (March 1965).

[34] See Benjamin J. Cohen, "The Euro-Dollar, the Common Market, and Currency Unification," *Journal of Finance*, XVIII (December 1963), 605-21; and Claudio Segre, "Financial Markets in the E.E.C.: Prospects for Integration," *Moorgate and Wall Street* (Autumn 1963), 38-62.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rency, furthermore, whose purchasing power was reasonably constant over a larger national product than any other currency could command.[35]

TABLE III. NEW EUROPEAN ISSUES PLACED IN THE U.S.
(in millions of dollars
before deducting discounts and commissions)

		GROSS AMOUNT SOLD	NONRESIDENT PORTION*
1960		50	26
1961		82	26
1962		273	75
1963	first half	285	63
	second half	69	16
1964	first half	19	8
	second half	32	5

* "Probably European for the most part."
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business* (August 1964 and September 1965).

A projection was therefore ventured that "New York is the most likely center of long-term financial integration for Europe."[36] Its head start over any potential rival, it was thought, could not be overcome. As with the idea of the indivisibility of Atlantic defense, of course, a single Atlantic capital market would not merely place constraints on a distinctively European Community, but would in all probability thwart its development altogether. For like the multilateral nuclear force proposed at the time, it would link the Europeans not directly to each other but only through the United States as "head and heart of the system."[37]

However, a financial center ordinarily gains ascendancy, and retains it, by sustaining higher rates of growth and of profits within its own region than are registered elsewhere. It can then attract an inflow of portfolio savings and can finance an outflow of direct investment as firms expand to absorb markets and secure sources of supply. German capital imports were in fact primarily portfolio investments at this time; the French and Italian predominantly direct.[38] The United States, how-

[35] U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *A Description and Analysis of Certain European Capital Markets*, Economic Policies and Practices, Paper No. 3, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington 1964), 32, 34.
[36] Kindleberger, 203. See also Peter B. Kenen, "Towards an Atlantic Capital Market," *Lloyd's Bank Review*, No. 69 (July 1963), 15-30.
[37] Stanley Hoffmann, "Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International System," in F. O. Wilcox and H. F. Haviland, eds., *The Atlantic Community: Progress and Prospects* (New York 1963), 23.
[38] See Commission Européenne, *Le Développement*, 62.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ever, though a heavy exporter of direct investment, found it necessary in the summer of 1963 to stop a net outflow of portfolio investment by proposing an interest equalization tax on American purchases of foreign securities.[39]

The effect on foreign issues in New York was immediate, as Table III also shows. But it was offset by a rise in long-term bank lending abroad, from $150 million in the first half of 1963 to over $500 million in the second; such lending for the whole of 1964 exceeded the previous year's total by $400 million. The outflow of direct investment did not abate either, however. On the contrary, it rose from $1.9 billion in 1963 to $2.3 billion in 1964, a record half of it that year going to Europe.[40]

Concern about this "invasion" by American enterprises was expressed at the start of 1963 by the French Minister of Finance, who thought it undesirable "that essential sectors of the economy of the Common Market should become dependent on decisions from abroad."[41] But the balance-of-payments difficulties in which the outflow of capital placed the United States made the American challenge relatively easy to parry.[42] Apart from some tightening of French licensing procedures and German proposals to register incoming direct investments, the primary defense was a growing reluctance on the part of both countries to hold increasing dollar accumulations in their reserves.[43] Table IV suggests how vulnerable the United States was to such pressure.

Accordingly, in January of 1965 the French announced that they would begin converting some of their existing dollar claims into gold and would insist on gold settlements of all future surpluses and deficits.[44] The Germans had already allowed the gold portion of their reserves to rise from fifty-one to fifty-nine percent in a little over a year, as a result of a rise in their gold holdings of $400 million and a decline in their dollar claims of $1 billion.[45]

In response, the American authorities in mid-February extended the

[39] With exceptions mainly for Canadian issues, this measure taxed American purchases of foreign shares at 15 percent and of bonds from 2¾ to 15 percent. It was passed in August 1964.

[40] U.S. Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business* (October 1964), 10; and *The Economist* (February 13, 1965), 669.

[41] *Common Market* (March 1963), 51.

[42] Kindleberger's counterargument—that in fact a European demand for liquidity was financed by American direct investment—holds only if no inflationary pressures existed in Europe, but they did. See his *Balance of Payments Deficits and the International Market for Liquidity* (Princeton 1965), 12.

[43] *The Economist* (January 23, 1965), 361.

[44] *Ibid.* (January 9, 1965), 133.

[45] See Deutsche Bundesbank, *Geschäftsbericht für das Jahr 1964* (Frankfurt 1965), 100-101; and *The Economist* (March 6, 1965), 1045.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interest equalization tax to certain classes of loans, called on commercial banks to limit increases in their foreign lending to five percent, and asked industrial corporations to show an improvement of from fifteen to twenty percent, each in its own balance of international payments,

TABLE IV. CHANGES IN AND COMPOSITION OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVES

	GOLD PROPORTION	CHANGES IN TOTAL RESERVES OVER PREVIOUS YEAR, IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS				
	1961	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*
United States		−606	−153	−377	−171	−1,222
Germany	.51	131	−207	694	232	−453
Belgium	.69	307	−60	187	252	112
France	.63	1,093	684	859	816	619
Netherlands	.81	95	−12	156	247	67
Italy	.61	548	19	−412	417	591
United Kingdom		−338	−10	−161	−831	688

SOURCE: Computed from International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics* (Supplement 1966/67), iii.

over the year.[46] Within a month, the reduced supply of dollars abroad had caused interest rates in the Euro-dollar market to rise by three-quarters of a percentage point.[47]

As the American challenge began to recede, three separate initiatives were launched to combine the resources of European capital markets independently, but without as yet resorting to a common European currency to do so. London was the first to take advantage of the U.S. interest equalization tax. A sharply increased volume of foreign bonds that might otherwise have been issued in New York was floated in the Euro-dollar market instead. Quotations in London had risen by a modest $20 million in 1963, but now jumped another $365.5 million in the first eleven months of 1964.[48]

The relative efficiency of the London capital market no doubt made it the logical stand-in for New York. The spread between costs to the borrower and yield to the investor, as shown in Table V, may be taken as a rough measure of it.[49] But with the continued use of the dollar, the

[46] Bank for International Settlements, *Thirty-fifth Annual Report* (Basel 1965); and *The Economist* (February 27, 1965), 887.

[47] *Ibid.* (March 20, 1965), 1296.

[48] *Ibid.* (March 27, 1965), 1419.

[49] The data in the table are roughly comparable with those given for Germany, France, and Italy in Bank for International Settlements, *Capital Markets* (Basel, January 1964), mimeographed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

basic dependence of the market on the United States was also perpetuated. Two risks in particular had to be taken into account: (1) the value of the market's means of payment was uniquely dependent on the ex-

TABLE V. RATES ON NEW INDUSTRIAL ISSUES, 1962[1]

	ANNUAL INTEREST EQUIVALENTS		
	Yield to Investor[2]	*Burden on Borrower*[3]	*Spread*
United States	4.45	4.6	0.15
Germany	6.10	7.0	0.90
Belgium	5.55	6.2	0.65
France	5.75	7.8	2.05
Netherlands	4.80	5.3	0.50
Italy	6.15	8.9	2.75
Switzerland	4.00	4.4	0.40
United Kingdom	6.45	6.7	0.25

[1] Entries based on a single "typical" issue.
[2] Rounded to nearest 0.05.
[3] Interest cost, plus taxation, underwriting, printing, and publicity costs at time of issue, plus annual taxation and commission for the payment of interest.

SOURCE: Computed from *The Times* (London), April 16, 1963, 16.

change rate policy of the United States; and (2) the terms on which these means were to be had could still be influenced by variations in American monetary policy, dictated less by European than by American needs.[50] The direct impact on Euro-dollar rates of the balance-of-payments measures of February 1965 showed how real this dependence was.

In order not to compromise an independent Europe for a wider capital market, therefore, an alternative to the dollar bond had to be devised as a basis for the market. One possibility was pioneered as early as 1961 by the Kredietbank of Brussels, in the form of bonds denominated in units of account.[51] The initial value of the unit was set equal to the gold value of the U.S. dollar.[52] But if the par value of seventeen European "reference currencies" should change, two-thirds of them in the same direction, the unit's value would also change in the same direction and

[50] Cohen, 614.
[51] Units of account have been used by the Bank for International Settlements, the European Payments Union, the European Monetary Agreement, the European Economic Community, and the European Investment Bank. The idea of using them for private as well as public transactions was first proposed in Robert Triffin, *Europe and the Money Muddle* (New Haven 1957), 291.
[52] The precise manner in which the value of the unit changes is newly defined for each issue. The specification given here is the standard one of Fernand Collin, *The Formation of a European Capital Market and Other Lectures* (Brussels 1963).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proportion as that currency among the two-thirds that moved the least.[53]

The value of the unit was thus not fixed in terms of the dollar or of gold, but in terms of whichever of the reference currencies turned out to be most stable among them. With respect to that currency, however, exchange risks for others continued very much as they did against the dollar. It was doubtful, therefore, that a widespread distribution of unit-of-account bonds could have been achieved without some credible guarantee that exchange rates would remain fixed with reference to it. But any active trading across national boundaries would then again have tended to equalize interest rates between participating markets and thus to reduce the power of national financial authorities over credit conditions in each.

The ultimate responsibility for both exchange and interest rate policy was now so diffused, however, that it was no longer clear to whom precisely the sovereignty of national monetary authorities was to pass. The prospect of losing control was not for that reason any more cheerfully accepted by any of them. The issue of unit-of-account bonds has therefore been intermittent and has not exceeded $117 million, all but $20 million of it raised either in 1963 or 1966.[54]

This was of course only a small proportion of the combined potential of the major European capital markets, as Table VI shows. Still barring a common currency to destroy their compartmentalization, a last at-

TABLE VI. VALUE OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES, 1962
(in billions of dollars)

	TOTAL BUSINESS, LOCAL AND STATE	CENTRAL GOVERNMENT	MORTGAGES	FOREIGN
United States	669.9	110.5	250.5	6.8
Germany	23.6	1.2	20.3	.2
Belgium	9.0	6.0	—	1.0
France	30.7	3.2	8.7	—
Netherlands	12.7	4.2	3.3	—
Italy	31.6	4.1	—	—
Total EEC	107.6	18.7	—	—
United Kingdom	73.9	46.4	15.0	2.3

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *A Description and Analysis of Certain European Capital Markets,* 8.

[53] The reference currencies are those of the former European Payments Union: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland, and Turkey.

[54] See Jean O. M. van der Mensbrugghe, "Bond Issues in European Units of Account," *International Monetary Fund Staff Papers* (November 1964), 453; James C. Ingram, "Unit of Account Bonds: Their Meaning and Function," *Moorgate and Wall Street* (Autumn 1964), 79; and Weil, 672.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tempt was made by the Deutsche Bank of Frankfurt at least to coordinate access to them. Large loans were to be broken up into separate tranches, each to be made out in the currency of a different country of issue, but with identical terms of issue.[55] With control over capital issues itself a major instrument of credit control, however, it was not until the middle of 1965 that the first such European Parallel Loan could be arranged, to raise the equivalent of $220 million for Italy in the six markets of the European Community.[56]

The Germans had meanwhile concentrated on expanding their own market for foreign issues, mainly to ameliorate balance-of-payments surpluses on capital account. The U.S. interest equalization tax was reinforced in 1964 as a stimulus by two fiscal measures in Germany itself: (1) a proposed abolition of a 2½ percent tax on the nominal value of fixed interest issues and (2) a proposed 25 percent withholding tax on foreign-owned German bonds only, exempting foreign issues denominated in deutschmarks.[57] In response, foreign issues so denominated rose from $30 million in 1963 to $230 million in 1964 as shown in Table II above.

Frankfurt thereby moved into the major ranks as an international supplier of funds.[58] Nevertheless, the prospect that the mark can directly or indirectly become the basis for a wider integration of capital markets in Europe remains doubtful. Against it stands the official French insistence that Paris should become the financial center of the European Community. The location issue is of course primarily symbolic. Behind it lies the problem of the sources of power in the Community once independent sovereignties have been dissolved by a common currency.

The Outcome

Two inferences can be drawn from the record of conflict over European capital markets. First, the spillover effect was clearly operative in the persistent search for a common currency to serve as the basis for

[55] See Abs, 18; and David Williams, "The Development of Capital Markets in Europe," *International Monetary Fund Staff Papers* (March 1965), 59.

[56] The tranches were these: Italy ($160 million), France ($25.4 million), Germany ($25 million), Netherlands ($6.9 million), Belgium ($2 million), and Luxembourg ($0.6 million), according to *The Economist* (June 26, 1965), 1547-48, and (July 3, 1965), 68.

[57] Deutsche Bundesbank, "Foreign Loan Issues in the Federal Republic of Germany," *Monthly Report* (December 1964), 3-6.

[58] On the otherwise unsettling, if perhaps temporary, effects of the withholding tax, see Hermann J. Abs, "The German Capital Market: Problems and Prospects," *The Banker* (October 1966), 682.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

capital market integration. But second, the reluctance to accept Germany's financial leadership shows as clearly that there is nothing inexorable in the spillover process. Precisely at the point of creating a common currency, the urge to draw back from the enterprise altogether may well be strongest. What the spillover hypothesis implies instead is the ultimate inconsistency of a common market and of political separatism, so that if political unification is rejected in the end, the customs union itself may be endangered also.

The issue of German hegemony was brought to a head by the insistence of the European Commission on immediate progress toward monetary union. On July 1, 1963, it submitted to the Council of Ministers proposals for a Committee of Central Bank Governors to coordinate monetary policy, for a Budgetary Policy Committee to test the national budgets of member states for mutual consistency, for an expansion of the Monetary Committee's responsibilities to include consultations on decisions affecting the international monetary system, recourse by member states to the International Monetary Fund, and financial assistance to third countries, and for a commitment to prior consultations on changes in currency parities.[59]

The Commission's ultimate objectives were more ambitious. In its Action Program for the period 1962 to 1966, it expressed the hope that the Committee of Central Bank Governors would serve as the nucleus for a "federal-type banking system," by advancing in the period 1966 to 1970 "from the coordination to the centralization of decisions."[60] The Action Program foresaw that, from the end of 1970 at the latest, economic union would have to involve permanently fixed rates of exchange—"the very essence of a monetary union"—as well.[61] The Council of Ministers did not adopt even the more modest initial proposals, however, until the threat of a serious inflationary crisis in the Community dramatized the need for concerted action to bring it under control.[62]

The remarkably buoyant growth rates on which the Common Market was launched had, by 1962, virtually absorbed labor reserves. As workers came to be in short supply throughout the Community and increasingly free to move, appreciable wage differentials between Com-

[59] For the full text, see *Bulletin of the European Economic Community* (Supplement, July 1963), 3-4.

[60] European Economic Community, *Memorandum of the Commission on the Action Program of the Community for the Second Stage* (Brussels, October 24, 1962), 65.

[61] *Ibid.*, 67.

[62] Murray Forsyth, "Towards a Common Economic Policy for the E.E.C.," *Planning* (July 27, 1964), 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mon Market partners grew progressively harder to sustain.[63] Abrupt wage adjustments in Italy at the start and in Holland at the close of 1963 and a persistent upward drift in France so diminished aggregate savings margins, however, that investment ratios already lower than the German still led to severe inflationary strains.[64] The effect on Germany was a sharp recovery of its export surplus, the bulk of it on Community account.

The resulting strain on German resources was sufficiently strong for a committee of experts to recommend flexible exchange rates to protect internal equilibrium, as the Italians especially might have done to protect external balance.[65] But inasmuch as the wage push was in large measure the direct consequence of the Common Market, a relative depreciation of the French and Italian currencies would have had to be recurrent, unless it was meant to be part of a complete withdrawal from the Common Market. To stay in, without upsetting the Community's monetary equilibrium, the French and Italians could not in the end escape the necessity of adjusting their investment ratios to the new distribution of incomes.

The European Commission had for some time urged this course.[66] The Council of Ministers accordingly on April 13, 1964, adopted a Recommendation specifying the priority of price stability over all other economic policy objectives, setting a five percent ceiling on the permissible increase in government expenditures, and urging a spectrum of measures to restrict credit and to restrain wages.[67] At the same time the Council issued a series of Decisions implementing the Commission's institutional proposals, together with a Declaration that there would henceforth also be prior consultations on changes in currency parities.

For the present, exchange rates held, though at a cost. The Italian balance of payments, which had deteriorated the worst, improved, but the part played by foreign investors buying up portions of Italian com-

[63] This thesis is argued in Bank for International Settlements, *Thirty-fourth Annual Report*, 7. Hourly wages in manufacturing in 1962 in dollar cents were 83 (Germany), 74 (Belgium), 62 (France), 66 (Netherlands), and 46 (Italy), as computed from *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1964* (Wiesbaden 1964), 129ff.

[64] Bank for International Settlements, *Thirty-fourth Annual Report*, 10-14; and European Economic Community, *Sixth Report on the Activities of the Monetary Committee* (Brussels, April 15, 1964), 15-20.

[65] *Opera Mundi Europe* (January 21, 1965), 7.

[66] With particular urgency in the annual report of the Commission presented by Robert Marjolin to the European Parliament on January 21, 1964. See *Bulletin of the European Economic Community* (March 1964) for the full text.

[67] *Journal officiel des communautés européennes* (April 22, 1964), 1029-64. See also European Economic Community, *Seventh Report on the Activities of the Monetary Committee* (Brussels, February 12, 1965), 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

panies in distress was large enough to be painful.[68] The effect of retrenchment on French and Italian growth rates was in any case marked.[69] Perhaps the sacrifice of growth for stability could "only be welcomed from the standpoint of the Community," as the Commission thought.[70] Yet until such interests as were sacrificed nationally gained some certainty of finding adequate consideration at Community level, the possibility of withdrawing from the Community and of reasserting monetary independence certainly had to remain open.

Aware of the regional disparities in the economic growth of the Community, the Commission had in its Action Program recommended a medium-term economic policy committee to draw up five-year programs for the balanced development of the Community. There was a rebuff by the German Chancellor in the name of free market principles, however, and though a committee was still set up its powers remained severely limited.[71] The Commission nevertheless proposed a pooling of external reserves as the next step toward monetary union. This the Germans supported on condition that to prevent abuse the Council of Central Bank Governors be expanded into an effective "open market committee" first, a step that in isolation was opposed elsewhere.[72]

When, undaunted, the Commission moved in the summer of 1965 to gain an independent source of revenue—by claiming the proceeds from industrial tariffs as well as from proposed agricultural levies—the French walked out in protest.[73] The objection was that supranational institutions could not assume away the actual power relations among the participating nation-states. These will first have to be restructured before the final shape of the institutions of the Community can be determined. What that structure of power is to be depends crucially on the capability of Germany to sustain its economic leadership and to gain acceptance in that role.

[68] *The Economist* (February 6, 1965), 590. The companies involved included Montecatini and Olivetti.

[69] Growth rates of real gross national product ranged in 1962 from 4.1 (Germany), 4.3 (Belgium), 6.6 (France), and 2.6 (Netherlands) to 6.3 (Italy). In 1965 they ranged from 4.4 (Germany), 3.0 (Belgium), 3.4 (France), and 5.0 (Netherlands) to 3.4 (Italy). See Bank for International Settlements, *Thirty-fifth Annual Report*; and European Investment Bank, *Annual Report 1965* (Brussels 1966).

[70] European Economic Community, *The Economic Situation in the Community* (December 1964), 38.

[71] Forsyth, 220; and *Bulletin of the European Economic Community* (November 1964), 13.

[72] *European Community* (April 1965), 6.

[73] The sum involved might have come to $4 billion a year. See Leon N. Lindberg, "Integration as a Source of Stress on the European Community System," *International Organization*, XX (Spring 1966), 248.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Prospects

German capability to function as an effective center is qualified by the legacy of the German past. Thus the movement for integration sprang perhaps less from a need to rely on the core area—"the Ruhr"—than from the desire to control it, as Ernst Haas has pointed out.[74] In order to do so it seemed necessary that Germany's neighbors should relinquish to supranational bodies the same measure of sovereignty that they intended Germany never to regain.[75] To the extent that Germany promises to dominate the Community, however, other countries may conclude that the preservation of separate nation-states offers better opportunities for the exercise of countervailing power than any institutional safeguards within a single polity can ensure. Or is it possible to shift the core area midway through an ongoing integration process?

[74] "The Challenge of Regionalism," *ibid.*, XII (Autumn 1958), 449.
[75] Uwe W. Kitzinger, *The Politics and Economics of European Integration* (New York 1963), 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN CIVIL VIOLENCE

By TED GURR*

UNTIL recently many political scientists tended to regard violent civil conflict as a disfigurement of the body politic, neither a significant nor a proper topic for their empirical inquiries. The attitude was in part our legacy from Thomas Hobbes's contention that violence is the negation of political order, a subject fit less for study than for admonition. Moreover, neither the legalistic nor the institutional approaches that dominated traditional political science could provide much insight into group action that was regarded by definition as illegal and the antithesis of institutionalized political life. The strong empirical bent in American political science led to ethnocentric inquiry into such recurring and salient features of American political life as voting and legislative behavior. The American Revolution and Civil War appeared as unique events, grist for exhaustive historical inquiry but unlikely subjects for systematic comparative study or empirical theory. Representative of the consequences of these attitudes is a recent judgment that political violence "by its very nature [is] beyond any simple or reasonable laws of causation."[1]

This article proposes, first, that civil violence *is* a significant topic of political inquiry and, second, not only that it is capable of explanation, but that we know enough about the sources of human violence to specify in general, theoretical terms some of the social patterns that dispose men to collective violence.

The proposition that civil violence is important as a genus is widely but not yet universally accepted, even by scholars concerned with some of its forms, revolution in particular.[2] This is the case, one suspects, be-

* This article is a revision of a paper read to the panel on "The Psychology of Political Unrest," at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, New York, September 2-6, 1966. Harry Eckstein's careful and helpful evaluation of draft versions of this paper is gratefully acknowledged. Others who have provided useful, though not always satisfiable, criticism of the theoretical model include Leonard Berkowitz, Alfred de Grazia, Mohammed Guessous, Marion J. Levy, Jr., John T. McAlister, Jr., Mancur L. Olson, Jr., Joel Prager, Bryant Wedge, and Oran R. Young. Theoretical work was supported by an award from a National Science Foundation institutional grant to New York University and by the Center for Research on Social Systems (formerly SORO) of American University.

[1] Arnold Forster, "Violence on the Fanatical Left and Right," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCCLXIV (March 1966), 142.

[2] For example, Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution," *World Politics*, XVIII

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cause revolutions have traditionally been regarded as the most significant form of civil strife, because the universe of such events has been defined by reference to their consequences rather than their common characteristics or preconditions, and because the older theoretical generalizations have emphasized primarily the processes of such events and categorization of their concomitants at a low level of generality.[3] But the evidence both of recent history and of systematic attempts at specifying the incidence of civil strife suggests that revolutions are but one of an extraordinarily numerous variety of interrelated forms of strife;[4] that some of these forms, among them coups d'état, guerrilla war, and massive rioting, can alter political processes and social institutions as drastically as any of the classic revolutions; and that the forms themselves are mutable, or rather, that by reifying our arbitrary distinctions among forms of strife we have overlooked some fundamental similarities.[5] Examination of those special conditions and processes that lead from turmoil to revolution provides a partial understanding of revolution *per se*, but for a sufficient explanation we require a more general theory, one capable of accounting for the common elements of that much larger class of events called civil strife.

(January 1966), 159-76, advances the curious argument that collective violence generally cannot be the object of useful theorizing because it is at the same time both pervasive and somehow peripheral.

[3] The emphasis on processes is evident in the major theoretical analyses of the "classic" revolutions, including Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolutions* (Chicago 1927); Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York 1938); George S. Pettee, *The Process of Revolution* (New York 1938); Louis R. Gottschalk, "Causes of Revolution," *American Journal of Sociology*, L (July 1944), 1-9; and Rex D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movements," *Social Forces*, XXVIII (March 1950), 270-79.

[4] A great many counts of the incidence of civil strife events have recently been reported. Harry Eckstein reports 1,632 "internal wars" in the period 1946-1959 in "On the Etiology of Internal Wars," *History and Theory*, IV, No. 2 (1965), 133-63. Rummel and Tanter counted more than 300 "domestic conflict events" per year during the years 1955-1960, including an annual average of 13 guerrilla wars and 21 attempted overthrows of government; see Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations, 1955-60: Turmoil and Internal War," *Peace Research Society Papers*, III (1965), 159-84. Most important to the argument that civil strife is a single universe of events are results of Rudolph Rummel's factor analysis of 236 socioeconomic and political variables, including nine domestic conflict measures, for a large number of nations. Eight of the conflict measures—e.g., number of riots, of revolutions, of purges, of deaths from group violence—are strongly related to a single factor but not significantly related to any others, strong empirical evidence that they comprise a distinct and interrelated set of events. See *Dimensionality of Nations Project: Orthogonally Rotated Factor Tables for 236 Variables*, Department of Political Science, Yale University (New Haven, July 1964), mimeographed.

[5] The "French Revolution" was a series of events that would now be characterized as urban demonstrations and riots, peasant uprisings, and a coup d'état. It is called a revolution in retrospect and by virtue of the Duc de Liancourt's classic remark to Louis XVI. The American Revolution began with a series of increasingly violent urban riots and small-scale terrorism that grew into a protracted guerrilla war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The resort to illicit violence is the defining property that distinguishes these collective events from others. We can regard this as just a definitional point,[6] but it has a crucial theoretical consequence: to direct attention to psychological theories about the sources of human aggression.

Some types of psychological theories about the sources of aggressive behavior can be eliminated at the outset. There is little value in pseudopsychological speculation about revolutionaries as deviants, fools, or the maladjusted. Psychodynamic explanations of the "revolutionary personality" may be useful for microanalysis of particular events but scarcely for general theory. Aggression-prone victims of maladaptive socialization processes are found in every society, and among the actors in most outbreaks of civil violence, but they are much more likely to be mobilized by strife than to be wholly responsible for its occurrence. Nor can a general theory of civil strife rest on culturally specific theories of modal personality traits, though it might well take account of the effects of these traits. Some cultures and subcultures produce significantly more aggression-prone than cooperative personalities, but an explanation of this order says little of the societal conditions that elicit aggression from the aggression-prone, and nothing at all of the capacity for civil violence of even the most apparently quiescent populations.

The only generally relevant psychological theories are those that deal with the sources and characteristics of aggression in all men, regardless of culture. Such psychological theories do not directly constitute a theory of civil strife. They do offer alternative motivational bases for such a theory and provide means for identifying and specifying the operation of some crucial explanatory variables. As is demonstrated in the following section, one or another of these theories is implicit in most theoretical approaches to civil strife that have no explicit motivational base, although only one of them appears highly plausible in the light of empirical evidence.

Psychological Theories of Aggression

There are three distinct psychological assumptions about the generic sources of human aggression: that aggression is solely instinctual, that

[6] The universe of concern, civil violence, is formally defined as *all collective, nongovernmental attacks on persons or property, resulting in intentional damage to them, that occur within the boundaries of an autonomous or colonial political unit.* The terms "civil strife," "violent civil conflict," and "civil violence" are used synonymously in this article. The universe subsumes more narrowly defined sets of events such as "internal war," which Harry Eckstein defines as "any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution, rulers, or policies" (in "On the Etiology of Internal Wars," 133), and "revolution," typically defined in terms of violently accomplished fundamental change in social institutions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it is solely learned, or that it is an innate response activated by frustration.[7] The instinct theories of aggression, represented, among others, by Freud's attribution of the impulse to destructiveness to a death instinct and by Lorenz's view of aggression as a survival-enhancing instinct, assume that most or all men have within them an autonomous source of aggressive impulses, a drive to aggress that, in Lorenz's words, exhibits "irresistible outbreaks which recur with rhythmical regularity."[8] Although there is no definitive support for this assumption, and much evidence to the contrary, its advocates, including Freud and Lorenz, have often applied it to the explanation of collective as well as individual aggression.[9] The assumption is evident in Hobbes's characterization of man in the state of nature and is perhaps implicit in Nieburg's recent concern for "the people's capability for outraged, uncontrolled, bitter, and bloody violence,"[10] but plays no significant role in contemporary theories of civil strife.

Just the opposite assumption, that aggressive behavior is solely or primarily learned, characterizes the work of some child and social psychologists, whose evidence indicates that some aggressive behaviors are learned and used strategically in the service of particular goals—aggression by children and adolescents to secure attention, by adults to express dominance strivings, by groups in competition for scarce values, by military personnel in the service of national policy.[11] The assumption that violence is a learned response, rationalistically chosen and dispassionately employed, is common to a number of recent theoretical approaches to civil strife. Johnson repeatedly, though not consistently, speaks of civil violence as "purposive," as "forms of behavior *intended* to disorient the behavior of others, thereby bringing about the demise

[7] Bryant Wedge argues (in a personal communication) that much human aggression, including some civil strife, may arise from a threat-fear-aggression sequence. Leonard Berkowitz, however, proposes that this mechanism can be subsumed by frustration-aggression theory, the inferred sequence being threat (anticipated frustration)-fear-anger-aggression, in *Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis* (New York 1962), chap. 2. It may be conceptually useful to distinguish the two mechanisms; it nonetheless appears likely that most variables affecting the outcome of the frustration-aggression sequence also are operative in the postulated threat-aggression sequence.

[8] Konrad Lorenz, *On Aggression* (New York 1966), xii.

[9] Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents,* trans. Joan Riviere (London 1930); Lorenz, chaps. 13, 14. Freud's instinctual interpretation of aggression is advanced in his later works; his early view was that aggression is a response to frustration of pleasure-seeking behavior. For a review and critique of other instinct theories of aggression, see Berkowitz, chap. 1.

[10] H. L. Nieburg, "The Threat of Violence and Social Change," *American Political Science Review,* LVI (December 1962), 870.

[11] A characteristic study is Albert Bandura and Richard H. Walters, *Social Learning and Personality Development* (New York 1963). For a commentary on instrumental aggression, see Berkowitz, esp. 30-32, 182-83, 201-2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of a hated social system."[12] Parsons attempts to fit civil violence into the framework of social interaction theory, treating the resort to force as a way of acting chosen by the actor(s) for purposes of deterrence, punishment, or symbolic demonstration of their capacity to act.[13] Schelling is representative of the conflict theorists: he explicitly assumes rational behavior and interdependence of the adversaries' decisions in all types of conflict.[14] Stone criticizes any emphasis on violence as a distinguishing or definitional property of civil strife on grounds that it is only a particular means, designed to serve political ends.[15]

The third psychological assumption about aggression is that it occurs primarily as a response to frustration. A "frustration" is an interference with goal-directed behavior; "aggression" is behavior designed to injure, physically or otherwise, those toward whom it is directed. The disposition to respond aggressively when frustrated is considered part of man's biological makeup; there is an innate tendency to attack the frustrating agent. Learning can and does modify the tendency: what is perceived to be frustrating, modes of aggressive response, inhibition through fear of retaliation, and appropriate targets are all modified or defined in the learning process, typically but not solely during socialization.

Frustration-aggression theory is more systematically developed, and has substantially more empirical support, than theories that assume either that all men have a free-flowing source of destructive energy or that all aggression is imitative and instrumental. Moreover, the kinds of evidence cited in support of theories of the latter type appear to be subsumable by frustration-aggression theory, whereas the converse is not the case.

One crucial element that frustration-aggression theory contributes to the study of civil violence concerns the drive properties of anger. In the recent reformulation of the theory by Berkowitz, the perception of frustration is said to arouse anger, which functions as a drive. Aggressive responses tend not to occur unless evoked by some external cue, but their occurrence is an inherently satisfying response to that anger.[16] Similar-

[12] Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston 1966), 12, 13, italics added.

[13] Talcott Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process," in Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War: Problems and Approaches* (New York 1964), 34-35.

[14] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 4.

[15] P. 161.

[16] The most influential and systematic statement of the theory is John Dollard and others, *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven 1939). Two important recent syntheses of the evidence are Berkowitz, *Aggression*, and Aubrey J. Yates, *Frustration and Conflict* (New York 1962). Also see Leonard Berkowitz, "The Concept of Aggressive Drive: Some Additional Considerations," in Berkowitz, ed., *Advances in Experimental Psychology*, Vol. II (New York 1965), 307-22.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ly, Maier has amassed extensive evidence that the innate frustration-induced behaviors (including regression, fixation, and resignation, as well as aggression) are for the actor ends in themselves, unrelated to further goals and qualitatively different from goal-directed behavior.[17]

To argue that aggression is innately satisfying is not incompatible with the presence of learned or purposive components in acts of individual or collective aggression. Cues that determine the timing, forms, and objects of aggression are learned, just as habits of responding aggressively to moderate as well as severe frustration can be learned. The sense of frustration may result from quite rational analysis of the social universe. Leaders can put their followers' anger to rational or rationalized uses. If anger is sufficiently powerful and persistent it may function as an autonomous drive, leading to highly rational and effective efforts by both leaders and the led to satisfy anger aggressively. The crucial point is that rationalization and organization of illicit violence are typically subsequent to, and contingent upon, the existence of frustration-induced anger. Collective violence may be a calculated strategy of dispassionate elite aspirants, and expectations of gains to be achieved through violence may be present among many of its participants. Nonetheless the implication of frustration-aggression theory is that civil violence almost always has a strong "appetitive," emotional base and that the magnitude of its effects on the social system is substantially dependent on how widespread and intense anger is among those it mobilizes.

If anger implies the presence of frustration, there is compelling evidence that frustration is all but universally characteristic of participants in civil strife: discontent, anger, rage, hate, and their synonyms are repeatedly mentioned in studies of strife. Moreover, the frustration assumption is implicit or explicit in many theoretical analyses of the subject. Smelser's concept of "strain" as one of the major determinants of collective behavior, particularly hostile outbursts and value-oriented movements (revolutions), can be readily reformulated in terms of perceived frustration.[18] So can Willer and Zollschan's notion of "exigency" as a precursor of revolution.[19] Ridker characterizes the consequence of

[17] Norman R. F. Maier, *Frustration: The Study of Behavior Without a Goal* (New York 1949), 92-115, 159-61. Maier postulates a frustration threshold that may open the way to any of four classes of "goal-less" behavior of which aggression is only one. His findings have not been releated adequately to the body of research on the frustration-aggression relationship. One can suggest, however, that the nonaggressive responses—fixation, regression, and apparent resignation—can be treated as more or less innate responses in a response hierarchy which are resorted to in the absence of aggression-evoking cues.

[18] Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York 1963).

[19] David Willer and George K. Zollschan, "Prolegomenon to a Theory of Revolu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

failure to attain economic expectations as "discontent," analogous in source and consequence to anger.[20] In Davies' theory of revolution, the reversal of a trend of socioeconomic development is said to create frustration, which instigates revolution.[21] Galtung's theory of both intranational and international aggression recognizes that "the external conditions leading to aggression ... probably have to pass through the minds of men and precipitate as perceptions with a high emotive content before they are acted out as aggression."[22]

In none of these approaches to theory, however, has frustration-aggression theory been systematically exploited nor have its variables been taken into account.[23] The primary object of this article is to demonstrate that many of the variables and relationships identified in social psychological research on the frustration-aggression relationship appear to underlie the phenomenology of civil violence. Juxtaposition of these two diverse types of material provides a basis for an interrelated set of propositions that is intended to constitute the framework of a general theory of the conditions that determine the likelihood and magnitude of civil violence. These propositions are of two types, whose proposed relationships are diagrammed in Figure 1: (1) propositions about the operation of *instigating variables*, which determine the magnitude of anger, and (2) propositions about *mediating variables*, which determine the likelihood and magnitude of overt violence as a response to anger.[24]

This approach does not deny the relevance of aspects of the social structure, which many conflict theorists have held to be crucial. The supposition is that theory about civil violence is most fruitfully based on systematic knowledge about those properties of men that determine how they react to certain characteristics of their societies.

---

tions," in George K. Zollschan and Walter Hirsch, eds., *Explorations in Social Change* (Boston 1964), 125-51.

[20] Ronald G. Ridker, "Discontent and Economic Growth," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XI (October 1962), 1-15.

[21] James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (February 1962), 5-19.

[22] Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression," *Journal of Peace Research*, II, No. 2 (1964), 95.

[23] Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, in "Aggressive Behaviors Within Polities, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, X (September 1966), 249-71, have formally equated political instability with aggressive behavior and have derived and tested several hypotheses about stability from frustration-aggression theory. They have attempted no general theoretical synthesis, however.

[24] The term "instigating" is adapted from the behavioristic terminology of Dollard and others. Instigating variables determine the strength of instigation, i.e., stimulus or motivation, to a particular kind of behavior. Mediating variables refer to intervening conditions, internal or external to the actors, which modify the expression of that behavior.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



a. The direction(s) of proposed effects on magnitude of civil violence are indicated by + and −.

FIGURE 1. VARIABLES DETERMINING THE LIKELIHOOD AND MAGNITUDE OF CIVIL VIOLENCE

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION: VARIABLES DETERMINING THE MAGNITUDE OF ANGER

My basic premise is that the necessary precondition for violent civil conflict is relative deprivation, defined as actors' perception of dis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

crepancy between their *value expectations* and their environment's apparent *value capabilities*.[25] Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are justifiably entitled. The referents of value capabilities are to be found largely in the social and physical environment: they are the conditions that determine people's perceived chances of getting or keeping the values they legitimately expect to attain. In a comparable treatment, Aberle defines relative deprivation as "a negative discrepancy between legitimate expectation and actuality," viewing expectations as standards, not mere prophecies or hopes.[26] For purposes of general theoretical specification I assume that perceived discrepancies between expectations and capabilities with respect to any collectively sought value—economic, psychosocial, political—constitute relative deprivation. The extent to which some values may be more salient than others is a subject of theoretical and empirical inquiry not evaluated here.

Relative deprivation can be related to the concept of frustration by extending Yates's distinction between the frustrating situation and the frustrated organism.[27] A frustrating situation is one in which an actor is, by objective standards, thwarted by some social or physical barrier in attempts to attain or continue enjoyment of a value. The actor can be said to be frustrated, however, only when he is aware of interference or thwarting. The awareness of interference is equivalent to the concept of relative deprivation as defined above.

A further distinction is necessary between two general classes of deprivation: those that are personal and those that are group or category experiences.[28] For given groups, and for some classes of societies, it is

[25] The phrase "relative deprivation" was first used systematically in Samuel A. Stouffer and others, *The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life*, Vol. I (Princeton 1949), to denote the violation of expectations. J. Stacy Adams reviews the concept's history and some relevant evidence and suggests that feelings of injustice intervene between the condition of relative deprivation and responses to it, in "Inequity in Social Exchange," in Berkowitz, ed., *Advances in Experimental Psychology*, 267-300. The "injustice" aspect is implicit in my definition and use of relative deprivation as *perceived* discrepancy between what people think they will get and what they believe they are entitled to. The Stouffer concept has been related to levels of social satisfaction and to anomie, but has not, so far as I know, been associated with the discontent-anger-rage continuum in the frustration-aggression relationship.

[26] David F. Aberle, "A Note on Relative Deprivation Theory," in Sylvia L. Thrupp, ed., *Millennial Dreams in Action: Essays in Comparative Study* (The Hague 1962), 209-14. Bert Hoselitz and Ann Willner similarly distinguish between expectations, regarded by the individual as "what is rightfully owed to him," and aspirations, which represent "that which he would like to have but has not necessarily had or considered his due," in "Economic Development, Political Strategies, and American Aid," in Morton A. Kaplan, ed., *The Revolution in World Politics* (New York 1962), 363.

[27] Pp. 175-78.

[28] Aberle, 210.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

possible to identify events and patterns of conditions that are likely to be widely seen as unjust deprivation. Such events may occur abruptly—for example, the suppression of a political party or a drastic inflation—or slowly, like the decline of a group's status relative to other social classes. Such conditions can be called collective frustrations[29] to distinguish them from such unexpected personal frustrations as failure to obtain an expected promotion or the infidelity of a spouse, which may be relatively common but randomly incident in most populations.

Whether empirical research ought to focus on conditions defined as collectively frustrating or directly on perceived deprivation is an operational question whose answer depends on the researcher's interest and resources, not upon the following theoretical formulation. Survey techniques permit more or less direct assessment of the extent and severity of relative deprivation.[30] To the extent that the researcher is prepared to make assumptions about measurable conditions that are collectively frustrating in diverse nations, cross-national aggregate data can be used in correlational studies.[31]

The basic relationship can be summarized in a proposition analogous to and assuming the same basic mechanism as the fundamental theorem of frustration-aggression theory:[32]

> *Proposition 1.1*: The occurrence of civil violence presupposes the likelihood of relative deprivation among substantial numbers of individuals in a society; concomitantly, the more severe is relative deprivation, the greater are the likelihood and intensity of civil violence.

This proposition may be truistic, although theories were noted above which attempt to account for civil strife without reference to discontent. Moreover, relative deprivation in some degree can be found in any society. The usefulness of the basic proposition is best determined by reference to the set of propositions that qualify it. These propositions specify the conditions that determine the severity and in some cases the

[29] The Feierabends use the comparable term "systemic frustration" to describe the balance between "social want satisfaction" and "social want formation."

[30] Hadley Cantril's work offers examples, especially *The Pattern of Human Concerns* (New Brunswick 1965).

[31] This approach is exemplified by the Feierabends' work and by Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," *World Politics*, XVI (April 1964), 442-54.

[32] The basic postulate of Dollard and others is that "the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression" (p. 1). It is evident from context and from subsequent articles that this statement was intended in more qualified fashion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

occurrence of deprivation, whether or not it is likely to lead to civil violence, and the magnitude of violence when it does occur. The fundamental question, which is susceptible to a variety of empirical tests, is whether the proposed precise relationship between severity of deprivation, as determined by variables I.2 through I.5, and magnitude of violence does hold when the effects of the mediating variables M.1 through M.5 are taken into account.

DEFINITIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Civil violence and relative deprivation are defined above. If relative deprivation is the perception of frustrating circumstances, the emotional response to it tends to be anger. Obviously there are degrees of anger, which can usefully be regarded as a continuum varying from mild dissatisfaction to blind rage. The severity of relative deprivation is assumed to vary directly with the modal strength of anger in the affected population; the determinants of strength of anger are specified in propositions I.2 to I.5, below.

The concept of magnitude requires elaboration. Various measures of quantity or magnitude of aggression are used in psychological research on the frustration-aggression relationship—for example, the intensity of electric shocks administered by frustrated subjects to a supposed frustrater, numbers of aggressive responses in test situations, or the length of time frustrated children play destructively with inanimate objects. A consideration of theory, however, suggests that no single measure of magnitude of aggression is *prima facie* sufficient. Assuming the validity of the basic frustration-aggression postulate that the greater the strength of anger, the greater the quantity of aggression, it seems likely that strong anger can be satisfied either by inflicting severe immediate damage on the source of frustration or by prolonged but less severe aggression, and that either of these tactics is probably more or less substitutable for the other. Which alternative is taken may very well be a function of opportunity, and while opportunities can be controlled in experimental situations, in civil violence they are situationally determined. Hence neither severity nor duration alone is likely to reflect the modal strength of collective anger or, consequently, to constitute an adequate measure of magnitude of civil violence.

Moreover, there are evidently individual differences—presumably normally distributed—in the strength of anger needed to precipitate overt aggression. Hence the proportion of a population that participates in collective violence ought to vary with the modal strength of anger: discontent will motivate few to violence, anger will push more across

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the threshold, rage is likely to galvanize large segments of a collectivity into action. This line of argument suggests that magnitude of civil violence has three component variables: the degree of participation within the affected population, the destructiveness of the aggressive actions, and the length of time violence persists.

Frustration-aggression theory stipulates a set of variables that determine the strength of anger or discontent in response to a given frustration. Dollard and others initially proposed that the strength of instigation to aggression (anger) varies with "(1) the strength of instigation to the frustrated response, (2) the degree of interference with the frustrated response, and (3) the number of frustrated response-sequences."[33] The first of these variables, modified in the light of empirical evidence, provides the basis for propositions about characteristics of value expectations that affect the intensity of anger. The second and third variables, similarly modified, suggest several propositions about value capabilities.

Before the propositions are presented, two qualifications of the classic behaviorist conceptualization of frustration as interference with specific, goal-directed responses must be noted. First, it appears from examination of specific outbreaks of civil violence that abrupt awareness of the likelihood of frustration can be as potent a source of anger as actual interference. The Vendée counterrevolution in eighteenth-century France was triggered by the announcement of military conscription, for example.[34] A survey of twentieth-century South African history shows that waves of East Indian and Bantu rioting historically have coincided with the parliamentary discussion of restrictive legislation more than with its actual imposition. The Indian food riots in the spring of 1966 were certainly not instigated by the onset of starvation but by its anticipation.

Second, it seems evident that the sense of deprivation can arise either from interference with goal-seeking behavior or from interference with continued enjoyment of an attained condition. As an example from psychological experimentation, frustration is often operationalized by insults; it seems more likely that the insults are a threat to the subjects' perceived level of status attainment or personal esteem than they are an interference with behavior directed toward some as-yet-unattained goal. Several examples from the history of civil violence are relevant. A student of the coup d'état that overthrew the Perón regime in Argentina states that the crucial events that precipitated the anti-Perónists into action were Perón's public insults to the Catholic hier-

[33] *Ibid.*, 28.
[34] Charles Tilly, *The Vendée* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

archy and isolated physical depredations by his supporters against Church properties—events symbolizing an attack on the moral foundations of upper-middle-class Argentine society.[35] In Soviet Central Asia, according to Massell, the most massive and violent resistance to Sovietization followed systematic attempts to break Muslim women loose from their slavish subordination to Muslim men.[36] The two kinds of interference may have differential effects on the intensity and consequences of anger; the point to be made here is that both can instigate violence.

Consequently, analysis of the sources of relative deprivation should take account of both actual and anticipated interference with human goals, as well as of interference with value positions both sought and achieved. Formulations of frustration in terms of the "want:get ratio," which refers only to a discrepancy between sought values and actual attainment, are too simplistic. Man lives mentally in the near future as much as in the present.[37] Actual or anticipated interference with what he has, and with the act of striving itself, are all volatile sources of discontent.

VALUE EXPECTATIONS

The propositions developed here concern the effects on perceived deprivation of the salience of an expectation for a group, rather than the absolute level of the expectation.[38] The first suggestion derived from psychological theory is that the more intensely people are motivated toward a goal, or committed to an attained level of values, the more sharply is interference resented and the greater is the consequent insti-

[35] Reuben de Hoyos, personal communication.

[36] Gregory Massell, "The Strategy of Social Change and the Role of Women in Soviet Central Asia: A Case Study in Modernization and Control," Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1966.

[37] For this kind of approach, see Daniel Lerner, "Toward a Communication Theory of Modernization: A Set of Considerations," in Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton 1963), 330-35.

[38] This general statement of theory is concerned with specification of variables and their effects, not with their content in specific cases; hence the conditions that determine the *levels* of expectation and changes in those levels are not treated here, nor are the conditions that affect perceptions about value capabilities. For some attempts to generalize about such conditions see Ted Gurr, "The Genesis of Violence: A Multivariate Theory of Civil Strife," Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1965, esp. chaps. 6-8. For empirical evaluation or application of the theory, it is of course necessary to evaluate in some way levels of expectation in the population(s) studied. Some approaches to evaluation are illustrated in Ted Gurr with Charles Ruttenberg, *The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model*, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 28 (Princeton 1967), and Ted Gurr, "Explanatory Models for Civil Strife Using Aggregate Data," a paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gation to aggression. One can, for example, account for some of the efficacy of ideologies in generating civil violence by reference to this variable. The articulation of nationalistic ideologies in colonial territories evidently strengthened preexisting desires for political independence among the colonial bourgeoisie at the same time that it inspired a wholly new set of political demands among other groups. Similarly, it has been argued that the desire of the nineteenth-century European factory worker for a better economic lot was intensified as well as rationalized by Marxist teachings.

Experimental evidence has suggested qualifications of the basic proposition which are equally relevant. One is that the closer men approach a goal, the more intensely motivated toward it they appear to be.[39] This finding has counterparts in observations about civil violence. Hoffer is representative of many theorists in noting that "discontent is likely to be highest when misery is bearable [and] when conditions have so improved that an ideal state seems almost within reach. . . . The intensity of discontent seems to be in inverse proportion to the distance from the object fervently desired."[40] The intensity of motivation varies with the perceived rather than the actual closeness of the goal, of course. The event that inflicts the sense of deprivation may be the realization that a goal thought to be at hand is still remote. The mechanism is clearly relevant to the genesis of post-independence violence in tropical Africa. Failure to realize the promises of independence in the Congo had extraordinarily virulent results, as is evident in a comparison of the intensive and extensive violence of the uprisings of the "Second Independence" of 1964-1965 with the more sporadic settling of accounts that followed the "First Independence" of 1960.[41]

The proposition relates as well to the severity of discontent in societies in the full swing of socioeconomic change. The rising bourgeoisie of eighteenth-century France, for example, individually and collectively had a major commitment to their improving conditions of life, and great effort invested in them. Many felt their aspirations for political influence and high social status to be close to realization but threatened by the declining responsiveness of the state and by economic deprivations inherent in stumbling state efforts to control trade and raise taxes.[42]

[39] See Berkowitz, *Aggression*, 53-54.

[40] Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York 1951), 27-28.

[41] Compare Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo* (Princeton 1965), chap. 13, with commentaries on the Kwilu and Stanleyville rebellions, such as Renée C. Fox and others, " 'The Second Independence': A Case Study of the Kwilu Rebellion in the Congo," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* VIII (October 1965), 78-109; and Herbert Weiss, *Political Protest in the Congo* (Princeton 1967).

[42] See, among many other works, Georges Lefebvre, *The Coming of the French Revolution* (Princeton 1947), Part II.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Although much additional evidence could be advanced, the relationships cited above are sufficient to suggest the following proposition and its corollaries:

Proposition I.2: The strength of anger tends to vary directly with the intensity of commitment to the goal or condition with regard to which deprivation is suffered or anticipated.

I.2a: The strength of anger tends to vary directly with the degree of effort previously invested in the attainment or maintenance of the goal or condition.

I.2b: The intensity of commitment to a goal or condition tends to vary inversely with its perceived closeness.

It also has been found that, under some circumstances, anticipation or experience of frustration tends to reduce motivation toward a goal. This is particularly the case if frustration is thought to be justified and likely.[43] Pastore, for example, reports that when subjects saw frustration as reasonable or justifiable, they gave fewer aggressive responses than when they perceived it to be arbitrary. Kregarman and Worchel, however, found that the reasonableness of a frustration did not significantly reduce aggression and that anticipation of frustration tended not to reduce anger but rather to inhibit external aggressive responses.[44]

The low levels of motivation and the moderate nature of interference that characterize these studies make generalization to "real," collective situations doubtful. If applied to a hypothetical example relevant to civil strife—say, the effects of increased taxation on a population under conditions of varying legitimacy attributed to the action—the experimental findings suggest three alternatives: (1) that anger varies inversely with the legitimacy attributed to interference; (2) that anger is constant, but inhibition of its expression varies directly with legitimacy; or (3) that no systematic relationship holds between the two. If the sources of legitimacy are treated in Merelman's learning-theory terms, the first of these alternatives appears most likely: if legitimacy is high, acceptance of deprivation (compliance) provides symbolic substitute rewards.[45]

[43] Value expectations are defined above in terms of the value positions to which men believe they are justifiably entitled; the discussion here assumes that men may also regard as justifiable some types of interference with those value positions.

[44] Nicholas Pastore, "The Role of Arbitrariness in the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XLVII (July 1952), 728-31; John J. Kregarman and Philip Worchel, "Arbitrariness of Frustration and Aggression," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LXIII (July 1961), 183-87.

[45] The argument is that people comply "to gain both the symbolic rewards of governmental action and the actual rewards with which government originally associated itself" and rationalize compliance with "the feeling that the regime is a morally appro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It may also be that the first alternative holds in circumstances in which legitimacy is high, the second in circumstances in which it is moderate. The first relationship can be formulated in propositional form, with the qualification that evidence for it is less than definitive:

Proposition I.3: The strength of anger tends to vary inversely with the extent to which deprivation is held to be legitimate.

VALUE CAPABILITIES

The environment in which people strive toward goals has two general characteristics that, frustration-aggression theory suggests, affect the intensity of anger: the degree of interference with goal attainment and the number of opportunities provided for attainment.

Almost all the literature on civil strife assumes a causal connection between the existence of interference (or "frustration," "cramp," or "disequilibrium") and strife. "Discontent" and its synonyms are sometimes used to symbolize the condition of interference without reference to interference *per se*. A direct relationship between degree of interference and intensity of strife is usually implicit but not always demonstrated. Rostow has shown graphically that poor economic conditions—high wheat prices, high unemployment—corresponded with the severity of overt mass protest in England from 1790 to 1850.[46] Variations in bread prices and in mob violence went hand in hand in revolutionary France.[47] There is correlational evidence that the frequency of lynchings in the American South, 1882-1930, tended to vary inversely with indices of economic well-being.[48] From cross-national studies there is suggestive evidence also—for example, Kornhauser's correlation of —.93 between per capita income and the Communist share of the vote in sixteen Western democracies in 1949.[49] The Feierabends devised "frustration" measures, based on value capability characteristics of sixty-two nations, and correlated them with a general measure of degree of political stability, obtaining a correlation coefficient of .50.[50]

priate agent of control . . ." (Richard M. Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, LX [September 1966], 551). The argument applies equally well to compliance, including acceptance of deprivation, with the demands of other social institutions.

[46] Walt W. Rostow, *British Economy of the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford 1948), chap. 5.

[47] George Rudé, "Prices, Wages, and Popular Movements in Paris During the French Revolution," *Economic History Review*, VI (1954), 246-67, and *The Crowd in History, 1730-1848* (New York 1964), chap. 7.

[48] Carl Hovland and Robert Sears, "Minor Studies in Aggression, VI: Correlation of Lynchings with Economic Indices," *Journal of Psychology*, IX (1940), 301-10.

[49] William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (New York 1959), 160.

[50] "Aggressive Behaviors Within Polities."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As far as the precise form of the relationship between extent of interference and intensity of aggression is concerned, the experimental results of Hamblin and others are persuasive. Three hypotheses were tested: the classic formulation that instigation to aggression varies directly with the degree of interference, and the psychophysical hypotheses that aggression ought to be a log or a power function of interference. The data strongly support the last hypothesis, that aggression is a power function of degree of interference—i.e., if magnitude of aggression is plotted against degree of interference, the result is a sharply rising "J-curve." Moreover, the power exponent—the sharpness with which the J-curve rises—appears to increase with the strength of motivation toward the goal with which interference was experienced.[51] It is at least plausible that the J-curve relationship should hold for civil strife. Compatible with this inference, though not bearing directly on it, is the logarithmic distribution curve that characterizes such cross-polity measures of intensity of civil violence as deaths per 100,000 population.[52] It also may account for the impressionistic observation that moderate levels of discontent typically lead to easily quelled turmoil but that higher levels of discontent seem associated with incommensurately intense and persistent civil violence. In propositional form:

> *Proposition I.4*: The strength of anger tends to vary as a power function of the perceived distance between the value position sought or enjoyed and the attainable or residual value position.[53]

Experimental evidence regarding the hypothesis of Dollard and others that the greater the number of frustrations, the greater the instigation to aggression is somewhat ambiguous. Most people appear to have hierarchies of response to repeated frustration, a typical sequence being intensified effort, including search for alternative methods or substitute goals, followed by increasingly overt aggression as other responses are extinguished, and ultimately by resignation or apparent acceptance of frustration. Berkowitz suggests that most such evidence, however, is congruent with the interpretation that "the probability of emotional reactions is a function of the degree to which all possible

[51] Robert L. Hamblin and others, "The Interference-Aggression Law?" *Sociometry*, XXVI (1963), 190-216.

[52] Bruce M. Russett and others, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven 1963), 97-100.

[53] There is a threshold effect with reference to physical well-being. If life itself is the value threatened and the threat is imminent, the emotional response tends to be fear or panic; once the immediate threat is past, anger against the source of threat tends to manifest itself again. See n. 7 above, and Berkowitz, *Aggression*, 42-46.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nonaggressive responses are blocked, more than to the interference with any one response sequence."[54]

The societal equivalents of "all possible nonaggressive responses" can be regarded as all normative courses of action available to members of a collectivity for value attainment, plus all attainable substitute value positions. Relevant conditions are evident in the portraits of "transitional man" painted by Lerner and others. Those who are committed to improving their socioeconomic status are more likely to become bitterly discontented if they have few rather than many prospective employers, if they can get no work rather than some kind of work that provides a sense of progress, if they have few opportunities to acquire requisite literacy and technical skills, if associational means for influencing patterns of political and economic value distributions are not available, or if community life is so disrupted that hearth and kin offer no surcease from frustration for the unsuccessful worker.[55] All such conditions can be subsumed by the rubric of "opportunities for value attainment," with the qualification that perception of opportunities tends to be more crucial than actual opportunities.

Much evidence from studies of civil strife suggests that the greater are value opportunities, the less intense is civil violence. The argument appears in varying guises. Brogan attributes the comparative quiescence of mid-nineteenth-century English workers vis-à-vis their French counterparts in part to the proliferation in England of new cooperatives, friendly and building societies, and trade unions, which provided positive alternatives to violent protest.[56] The first of the American Negro urban rebellions in the 1960's occurred in a community, Watts, in which by contemporary accounts associational activity and job-training programs had been less effective than those of almost any other large Negro community. Cohn explains the high participation of unskilled workers and landless peasants in the violent millenarian frenzies of medieval Europe by reference to the lack of "the material and emotional support afforded by traditional social groups; their kinship groups had disintegrated and they were not effectively organised in village communities or in guilds; for them there existed no regular, institutionalised methods of voicing their grievances or pressing their claims."[57] Kling attributes the chronic Latin American pattern of coup d'état to

[54] Leonard Berkowitz, "Repeated Frustrations and Expectations in Hostility Arousal," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LX (May 1960), 422-29.

[55] See, for example, Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe 1958).

[56] Denis W. Brogan, *The Price of Revolution* (London 1951), 34.

[57] Norman R. C. Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, 2d ed. rev. (New York 1961), 315.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the lack of adequate alternatives facing elite aspirants with economic ambitions; political office, seized illicitly if necessary, provides opportunity for satisfying those ambitions.[58]

More general observations also are relevant. Economists suggest that government can relieve the discontents that accompany the strains of rapid economic growth by providing compensatory welfare measures—i.e., alternative means of value satisfaction.[59] Numerous scholars have shown that migration is a common response to deprivation and that high emigration rates often precede outbreaks of civil violence. In a cross-national study of correlates of civil violence for 1961-1963, I have found a rather consistent association between extensive educational opportunities, proportionally large trade union movements, and stable political party systems on the one hand and low levels of strife on the other, relationships that tend to hold among nations whatever their absolute level of economic development. Education presumably increases the apparent range of opportunity for socioeconomic advance, unionization can provide a secondary means for economic goal attainment, and parties serve as primary mechanisms for attainment of participatory political values.[60] Hence:

Proposition 1.5: The strength of anger tends to vary directly with the proportion of all available opportunities for value attainment with which interference is experienced or anticipated.

The Mediation of Anger: The Effects of Social Control and Social Facilitation

For the purpose of the theoretical model I assume that the average strength of anger in a population is a precise multiple function of the instigating variables. Whether or not civil violence actually occurs as a response to anger, and its magnitude when it does occur, are influenced by a number of mediating variables. Evidence for these variables and their effects is found both in the psychological literature and in studies of civil violence *per se*. It is useful to distinguish them according to whether they inhibit or facilitate the violent manifestation of anger.

SOCIAL CONTROL: THE EFFECTS OF RETRIBUTION

The classic formulation is that aggression may be inhibited through

[58] Merle Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," *Western Political Quarterly*, IX (March 1956), 21-35.

[59] Ridker, 15; Mancur Olson, Jr., "Growth as a Destabilizing Force," *Journal of Economic History*, XXIII (December 1963), 550-51.

[60] Gurr with Ruttenberg.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fear of "such responses on the part of the social environment as physical injury, insults, ostracism, and deprivation of goods or freedom."[61] Good experimental evidence indicates that anticipation of retribution is under some circumstances an effective regulator of aggression.[62] Comparably, a linear relationship between, on the one hand, the capacity and willingness of government to enforce its monopoly of control of the organized instrumentalities of force and, on the other, the likelihood of civil violence is widely assumed in the literature on civil strife. Strong apparent force capability on the part of the regime ought to be sufficient to deter violence, and if violence should occur, the effectiveness with which it is suppressed is closely related to the likelihood and intensity of subsequent violence. Smelser states that a major determinant of the occurrence of civil strife is declining capacity or loyalty of the police and military control apparatus.[63] Johnson says that "the success or failure of armed insurrection and . . . commonly even the decision to attempt revolution rest . . . upon the attitude (or the revolutionaries' estimate of that attitude) that the armed forces will adopt toward the revolution."[64] In Janos' view, the weakening of law-enforcement agencies "creates general disorder, inordinate concrete demands by various groups, and the rise of utopian aspirations."[65] Military defeat is often empirically associated with the occurrence of revolution. Race riots in the United States and elsewhere have often been associated with tacit approval of violence by authorities.[66] Paret and Shy remark that "terror was effective in Cyprus against a British government without sufficient political strength or will; it failed in Malaya against a British government determined and able to resist and to wait."[67]

It also has been proposed, and demonstrated in a number of experimental settings, that if aggression is prevented by fear of retribution or by retribution itself, this interference is frustrating and increases anger. Maier, for example, found in animal studies that under conditions of

[61] Dollard and others, 34.

[62] For summaries of findings, see Richard H. Walters, "Implications of Laboratory Studies of Aggression for the Control and Regulation of Violence," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCCLXIV (March 1966), 60-72; and Elton D. McNeil, "Psychology and Aggression," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (September 1959), 225-31.

[63] Pp. 231-36, 261-68, 332, 365-79.

[64] Chalmers Johnson, *Revolution and the Social System* (Stanford 1964), 16-17.

[65] Andrew Janos, *The Seizure of Power: A Study of Force and Popular Consent*, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 16 (Princeton 1964), 5.

[66] See, for example, H. O. Dahlke, "Race and Minority Riots: A Study in the Typology of Violence," *Social Forces*, XXX (May 1952), 419-25.

[67] Peter Paret and John W. Shy, *Guerrillas in the 1960's*, rev. ed. (New York 1964), 34-35.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

severe frustration, punishment increased the intensity of aggression.[68] Walton inferred from such evidence that a curvilinear relationship ought to obtain between the degree of coerciveness of a nation and its degree of political instability, on the argument that low coerciveness is not frustrating and moderate coerciveness is more likely to frustrate than deter, while only the highest levels of coerciveness are sufficient to inhibit men from civil violence. A permissiveness-coerciveness scale for eighty-four nations, based on scope of political liberties, has been compared against the Feierabends' political stability scale, and the results strongly support the curvilinearity hypothesis.[69] Bwy, using a markedly different measure of coerciveness—one based on defense expenditures—found the same curvilinear relationship between coerciveness and "anomic violence" in Latin America.[70] Some theoretical speculation about civil strife implies the same relationship—for example, Lasswell and Kaplan's stipulation that the stability of an elite's position varies not with the actual use of violence but only with ability to use it,[71] and Parsons' more detailed "power deflation" argument that the repression of demands by force may inspire groups to resort to increasingly intransigent and aggressive modes of making those demands.[72]

One uncertainty about the curvilinear relationship between retribution and aggression is whether or not it holds whatever the extent of initial deprivation-induced anger. It is nonetheless evident that the threat or employment of force to suppress civil violence is by no means uniform in its effects, and that it tends to have a feedback effect that increases the instigation to violence. Such a relationship is diagrammed in Figure 1 and is explicit in the following proposition and its corollary:

> *Proposition M.1*: The likelihood and magnitude of civil violence tend to vary curvilinearly with the amount of physical or social retribution anticipated as a consequence of participation in it, with likelihood and magnitude greatest at medium levels of retribution.
>
> *M.1a*: Any decrease in the perceived likelihood of retribution tends to increase the likelihood and magnitude of civil violence.

These propositions and corollaries, and all subsequent propositions,

[68] *Frustration*, *passim*.

[69] Jennifer G. Walton, "Correlates of Coerciveness and Permissiveness of National Political Systems: A Cross-National Study," M.A. thesis, San Diego State College, 1965.

[70] Douglas Bwy, "Governmental Instability in Latin America: The Preliminary Test of a Causal Model of the Impulse to 'Extra-Legal' Change," paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, 1966.

[71] Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry* (New Haven 1950), 265-66.

[72] "Some Reflections on the Place of Force."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hold only, of course, if deprivation-induced anger exists. If the modal level of collective discontent is negligible, a condition that holds for at least some small, although few large, collectivities, the mediating variables have no inhibiting or facilitating effects by definition.

The propositions above do not exhaust frustration-aggression evidence about effects of retribution. Experimental evidence further indicates that a delay in the expression of the aggressive response increases its intensity when it does occur.[73] Observations about civil violence also suggest that the effects of feared retribution, especially external retribution, must take account of the time variable. The abrupt relaxation of authoritarian controls is repeatedly associated with intense outbursts of civil violence, despite the likelihood that such relaxation reduces relative deprivation. Examples from recent years include the East German and Hungarian uprisings after the post-Stalin thaw, the Congo after independence, and the Dominican Republic after Trujillo's assassination.

A parsimonious way to incorporate the time dimension into frustration-aggression theory is to argue that in the short run the delay of an aggressive response increases the intensity of anger and consequently the likelihood and magnitude of aggression, but that in the long run the level and intensity of expectations decline to coincide with the impositions of reality, and anger decreases concomitantly. Cognitive dissonance theory would suggest such an outcome: men tend to reduce persistent imbalances between cognitions and actuality by changing reality, or, if it proves intransigent, by changing their cognitive structures.[74] The proposed relationship is sketched in Figure 2.



FIGURE 2. DISPLACEMENT OF INSTIGATION TO VIOLENCE OVER TIME

[73] J. W. Thibaut and J. Coules, "The Role of Communication in the Reduction of Interpersonal Hostility," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XLVII (October 1952), 770-77.

[74] See Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston 1957).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One example of experimental evidence to this point is the finding of Cohen and others that once subjects became accustomed to certain kinds of frustration—withdrawal of social reinforcement in the experimental situation used—they were less likely to continue to seek the desired value or condition.[75] One can, moreover, speculate that the time-scale is largely a function of the intensity of commitment to the frustrated response or condition. The effects of South Africa's apartheid policies and the means of their enforcement offer an example. These policies, which impose substantial and diverse value-deprivations on non-whites, especially those in urban areas, were put into effect principally in the 1950's. Violent protests over their implementation were repressed with increasing severity, culminating in the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 and a series of strikes and riots. By the mid-1960's, when deprivation was objectively more severe than at any time previously in the twentieth century, levels of civil strife were very low, inferentially the result of very high levels of deterrence (feared retribution). Since deprivation remains severe and has affected a wide range of values, avoidance of violence in this case probably would require the maintenance of very high and consistent deterrence levels beyond the active life-span of most of those who have personally experienced the initial value-deprivation. Any short-run decline in the perceived likelihood or severity of retribution, however, is highly likely to be followed by intense violence. In propositional form:

Proposition M.2: Inhibition of civil violence by fear of external retribution tends in the short run to increase the strength of anger but in the long run to reduce it.

M.2a: The duration of increased anger under conditions of inhibition tends to vary with the intensity of commitment to the value with respect to which deprivation is suffered.

SOCIAL CONTROL: THE EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED DISPLACEMENT

On the evidence, the effects of repression in managing discontent are complex and potentially self-defeating in the short run. Displacement theory suggests means that are considerably more effective. Several aspects of displacement theory are relevant for civil violence. Among Miller's basic propositions about object and response generalization is the formulation that the stronger the fear of retribution relative to the

[75] Arthur R. Cohen and others, "Commitment to Social Deprivation and Verbal Conditioning," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LXVII (November 1963), 410-21.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strength of anger, the more dissimilar will the target of aggression be from the source of interference and the more indirect will be the form of aggression.[76] With reference to object generalization, Berkowitz has proposed and demonstrated that hostility tends to generalize from a frustrater to previously disliked individuals or groups.[77] A counterpart of this thesis is that displaced aggressive responses tend to be expressed in previously used forms.

Examples of object generalization in civil violence are legion. Several studies have shown positive relationships between poor economic conditions and lynchings of Negroes in the American South.[78] An initial reaction of urban white colonialists to African rural uprisings in Madagascar in 1947 and Angola in 1961 was vigilante-style execution of urban Africans who had no connections with the rebellions. English handweavers, when their livelihood was threatened by the introduction of new weaving machines, destroyed thousands of machines in the Luddite riots of 1811-1816, but almost never directly attacked the employers who installed the machines and discharged superfluous workers.[79]

Object generalization is a crucial variable in determining who will be attacked by the initiators of particular acts of civil violence, but is only peripheral to the primary concern of the theory, the determination of likelihood and magnitude of violence as such. Most important in this regard is the psychological evidence regarding response generalization. Experimental evidence suggests that only a narrow range of objects provides satisfying targets for men's aggressive responses, but that almost any form of aggression can be satisfying so long as the angry person believes that he has in some way injured his supposed frustrater.[80]

By extension to the collectivity, insofar as adequate response displacement options are available, much anger may be diverted into activity short of civil violence. The evidence is diverse and extensive that participation in political activity, labor unions, and millenarian religious

[76] Neal E. Miller, "Theory and Experiment Relating Psychoanalytic Displacement to Stimulus-Response Generalization," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XLIII (April 1948), 155-78.

[77] *Aggression*, chap. 6.

[78] See n. 48 above.

[79] Rudé, *The Crowd in History*, chap. 5. The high levels of verbal aggression directed against the employers suggest that displacement was involved, not a perception of the machines rather than employers as sources of deprivation. In the Luddite riots, fear of retribution for direct attacks on the owners, contrasted with the frequent lack of sanctions against attacks on the machines, was the probable cause of object generalization. In the Madagascar and Angola cases structural and conceptual factors were responsible: the African rebels were not accessible to attack but local Africans were seen as like them and hence as potential or clandestine rebels.

[80] Some such evidence is summarized in Berkowitz, "The Concept of Aggressive Drive," 325-27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

movements can be a response to relative deprivation which permits more or less nonviolent expression of aggression. Studies of voting in the United States show that politicians in farm states are rather consistently voted out of office after periods of low rainfall and that the occurrence of natural disasters may lead to hostility against officials.[81] Extremist voting—which may be regarded as nonviolent aggression—in nine European countries during the Depression has been shown to correlate +.85 with the percentage of the labor force unemployed.[82] Studies of labor movements repeatedly document the transformation of labor protest from violent to nonviolent forms as unionization increases. Comparative and case studies similarly document the development of aggressive millenarian religious movements as a response to natural disaster or political repression, in places and eras as diverse as medieval Europe, colonial Africa, and among the indigenous peoples of the Americas and the South Pacific.[83]

This is not to imply that displacement is a sole or exclusive function of such institutions. Their instrumental functions for participants (Proposition I.5) can be crucial: peaceful political and union activism are alternative means to goals whose attainment by other means is often impaired; religious chiliasm provides hope and belief for those whose social universe has been destroyed. But insofar as men become accustomed to express discontents through such institutional mechanisms, the likelihood that anger will lead to civil violence is diminished. In propositional form:

> *Proposition M.3*: The likelihood and magnitude of civil violence tend to vary inversely with the availability of institutional mechanisms that permit the expression of nonviolent hostility.

SOCIAL FACILITATION: COGNITIVE FACTORS

Experimental, developmental, and field studies of the effects of rewarding individual aggression demonstrate that habitual aggression may be developed and maintained through intermittent rewards and may also be generalized to situations other than those in which the habits were acquired.[84] A number of experiments indicate that the pres-

[81] A critical and qualifying review of evidence to this effect is F. Glenn Abney and Larry B. Hill, "Natural Disasters as a Political Variable: The Effect of a Hurricane on an Urban Election," *American Political Science Review*, LX (December 1966), 974-81.

[82] Kornhauser, 161. For interview evidence on the motives of protest voting, see Hadley Cantril, *The Politics of Despair* (New York 1958).

[83] Representative studies are Cohn; James W. Fernandez, "African Religious Movements: Types and Dynamics," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, II, No. 4 (1964), 531-49; and Vittorio Lanternari, *The Religions of the Oppressed* (New York 1963).

[84] Summarized in Walters.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ence of cues or stimuli associated with anger instigators is necessary for most aggressive responses to occur. A summary proposition is that "a target with appropriate stimulus qualities 'pulls' (evokes) aggressive responses from a person who is ready to engage in such actions either because he is angry or because particular stimuli have acquired cue values for aggressive responses from him."[85]

For members of a collectivity a variety of common experiences can contribute to the acquisition of aggressive habits and the recognition of aggression-evoking cues. Among them are socialization patterns that give normative sanction to some kinds of aggressive behavior; traditions of violent conflict; and exposure to new generalized beliefs that justify violence. The literature on civil violence suggests at least four specific modes by which such experiences facilitate violent responses to deprivation. They can (1) stimulate mutual awareness among the deprived, (2) provide explanations for deprivation of ambiguous origin, (3) specify accessible targets and appropriate forms of violence, and (4) state long-range objectives to be attained through violence.

Subcultural traditions of violent protest are well documented in European history. The frequency with which Parisian workers and shopkeepers took to the streets in the years and decades following the great *journées* of 1789 is one example. At least 275 food riots, most of them similar in form and sequence, took place in rural England between 1725 and 1800 in close correlation with harvest failures and high food prices.[86] Hobsbawm points out that in Southern Italy "every political change in the nineteenth century, irrespective from what quarter it came, automatically produced its ceremonial marches of peasants with drums and banners to occupy the land," while in Andalusia "millenarian revolutionary waves occurred at roughly ten-year intervals for some sixty or seventy years."[87] Lynching as a Southern white response to Negro transgressions and the mobbing of white policemen by Negroes are comparable expressions of subcultural traditions that facilitate civil violence.

The theoretical point is that the initial occurrences of civil violence among some homogeneous group of the deprived—those events that set the pattern—tend to be nonrational responses to extreme deprivation. If violence provides a satisfactory outlet for tensions or if it motivates authorities to remedy the sources of deprivation, civil violence

[85] Leonard Berkowitz, "Aggressive Cues in Aggressive Behavior and Hostility Catharsis," *Psychological Review*, LXXI (March 1964), 104-22, quotation from 106.
[86] Rudé, *The Crowd in History*, 19-45.
[87] E. J. Hobsbawm, *Social Bandits and Primitive Rebels*, 2nd ed. (Glencoe 1959), 63-64.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tends to become a sanctioned group activity. The fact that normative support for violence thus develops does not mean that violence subsequently occurs without instigation. Deprivation remains a necessary precondition for violence; the strength of anger at which it is likely to occur is lowered.

A related source of attitudinal support for collective violence is the articulation of ideology or, more generally, what Smelser calls generalized belief among the deprived. Such beliefs, ranging from rumors to fully articulated ideologies, are said to develop in situations characterized by social strain that is unmanageable within the existing framework for social action.[88] It is evident that in many social settings relative deprivation is manifest but its sources obscure. In psychological terms, no cues associated with the anger instigator are present. The agency responsible for an unwanted tax increase is apparent to the most ignorant villager; the causes of economic depression or of the disintegration of traditional mores are often unclear even to economists and sociologists. A new ideology, folk-belief, or rumor can serve to define and explain the nature of the situation, to identify those responsible for it, and to specify appropriate courses of action.

Moreover, there usually are a number of competing generalized beliefs circulating among the deprived. Those most likely to gain acceptance tend to be those with substantial aggressive components, i.e., those that rationalize and focus the innate drive to aggression. Cohn's comparative study of the waves of chiliastic excitement that swept medieval Europe in times of plague and famine, for example, documents the fact that the heresies that most effectively mobilized the deprived were those that suited or could be molded to their states of mind: "when . . . eschatological doctrines penetrated to the uprooted and desperate masses in town and country they were re-edited and reinterpreted until in the end they were capable of inspiring revolutionary movements of a peculiarly anarchic kind."[89]

Some of these observations can be summarized in this proposition and its corollary:

Proposition M.4: The likelihood and magnitude of civil violence tend to vary directly with the availability of common experiences and beliefs that sanction violent responses to anger.

M.4a: Given the availability of alternative experiences and beliefs, the likelihood that the more aggressive of them will prevail tends to vary with the strength of anger.

[88] Chap. 5. [89] P. 31.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOCIAL FACILITATION: SOURCES OF GROUP SUPPORT FOR VIOLENCE

A classic subject of social psychological theory is the extent to which some social settings facilitate overt aggression. It is incontrovertible that individuals tend to behave in crowds differently from the way they act alone. The crowd psychologies of scholars such as Le Bon and Sorokin have emphasized the "unconscious" nature of crowd behavior and its "de-individuating" effects.[90] It appears more fruitful to examine experimentally identified variables that contribute to the "crowd behavior" phenomenon. From this point of departure one can distinguish at least three modes by which groups affect individuals' disposition to violence: (1) by providing normative support, (2) by providing apparent protection from retribution, and (3) by providing cues for violent behavior.

1. *Normative support.* There is good experimental evidence that individuals alone or in poorly cohesive groups are less likely to express hostility than those in highly cohesive groups. Members of highly cohesive friendship groups respond to external frustrations with greater hostility than randomly formed groups. Similarly, if individuals believe that their peers generally agree with them about a frustrater, their public display of antagonism more closely resembles their privately expressed antagonism than if they do not perceive peer agreement.[91]

Theoretical and empirical studies of civil violence repeatedly refer to the causal efficacy of comparable conditions. Social theorists describe the perception of anonymity and of universality of deprivation characteristic of riotous crowds. Hopper's classic picture of group interaction under conditions of relative deprivation in the early stages of the revolutionary process is relevant: by participating in mass or shared behavior, discontented people become aware of one another; "their negative reactions to the basic factors in their situations are shared and begin to spread. . . . Discontent . . . tends to become focalized and collective."[92] Comparative studies of labor unrest show that the most strike-prone industries are those whose workers are relatively homogeneous and isolated from the general community.[93] Some of the efficacy of revolu-

[90] Gustave Le Bon, *The Psychology of Revolution* (London 1913); Pitirim Sorokin, *The Sociology of Revolutions* (Philadelphia 1925).

[91] Representative studies include J. R. P. French, Jr., "The Disruption and Cohesion of Groups," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XXXVI (July 1941), 361-77; A. Pepitone and G. Reichling, "Group Cohesiveness and the Expression of Hostility," *Human Relations*, VIII, No. 3 (1955), 327-37; and Ezra Stotland, "Peer Groups and Reactions to Power Figures," in Dorwin Cartwright, ed., *Studies in Social Power* (Ann Arbor 1959), 53-68.

[92] Pp. 272-75, quotation from 273.

[93] Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel, "The Isolated Mass and the Integrated Individual:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tionary brotherhoods and tightly knit bands of rebels in prosecuting civil violence can be interpreted in terms of the reinforcement of mutual perception of deprivation and the justification of violence as a response to it.

2. *Protection from retribution.* Groups appear capable of reducing fears of external retribution for violence in at least three ways. Crowd situations in particular provide members with a shield of anonymity. In an experimental study by Meier and others, two-thirds of subjects who were prepared to join a lynching mob said, *inter alia*, that they would do so because in the crowd they could not be punished. The same relationship is apparent in the handful of studies made of riot participants: crowd members usually feel insulated from retribution.[94]

Organized groups can provide apparent protection from retribution by acquiring sufficient force capability to prevent the agents of retribution—i.e., military and internal security forces—from effectively reaching them. Increases in the relative force capability of a deprived group may also reinforce rationalization for violence by raising hopes of success or may merely facilitate the expression of rage by providing desperate men with the means to strike at tormentors who had previously been unassailable.

A third aspect of group protectiveness is the perceived effect of hierarchical organization and the presence of highly visible leaders. Leaders of revolutionary organizations, in addition to their other manifest functions, not only foment but assume responsibility for illicit violence. Their followers tend to see such leaders as the likely objects of retaliatory efforts and hence feel less personal risk.

3. *Cues for violence.* The transition from anger to aggression is not automatic or even abrupt. Laboratory studies of imitative behavior repeatedly document the significance of aggression-releasing cues provided by social models. The act of punishing aggression itself can serve as a model for imitation by the person punished. Aggression-releasing cues need not necessarily originate with high-status persons. Polansky and others found that when frustrations were imposed on groups of children, "impulsive" but low-status children were both initiators and ready followers of aggressive behavioral contagion. On the other hand, not any aggressive model evokes aggression from angered subjects; the

An International Analysis of the Inter-Industry Propensity to Strike," in Arthur Kornhauser and others, eds., *Industrial Conflict* (New York 1954), 189-212.

[94] Norman C. Meier and others, "An Experimental Approach to the Study of Mob Behavior," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XXXVI (October 1941), 506-24. Also see George Wada and James C. Davies, "Riots and Rioters," *Western Political Quarterly*, X (December 1957), 864-74.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

models that evoke greatest aggression are those associated with the subjects' present situation or with settings in which they were previously aggressive.[95]

Angry crowds of men also appear to require some congruent image or model of violent action before they will seize cobblestones or rope or rifles to do violence to fellow citizens. Such models may be symbolic: invocation of a subcultural tradition of violence by a leader, or articulation of a new generalized belief that is explicit in its prescription of violence. In general, however, a "call to arms" or an appeal to a tradition of violence appears less effective by itself than when accompanied by the sight or news of violence. The calculated use of terrorism by rebels can have such an effect, and so can a soldier's random shot into a crowd of demonstrators. Many specific cases of civil violence have been set off by comparable acts of violence elsewhere. "Revolutionary contagion" is evident in the 1830 and 1848 waves of European revolutionary upheavals and in the post-Stalin uprisings in Eastern Europe and Siberia. The same phenomenon is apparent in the initiation of innumerable cases of small-scale, unstructured violence. Series of riots in rural France and England have graphically been shown to spread outward from one or a few centers, riots occurring in the furthest villages days or weeks after the initial incident. Such patterning is evident, to mention a few cases, in the French Corn Riots of 1775, the "Plug-Plot" riots around Manchester in 1842, and the incidence of farmers' protest meetings and riots in Brittany in the summer of 1961.[96] The demonstration effect apparent in such series of events appears to have affected their form and timing more than the likelihood of the occurrence of strife. The people who responded to the events were already angered; they probably would have erupted into violence in some form sometime in the proximate future.

These three modes of group facilitation of civil violence can be summarized in propositional form:

> *Proposition M.5*: The likelihood and magnitude of civil violence tend to vary directly with the extent to which the deprived occupy organizational and/or ecological settings that provide (1) normative support through high levels of interaction, (2) apparent protection from retribution, and (3) congruent models for violent behavior.

[95] See Walters; Norman Polansky and others, "An Investigation of Behavioral Contagion in Groups," *Human Relations*, III, No. 3 (1950), 319-48; and Leonard Berkowitz and Russell G. Geen, "Film Violence and the Cue Properties of Available Targets," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, III (June 1966), 525-30.

[96] Rudé, *The Crowd in History*; Henri Mendras and Yves Tavernier, "Les Manifestations de juin 1961," *Revue française des sciences politiques*, XII (September 1962), 647-71.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Forms of Civil Violence

The theoretical framework comprising the ten propositions is formally restricted to physically violent collective behavior. It is likely that it is as applicable to a still larger class of events, including those characterized by the threat of violence or by high levels of verbal aggression —for example, bloodless coups, demonstrations, and political strikes. Violent events tend to be more salient for the political system, however, and for most operational purposes constitute a more workable and clearly defined universe.

I have not discussed the propositions with reference to specific forms of civil violence on grounds that all of the variables specified are relevant to each form specified in current typologies.[97] It is nonetheless likely that the propositions are of differential weight for different forms, and it is useful to demonstrate how variations in form may be generally accounted for in the context of the theoretical model. The first question to be asked is how detailed a listing of forms one should attempt to account for. A series of factor analytic studies provide a systematic, empirical answer to that question. In each of eleven studies, data on the incidence and characteristics of various types of strife were collected and tabulated, by country, and the "country scores" (number of riots, assassinations, deaths from civil violence, coups, mutinies, guerrilla wars, and so on, in a given time period) were factor analyzed. Whatever the typology employed, the period of reference, or the set of countries, essentially the same results were obtained. A strong *turmoil* dimension emerges, characterized by largely spontaneous strife such as riots, demonstrations, and nonpolitical clashes, quite distinct from what we may call a *revolutionary* dimension, characterized by more organized and intense strife. This revolutionary dimension has two components, appearing in some analyses as separate dimensions: *internal war*, typically including civil war, guerrilla war, and some coups; and *conspiracy*, typically including plots, purges, mutinies, and most coups.[98] Events within each of the three types tend to occur together; events within any two or all three categories are less likely to do so. The implication is

[97] Representative typologies are proposed by Johnson, *Revolution and the Social System*, 26-68; Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," *Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research*, VIII (1963), 25-26; and Harry Eckstein, "Internal Wars: A Taxonomy," unpubl. (1960).

[98] Two summary articles on these factor analyses are Rudolph J. Rummel, "A Field Theory of Social Action With Application to Conflict Within Nations," *Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research*, X (1965), 183-204; and Tanter. What I call internal war is referred to in these sources as subversion; I label conspiracy what these sources call revolution. My terminology is, I believe, less ambiguous and more in keeping with general scholarly usage.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that they are substantively distinct forms of strife for each of which separate explanation is required.

Two complementary approaches to accounting for these three basic types of civil violence can be proposed within the context of the theoretical model. The first is that the two major dimensions, turmoil and revolution, reflect the varying class incidence of deprivation among societies. The defining characteristic of "turmoil" events is mass participation, usually rather spontaneous, disorganized, and with low intensity of violence; the forms of "revolution" reflect organized, often instrumental and intense, application of violence. The ability to rationalize, plan, and put to instrumental use their own and others' discontent is likely to be most common among the more skilled, highly educated members of a society—its elite aspirants. Thus if the incidence of mass deprivation is high but elite deprivation low, the most likely form of civil violence is turmoil. But if severe discontent is common to a substantial, alienated group of elite aspirants, then organized, intensive strife is likely.

The forms of revolution differ principally in their scale and tactics: internal wars are large-scale, and their tactics are typically to neutralize the regime's military forces; conspirators, usually few in number, attempt to subvert the regime by striking at its key members.

The differences between internal war and conspiracy can be accounted for by several characteristics. If severe deprivation is restricted largely to elite aspirants, the consequence is likely to be "conspiracy" phenomena such as plots, coups d'état, and barracks revolts. If discontent is widespread among substantial numbers of both mass and elite aspirants, the more likely consequence is large-scale, organized violence —civil and guerrilla war. The strategic position of the discontented elite aspirants may be relevant as well. If they are subordinate members of the existing elite hierarchy, they are likely to attack the regime from within, hence coups, mutinies, and plots. If they are instead excluded from formal membership in the elite though they possess elite qualities —acquired, for example, through foreign education—they must organize violent resistance from without. These are essentially Seton-Watson's explanations for the relative frequency of conspiracy in underdeveloped societies compared with the frequency of massive revolutionary movements in more developed states. In summary, "it is the combination of backward masses, extremist intellectuals and despotic bureaucrats which creates the most conspiratorial movements."[99]

[99] Hugh Seton-Watson, "Twentieth Century Revolutions," *Political Quarterly*, XXII (July 1951), 258.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These observations are of course only the beginning of an accounting of the forms of civil strife. They are intended to demonstrate, however, that such a theoretical explanation not only is compatible with but can be formulated within the framework of the theoretical model by showing the loci of deprivation in a society. They can be stated thus in propositional form:

Proposition F.1: The characteristic form of civil violence tends to vary with the differential incidence of relative deprivation among elite aspirants and masses: (1) mass deprivation alone tends to be manifested in large-scale civil violence with minimal organization and low intensity; (2) elite-aspirant deprivation tends to be manifested in highly organized civil violence of high intensity.

F.1a: Whether organized and intense civil violence is large-scale or small-scale is a joint function of the extent of mass deprivation and the strategic access of deprived elite aspirants to the incumbent political elite.

Conclusion

I have advanced eleven general propositions about the variables operative in generating and structuring violent political unrest. They are based on the assumption that the frustration-aggression mechanism, however culturally modified, is the source of most men's disposition to illicit collective violence. The propositions do not constitute a theory of the revolutionary process or of the outcomes of strife, but of the conditions that determine the *likelihood* and *magnitude* of strife. On the other hand, the variables stipulated by the propositions are not irrelevant to revolutionary processes. Process models can be formulated wholly or partly in terms of changing patterns of weights on the component variables.

It is likely that most "causes" and "correlates" of the occurrence and intensity of civil strife can be subsumed by these variables, with one exception: foreign intervention. This exception is no oversight but simply recognition that decisions to intervene are external to domestic participants in civil strife. The effects of foreign intervention can be readily interpreted by reference to the model, however: intervention on behalf of the deprived is likely to strengthen group support (M.5) and may, as well, heighten and intensify value expectations (I.2). Foreign assistance to a threatened regime is most likely to raise retribution levels (M.1), but may also alter aspects of value capabilities (I.4, I.5) and strengthen justification for violence among the deprived, insofar as they identify foreigners with invaders (M.4).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The framework has not been elaborated merely to provide a satisfying theoretical reconstruction of the general causes of civil violence. It is intended primarily as a guide for empirical research using the techniques of both case and comparative studies. The framework stipulates the variables for which information should be sought in any thorough case study of the origins of an act of civil strife.[100] For purposes of comparative analysis it stipulates relationships that should hold among cultures and across time. Its most important objectives are to encourage empirical validation of its component propositions in a variety of contexts by a variety of operational means, and specification of their separate weights and interacting effects in those contexts.[101]

[100] For example, it has been used by Bryant Wedge to analyze and compare interview materials gathered in the study of two Latin American revolutions, in "Student Participation in Revolutionary Violence: Brazil, 1964, and Dominican Republic, 1965," a paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1967.

[101] Studies based on this theoretical model and using cross-national aggregate data include Ted Gurr, *New Error-Compensated Measures for Comparing Nations: Some Correlates of Civil Strife*, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 25 (Princeton 1966); Gurr with Ruttenberg; Gurr, "Explanatory Models for Civil Strife"; and Gurr, "Why Urban Disorders? Perspectives From the Comparative Study of Civil Strife," *American Behavioral Scientist* (forthcoming).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Articles

THE GERMAN PROBLEM 1945-1950

By KLAUS EPSTEIN

Hans Peter Schwarz, *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik: Deutschland im Widerstreit der aussenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren der Besatzungsherrschaft 1945-1949*, Berlin and Neuwied, Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1966, 884 pp. DM 38.

I. Range and Methodology of the Book

SCHWARZ'S study *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik* is, in the opinion of this reviewer, the single most important book on the occupation period in Germany after World War II that has yet appeared. It is not an ordinary narrative history—indeed, it presupposes a good deal of prior knowledge—but is rather a topical analysis of the following problems: the various possible solutions to the German question in the years after 1945; the policies toward Germany of the four victorious powers—Russia, France, Britain, and the United States; the development of German attitudes on the future political orientation of one or two Germanies; and finally, the factors that led to the voluntary acceptance of Western integration by most West Germans even though this integration meant the partition of Germany.

Schwarz's study is important because the author has based it upon new material, because he has woven a vast array of old material into a revealing pattern that yields new insights, because he has used a methodology calculated to bring out the most significant factors in the post-1945 situation, and because he has the knack of both asking and answering the right kind of question. He has found much new material in the archives of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic party (SPD), which permits him to explain in detail for the first time the genesis of Adenauer's and Schumacher's conceptions of foreign policy. He has also uncovered new material on the meetings of the premiers of the various West German *Länder* and on meetings between German and Allied authorities. This material he was permitted to see but not to quote, since "official" German records for the period after 1945 are covered by the traditional fifty-year rule.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Schwarz's use of old material is notable for its marvellous synthesis of German, American, British, and French materials (significant Russian materials are, unfortunately, virtually unavailable), including official, memoir, journalistic, and secondary sources.

The author's method consists of selecting key representatives of each school of thought concerning future German policy, analyzing their views in depth, and seeking to probe their motives. His examination of their "subjective motives" is always accompanied by careful analysis of the "objective elements" of the German situation. He is concerned with the interaction between various groups and schools of thought, and he gives special emphasis to four types of conflict situation: between the four great powers; between different policy-making factions within each of these powers; between these four victorious powers, collectively and singly, and the defeated Germans living under their occupation; and between Germans themselves, with their variegated orientation depending upon factors such as political position, ideology, party affiliation, and zonal residence. Schwarz's preoccupation with conflict and alternatives provides color and drama unusual in an analytic work and frees him from any kind of historical determinism. He insists that the situation was quite "open" in 1945, with the possibility that the German problem would be "solved" in ways other than the partition that actually evolved in the years 1945-1949. His main interest is in questions such as, At what time, under the impact of what forces did partition become inevitable? and Why and how did the vast majority of West Germans voluntarily opt for Western integration, though this meant the partition of their country?

Schwarz is fascinated by the methodological problem of writing a study of German foreign policy conceptions at a time when a sovereign Germany had ceased to exist, when there was no foreign office or other organ charged with conducting foreign relations, and when Germans were not supposed to have any foreign policy at all other than that of obeying their conquerors. This situation made for an exceptional degree of interaction between areas traditionally segregated under the labels "domestic" and "foreign," for every action of both the victors and the Germans in fields far removed from conventional diplomacy—drafting provincial boundaries, regulating the food supply, licensing parties and newspapers—was bound to have far-reaching consequences for future foreign policy. In the absence of a German government and diplomatic corps, foreign policy functions were exercised by the premiers of individual *Länder* (Bavaria, Württemberg, and so on), by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

German officials sitting on consultative zonal bodies (the *Länderrat* of the American Zone and the *Zonenbeirat* of the British Zone), and by the leaders of the Bizonal Frankfurt *Wirtschaftsrat*. The claim of all these men to speak for Germany was challenged by the leaders of the emerging political parties (Adenauer of the CDU, Schumacher of the SPD) who claimed that they alone spoke for a broad national constituency and with complete independence from the pressures of military government. In the special German situation, particular importance must also be attached to the voice of the German press, despite the fact that its organs were licensed and censored in various degrees by the different military governments. Schwarz succeeds in the difficult task of examining various organs of opinion without letting his examination degenerate into endless paraphrases; moreover, he wisely avoids any attempt to "quantify" opinions expressed in a situation where public opinion polls were virtually meaningless.

Though the book deals with a subject of explosive emotional potential, one still charged with high contemporary significance, Schwarz generally proceeds *sine ira et studio*. He is concerned with unraveling the truth about important and intricate questions rather than with praising heroes or ferreting out villains. His scholarly detachment does not, however, mean that he lacks a point of view or refuses to pass specific judgment on people and ideas. He believes that Germany's integration into the West became inevitable after the summer of 1947 and that it has on the whole been beneficial for Germany and the world. He is frankly hostile to both the Russians' maximum goal (communizing all of Germany) and their minimum goal (communizing the East Zone and drawing a sharp line against West Germany), but he keeps free of any strident cold-war rhetoric. He deplores the creation and perpetuation of the partition of Germany, but views it as the *unintentional* result of "understandable" Allied actions (both Russian and American) in the years 1945-1949, rather than of any deliberate design—and he never forgets that the man primarily responsible for the division of Germany was Adolf Hitler. Schwarz's frequently sharp judgments on individual figures are usually directed not against their moral values but against their inadequate understanding of "objective" realities. For example, he attacks those Germans who wanted to "mediate" the cold war between the Russian and American "giants" for exaggerating the influence of a puny, defeated, discredited Germany—irrespective of the "desirability" of such mediation; and, a second example, he ridicules those Germans who advocated a decentralized state devoted to farming

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and handicrafts for ignoring the inevitability of modern urban industrialization, whatever its problems and however undesirable its by-products.

It should be added that the value of Schwarz's book is quite independent of whether or not the reader agrees with all of the author's judgments. There can be no disagreement that he has provided a stimulating analysis based upon scrupulous examination of all available sources. In view of the length, detail, and difficulty of the book, it may prove helpful to outline its main themes in a simplified pattern—with the intention, needless to say, of whetting the appetite rather than replacing warm hash with cold.

II. Alternative Solutions for Germany

There were, basically, five theoretically possible solutions to the German problem in 1945: a four-power agreement on a "Carthaginian peace"; a four-power agreement on a "neutralized" Germany standing outside existing power blocs; Soviet domination of all of Germany; Western domination of all of Germany, leading eventually to a free united Germany allied with the West; and a partition of Germany between a Western-oriented West Germany and an Eastern-dominated East Germany. Each of these solutions was promoted and hindered by several factors and attitudes among both Allies and Germans.

1. A "Carthaginian peace" was desired by strong currents of public opinion in all the victorious powers, an entirely understandable fact at a time when Nazi horrors were fresh in everyone's mind. Its ingredients would have been Allied annexation of broad German territories (e.g., annexation of the country up to the Oder-Neisse line by Russia and Poland, and of the Rhineland by France); internationalization of the Ruhr; a drastic economic policy of dismantling, reparations, and "industrial ceilings" in the spirit of the Morgenthau Plan; and permanent Allied controls over Germany to enforce this harsh policy upon a hungry, sullen, and rebellious "native" population. Such a policy was "objectively" impossible—at least in the long run—for two reasons: it could never win the support of the German people and hence could not be permanently acceptable to governments responsive to a "civilized" public opinion; and it presupposed permanent agreement between Russia and the United States not to mobilize German resources against one another. If it is accepted that the cold war between Russia and the U.S. was "inevitable" (even apart from conflict over Germany), then it is clear that a "Carthaginian peace" was based upon a utopian premise of continued Allied harmony.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

2. A four-power agreement on a neutralized, united Germany enjoying an ever-increasing measure of self-government—in short, the solution applied to the Austrian problem in 1955—also meant that Germany would be subjected to punitive, discriminatory treatment, although the chances of winning German support obviously stood in inverse proportion to the degree of punishment and discrimination. Like the first, this solution was made virtually impossible by the mutual hostility of Russia and America in the cold war, as well as by the incompatibility of their aims, the basic factor behind the cold war. By 1947 these aims were made apparent in Germany by the Russians' "Sovietizing" their zone and making enormous reparations demands, while the Americans promoted democracy and free enterprise, subsidized their zone, and worked for the integration of Western Germany into the (Western) European Recovery Program.

3. The Soviet domination of all of Germany—and presumably all of Europe—was a genuine possibility if the U.S. were to relapse into isolationism, withdraw its troops from Europe, and fail to buttress the sagging Western European economy. These possibilities were taken very seriously indeed by many influential people until the Marshall Plan of 1947 and the negotiation of NATO in 1949. Thereafter Soviet domination could only be the result of victorious war.

4. The Western domination of all of Germany—and perhaps of much of Eastern Europe as well—could have been achieved only through a ruthless Western exploitation of military superiority in 1945 to impose unfavorable (though possibly "just") terms upon the Russians. Such a policy was advocated by Winston Churchill in June 1945, but it was never seriously considered by President Truman and would not have been supported by public opinion at the time.

5. The last theoretical solution was the partition of Germany at the zonal boundary of 1945, dividing a democratic West Germany from a Communist East Germany. The latter could be created and maintained only through Russian coercion; the former, though perhaps initiated originally by American pressure, could be maintained only with the voluntary concurrence of the majority of West Germans. Such concurrence could, in fact, be achieved because the American program of a West Germany integrated into Western Europe and the Atlantic Community offered West Germans broad advantages: psychological "rehabilitation" from the pariah status created by Nazism; a democratic libertarian constitutional structure; an economic revival promoted by Marshall Plan funds; security against Communist designs, as proved by the Berlin airlift and the permanent stationing of Allied troops; de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

feat of the French desire for dismemberment; and Allied refusal to recognize the Polish annexation of the Eastern territories. America's ideas on West Germany's specific internal structure—federalism as opposed to centralization, free-enterprise capitalism as opposed to socialism—were naturally more acceptable to the CDU than to the SPD, but the latter's leaders were willing to go along in the hope of securing changes after they had won (as they expected to win) control of the West German state through an early electoral victory.

Some of the drawbacks of a clear-cut option for the West were only temporary; others were believed to be so. There would be some delay in securing "equality of status" for West Germany within the Western alliance, and the U.S. was willing to make considerable concessions to the British until 1950 on the question of industrial dismantling (however incompatible with the Marshall Plan) and to the French on the questions of an International Ruhr Authority (replaced only in 1952 by the Schuman Plan) and the economic annexation of the Saar (terminated only in 1956 by Franco-German agreement). The greatest drawback of a West German state, the partition of Germany, was believed by nearly all West German leaders to be temporary: both Adenauer and Schumacher believed in the so-called magnet theory, which assumed that a free, prosperous, and strong Germany would prove irresistibly attractive to the East Germans. It has, indeed, proved so to the *population* of East Germany; but East Germany's Russian masters have unfortunately been able to prevent this irresistibility from being translated into unification.

III. The Policies of the Four Powers

Schwarz's analysis of the German policy of each of the four occupation powers is excellent in showing two interconnected facts: that factions with very different policy conceptions contended for supremacy within each civilian government and its military authorities; and that there were considerable changes within each country's policy in the years 1945-1947, with 1947 constituting a general watershed between a "policy of ambivalence" (or "postponement") that left different options open and a "policy of decision" that led by a seeming inevitability to the partition of Germany.

America's German policy was marked by continuous conflict between a "vindictive" Left, which strove for a "Carthaginian peace" in cooperation with Russia, and a "realistic" Right, which wanted to enlist West German resources in the cold war against communism. The Left believed itself to be carrying out the legacy of President Roosevelt; its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

program found an extreme expression in the Morgenthau Plan and a somewhat more moderate expression in the basic occupation directive, JCS 1067, of April 26, 1945. It wanted to cooperate with "our heroic Russian ally" in eliminating the triple evil of militarism, Junkerism, and big capital through a common policy administered through the Allied Control Council (the four-power authority, composed of the four Allied military commanders, set up at Berlin on July 30, 1945). Secretary of State James Byrnes and Deputy Military Commander (after 1947, Commander) Lucius Clay were initial supporters of this policy until they learned, by the late summer of 1946, that it meant economic ruin for the American Zone (necessitating food imports financed by the American tax-payer) and economic ruin for Western Europe (with the opportunity for Communist takeovers) because of the traditional interdependence of the German and Western European coal and steel economy. They were also appalled by the horrors perpetrated by the Russians in their zone, the Russian-encouraged expulsion of twelve million German refugees from Eastern Europe, and the astronomic Russian reparations demands, which far exceeded Germany's ability to pay (and would, if taken from the Western zones, be paid indirectly by the American government that subsidized those zones).

General Clay and other American military officers in contact with German realities began in fact a quiet sabotage of JCS 1067 by the summer of 1946; their sensible attitude was soon strengthened when the outbreak of the cold war between the U.S. and Russia made a viable West Germany seem desirable. Clay's "realism" was also reinforced by the declining influence of the "Carthaginian" school in Washington (following Henry Wallace's departure from the Cabinet), the development of the "containment policy" with George Kennan as its articulate spokesman, the replacement of Byrnes by Marshall as Secretary of State, and the Republican triumph in the congressional elections of 1946. Prominent Republicans like Herbert Hoover, and his main adviser on German policy, émigré economist Gustav Stolper, were ideologically sympathetic to German big business threatened by dismantling and above all placed "economic common sense" above vindictive passions. The result of the triumph of these new ideas of U.S. policy-making was a decision in the autumn of 1947 to promote the creation of a West German state closely linked with Western Europe—a policy which the Russians were bound to oppose and which the British and French supported only as the result of considerable American pressure.

The British constituted the smallest obstacle. Though Labourite Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was personally very anti-German (he had

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

never forgiven the SPD for its "chauvinism" in 1914), he was essentially pragmatic in his outlook and maintained a constant feud with the Labourite left wing with its demand for a distinctly "socialist" foreign policy whose tenets included cooperation with Russia at Germany's expense. Bevin could count for support upon the bulk of the Labour party and upon the Tory opposition, especially Winston Churchill, whose advocacy of conciliation with Germany was no doubt promoted by his anticommunism. (In most ways British views paralleled those of the "realistic" American Right.) In "domestic" German politics the British Labour government naturally favored the SPD with its program of socialism, but it did so with little vigor and its policy was sometimes sabotaged by predominantly antisocialist Tory officers in the occupation administration. In any case, Britain ceased to have an independent German policy by the autumn of 1946; at that time its inability to feed its zone (with its huge Ruhr industrial complex but inadequate agricultural hinterland) forced Britain to agree to an economic merger with the U.S. zone through the Bizonia agreement (September 4, 1946, effective January 1, 1947). The U.S. thenceforth paid the piper and called the tune in a common Anglo-American policy.

France's German policy in the first years after 1945, as formulated by General de Gaulle and implemented by Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, frankly aimed at terminating the "German danger" once and for all. It called for the permanent dismemberment of Germany, a veto upon the "central administrative bodies" contemplated by the Potsdam Conference, the internationalization of the Ruhr with a paramount voice for France, the dismantling of German industry and heavy reparations, and the long-term control of what remained of Germany by the armies of occupation. This policy could not, of course, win any indigenous German support; its implementation far exceeded France's strength in the face of American opposition; and it ignored France's dependence upon Marshall Plan aid (whose grant was implicitly made conditional upon France's cooperation in an economically "sensible" German policy). Luckily for the future of Franco-German relations, French policy shifted in 1948 (not least because of American pressure) from dismemberment in the tradition of Richelieu to conciliation in the spirit of a "new Europe" (a shift connected with Robert Schuman's replacing Bidault at the Foreign Office). The friction between civilian government and military occupation authorities (already noted in the case of Britain and the U.S.) became especially pronounced in the French case after 1948. The French zonal command under General Koenig remained stubbornly "Gaullist" in its outlook on German policy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and did its (unsuccessful) best to sabotage the creation of a West German state in 1948-1949.

Russian policy toward Germany after 1945 is especially hard to analyze because revealing sources are unavailable. It is clear, however, that the Russians operated under well-nigh fatal handicaps in carrying out any policy requiring popular German support. They were burdened by the traditional Russophobia of most Germans, by memories of Goebbels' propaganda, by atrocities perpetrated by their troops in 1945, by their own understandable but impolitic desire for quick and heavy reparations, by the cession of the Oder-Neisse territories to Poland, and by their brutal expulsion of the twelve million Germans living in Eastern Europe. Additional handicaps were the hatred of communism felt by nearly all Germans—the Right because it still had something to lose, the Social Democratic Left because it deeply resented the "shotgun marriage" between the East Zone SPD and the minuscule Communist party in April 1946. The arbitrary and terroristic manner in which social reforms were imposed upon the East Zone caused general revulsion even among those Germans who believed that some of these reforms, e.g., the expropriation of the Junkers, were long overdue.

These handicaps (some inevitable, some created) suggest that the Russians never had any realistic chance in establishing any policy aiming at influence in Germany beyond their zonal boundary; this appears to have been the view of Colonel Tulpanov, the main "political officer" of the Soviet military government, and of the "radical" faction of the Moscow Politburo allegedly led by Zhdanov. Another group of Russians, however, including Ambassador Semjonov (the Foreign Office delegate at Berlin) and representing a "moderate" Moscow faction allegedly led by Beria, had some hope for the creation of centralized German institutions that they hoped either to dominate or, at least, to use to block the otherwise inevitable integration of West Germany into the anti-Soviet bloc promoted by American policy. The creation of "all-German institutions" was conspicuously advocated by Foreign Minister Molotov at the Four-Power Conference of Foreign Ministers held at Paris (July 1946) and at Moscow (April 1947); it was rejected by the Americans partly because it was accompanied by unacceptable reparation demands, partly because it flew in the face of American federalist ideas, and mostly (in 1947) because it would prevent the by then much desired integration of West Germany into the West. It should be added that the Russians proved slippery in matters of detail, perhaps because their proposals constituted more propaganda than policy. (Must the Russians not have reckoned with the probability that Ger-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

man central institutions would be dominated by anti-Communists?) It cannot be denied, however, that as propaganda their proposals were largely successful, not so much at the time (since objective needs drove most West Germans to support a West German state at the price of freezing partition) but for the future: they created the basis for the widely held view that the Americans were *at least* as responsible for Germany's partition as the Russians. The Russians probably felt they had nothing to lose by their proposals: if rejected, they were good propaganda; if accepted, they would block the Western integration of West Germany at least temporarily. Moreover, Russia could probably either influence or sabotage any centralized institutions established, and as a last resort it could always fall back upon its unchallenged control of its own East Zone.

IV. The Attitude of the Germans

Germans with the ambition to play a conspicuous role in the emergence of a future Germany were in a most unenviable position in 1945. They stood in the crossfire of highly divergent Allied conceptions, and it required the gift of prophecy to assess the future constellation of forces correctly. The policies of the two major powers, America and Russia, were highly ambivalent; no one could foresee whether, and when, their vindictive policies (JCS 1067, brutal exploitation of the East Zone) would yield to more constructive ones. Basic questions were shrouded in uncertainty. Would the U.S. maintain its troops in Germany, or would it relapse into isolationism? Would Russia make a credible attempt to achieve a neutralized Germany governed by German administrative bodies, or would it concentrate on imposing communism upon the East Zone? A man's career, perhaps even his life, might depend upon guessing the correct answer to these questions. To commit oneself to America might prove fatal if American withdrawal was followed by Soviet domination; to commit oneself to Soviet-sponsored neutrality might bar a career in West Germany if the Americans stayed and the country was partitioned. It is easy to say that "men of principle" *ought* not to have been influenced by "opportunist" considerations, but these inevitably played a role in men's thinking. Among active politicians, ambition and principle are rarely far apart, though it must be said that the three politicians whose careers Schwarz analyzes in detail—Jakob Kaiser, Konrad Adenauer, and Kurt Schumacher—did not hesitate to "stick their necks out" long before the future constellation of German affairs became evident; two of them—Kaiser and Schu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

macher—were to fail because their principles led them to assume positions against the stream.

These three men stood for three very different ideals of Germany's future policy: a "bloc-free" united Germany remaining neutral between the cold-war contenders, a free-enterprise West Germany clearly aligned with the West, and a socialist Germany that combined a basically Western orientation with occasional hopes that a *politically* neutralized united Germany was still possible, perhaps as part of a "socialist third force" between capitalist America and Communist Russia.

Jakob Kaiser, a former Christian trade unionist and survivor of the anti-Hitler conspiracy, was head of the East Zone CDU (a party harassed but tolerated by the Russian military government). He wanted a neutralized, united Germany in which the creation of centralized administrative boards would eventually be followed by a democratic government. Such a government (beginning with an advisory "national representative body" composed of leaders of all parties) was advocated by Kaiser in the spring of 1947. He believed that it would counteract zonal particularism in the name of national unity, seek a creative synthesis between Western democracy (minus capitalism) and Eastern socialism (minus totalitarianism) through "Christian socialism," and serve more generally as a bridge between East and West. There is no question that centralized government in Berlin appeared to be not only in Germany's national interest but in Kaiser's personal interest also. Who would be more suitable to head such a government than Kaiser, the leader of the strongest non-Communist party in the East Zone, with headquarters in Berlin, the still undivided old German capital? Even if he did not reach this pinnacle of ambition, a centralized united Germany constituted the only hope for preventing the complete Sovietization of the East Zone and the consequent undermining of the independence of Kaiser's own East-CDU.

Kaiser's policy was destined to fail because of a variety of factors beyond his personal control: it could not count upon either solid Allied or German support, and it led him into a tragic isolation from all parties. His plans presupposed a four-power agreement on Germany which the cold war made impossible, as Russia progressively Sovietized its own zone and America became increasingly anxious to organize a West German state. His proposal for a "national representative body" was disliked by the Allied powers as cheeky and premature, by Adenauer as a threat to his leadership of the emergent West German CDU, and by Schumacher as intolerable because the independent West Ger-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

man SPD was asked to sit at the same council table with the satellite Socialist Unity party (SED) which had swallowed up the SPD's East Zone comrades. Kaiser himself was forced to engage in a difficult tightrope walk of remaining acceptable to both the Russians (with their influence over his East Zone CDU) and West Germany's anti-Communist politicians (whose cooperation was needed for a neutralist "all-German" settlement). This proved impossible by the autumn of 1947 because West Germans increasingly considered him a "Russian stooge." Adenauer viewed his Christian socialism as fuzzy and dangerous nonsense; Bavarian federalists disliked his stress upon centralization, identification with Berlin, and occasional invocation of old Prussian traditions; Schumacher thought his belief in Germany as a bridge between East and West a megalomaniacal illusion; and supporters of the "European movement" disliked the clear-cut priority he gave to national over European aims. The U.S. viewed Kaiser's ideal of a centralized, socialist, neutralized Germany as the opposite of its own desire for a federalist, capitalist West Germany allied to the West. At the same time the Russians considered him an enemy because he criticized their arbitrary political conduct, favored Germany's participation in the Marshall Plan, and refused to participate in the stage-managed *Volkskongress* assembled in December 1947 to denounce U.S. policy. (To point up Kaiser's dilemma, it is clear that participation would have destroyed Kaiser's remaining credit in West Germany.) Matters were brought to a head when the Russians penalized his independence by pulling the wires of an intrigue in his own party, which deposed him from the leadership of the East-CDU.

Schwarz gives a profound assessment of Kaiser's failure: "It provided both a test case and an alibi for German postwar policy. If not even Kaiser—the relatively flexible propagandist of a bloc-free Germany, who showed much sympathy for Russia and was generally ready to compromise—could dissuade Russia from its desire to Sovietize all of Germany, or at a minimum, its own zone of occupation, then this policy was clearly beyond the realm of possibility" (p. 343).

The success of Konrad Adenauer provides an instructive contrast to Jakob Kaiser's failure. Though Schwarz has unearthed a piquant case of a "neutralist aberration" in a New Year's Eve interview in the *Rheinischer Merkur* of December 30, 1946, Adenauer must be viewed as the staunch champion of a West German state allied to the West. His success was due to the fact that he, with the majority of West German public opinion, was ready to accept the American post-1947 program of resolute anticommunism, a West German state integrated into West-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ern Europe, and an internal structure marked by democracy, federalism, and free enterprise. The U.S. was strong enough to impose this program upon Britain and France and to overcome a good deal of West German reluctance based on fear of contributing to Germany's partition.

Adenauer's success was not, however, exclusively due to his skillful identification with "inevitable developments"; it also owed much to purely personal qualities. His adherence to clear-cut lines of policy, however unpopular—for example, his consistent opposition to socialization even when this was supported by much of his own CDU in 1946-1948—inspired confidence in his solidity and sincerity. His enthusiastic support of the European movement and the flexible nature of his resistance to France's Ruhr and Saar policies (where Schumacher preferred defiant nationalist gestures) made Adenauer an ideal architect of Franco-German reconciliation. His maintenance of good relations with the Western Allies, even as he persistently pressed for concessions on the road to sovereignty, was based upon a policy of trust—trust in the future and trust that Allied and German interests ultimately ran parallel—which did not scruple at making considerable concessions (as in Germany's participation in the discriminatory International Ruhr Authority set up in 1949) which Schumacher considered a dangerous mortgage of Germany's future. Adenauer succeeded in a tightrope act almost as difficult as the one in which Kaiser failed: he maintained in Allied eyes the image of a good European and faithful champion of Western integration, while West Germans simultaneously considered him a tough, independent bargainer who never relaxed his pressure upon the Allies. Adenauer showed, moreover, a wise tactical deference to national feelings that he probably did not share: he was very cautious in his open opposition to Kaiser's popular proposal of a "national representative body" in 1947, and he repeatedly proclaimed his hesitation about participating in the creation of a West German state in 1948-1949 (a hesitation that did not prevent him from becoming the president of the constitution-writing *Parlamentarischer Rat*, a post that proved to be the foundation of his subsequent leadership of the West German state). Adenauer was destined to place his personal stamp upon this state in his fourteen years of chancellorship between 1949 and 1963, years marked by great successes in foreign policy so long as the postwar cold-war constellation remained the dominant factor in world affairs. Schwarz goes far beyond Adenauer's biographers Paul Weymar (1955), Arnold Heidenheimer (1960), and Charles Wighton (1963) in his analysis of the genesis of Adenauer's conceptions of foreign policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kurt Schumacher, Adenauer's great antagonist until his early death in 1952, aimed at a united, socialist Germany integrated into a socialist Western Europe. His tragedy consisted of the fact that all three elements of this goal turned out to be utopian. Russia's hostility made it impossible to achieve German unity on terms acceptable to Schumacher—Russian sponsorship of the Socialist Unity party killed democratic socialism in the East Zone. The victory of socialism in *West* Germany was made impossible by the opposition of capitalist America, the weakness of Labourite Great Britain (the natural sponsor of a socialist Germany), and the indigenous strength of Germany's capitalist forces—the latter much reinforced after 1948 by Marshall Plan aid and the visible successes of Erhard's laissez-faire policies. Schumacher's European vision was frustrated by the pitiful weakness of French socialism and the insular indifference of the British Labour party. Schumacher could never count upon political allies in other European countries comparable in weight to Adenauer's Robert Schuman and Alcide de Gasperi.

Schumacher's political ineffectiveness—essentially rooted in his misreading of the constellation of forces and his consequent pursuit of utopian aims—was reinforced by regrettable personal traits. His snarling tone toward the Allies was a liability at a time when most Germans recognized the indispensability of Allied friendship; his opposition to the flexible manner of Adenauer's policy of Western integration—Schumacher generally insisted upon an unattainable *immediate* equality of status—gave him a reputation of being opposed to the popular policy of Western integration *per se*. (This reputation was partly deserved because Schumacher soured on Europe when he saw the emergence of a Europe "Catholic, conservative, capitalist, and cartelized.") The stridency of his untimely nationalism—a matter curiously left undiscussed by Schwarz—also proved a liability.

Schumacher was unsuccessful in his desire for a socialist German state; but it must not be thought on that account that his career was a total failure. Whatever the SPD's occasional hankering for a neutralist policy, he set it on a firmly anti-Communist and pro-Western course. He prevented the Socialist Unity party from securing any toehold in any of the three Western zones. By the threat of noncooperation, he forced the Western Allies to permit the West German constitution to be more centralized (and hence more suitable to future socialist experiments) than the U.S. and France had originally intended (the famous "Hannover ultimatum" of April 20, 1949). After the Federal Republic was established in 1949, his anti-Western intransigence no doubt

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strengthened Adenauer's position in his negotiations with the Allies.

It is remarkable, indeed, to what extent Adenauer and Schumacher agreed on many basic questions despite their personal antagonism, different views on Germany's domestic organization, and differences on tactics in the conduct of foreign policy. Both had a passionate hatred of barbarous "Asiatic communism"; both made a clear-cut, courageous option for the West long before it was clear that the U.S. presence would remain in Europe. Both were willing to cooperate with the West despite resentment about the continuation of vindictive Allied policies (for example, the dismantling program) and the risk of denunciation by the East as "partitioners" (*Spalter*). Both viewed each new settlement with the Western Allies (the Frankfurt Economic Council, the Occupation Statute, the Petersberg Agreement) as but a *provisional* settlement to be used as a platform for securing additional concessions until full "equality of status" was finally achieved. Most interesting of all, they had virtually identical views on reunification. They believed in the magnetic attraction of West Germany as part of a general "policy of strength," and viewed reunification as the incorporation of the East Zone into West Germany through free elections. They were adamantly opposed to any kind of official contact between the Federal Republic (and its democratic parties) and the German Democratic Republic (with its dominant Socialist Unity party) and to any kind of joint East-West German bodies—a policy crystallized as early as 1947 in their common opposition to Kaiser's plan for a "national representative body."

In addition to discussing the three major champions of the three major options open to Germany, Schwarz also discusses an advocate of a fourth possible option—voluntary cooperation with Russia. Rudolf Nadolny, former ambassador to the Soviet Union (1928-1933) and considered by some Russia's candidate for chancellor in a new German government, was a lifelong champion of Russo-German friendship. He believed that Russia's real interests would be far better served by a united, friendly, but non-Communist Germany than by a communized East Zone confronted by a bitterly anti-Russian West German state; the former settlement would likewise serve Germany's best interests by preventing partition. Nadolny's proposals to the Russians, advanced in personal conversations with the sympathetic Ambassador Semjonov at Karlshorst (seat of the Russian military government) in 1946 and in a long memorandum to Molotov on April 30, 1947, show that he was far from being a Russian stooge (as was believed by Schumacher and other West German politicians).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nadolny urged the Russians to create the prerequisites for German-Russian friendship by returning some of the Eastern territories under Polish administration, agreeing to a common economic administration of all four zones, releasing German prisoners of war still held in Russia, terminating the severe economic exploitation and arbitrary administration of the East Zone, and giving equal chances to all parties by ending the favors bestowed upon the Socialist Unity party. It is not surprising that the Russians refused to accept this program, which asked them to give up very concrete assets for the remote hope of a friendly Germany dominated by unrepresentative men like Nadolny. The failure of Nadolny's efforts shows that a voluntary option for Russia made sense only for confirmed Communists and those willing to become Communist satellites (an accurate description of Grotewohl, head of the SPD before the fusion, and those East-CDU politicians who cooperated with the Russians in dethroning Kaiser from party leadership).

Schwarz's book also includes an examination of several other politicians, authors, and publications whose outlook constituted some variation of the basic positions of Kaiser, Adenauer, and Schumacher. In examining spokesmen of neutralism he provides a contemptuous account of the outlook of the left-wing journal *Der Ruf*, edited by Hans Werner Richter, which has some historical importance as the original outlet for many literary figures subsequently loosely organized in "Group 47." Most of its contributors shared most of the illusions of Jakob Kaiser; but whereas Kaiser agreed to become Minister of All-German Affairs in Adenauer's government—recognizing that events had overridden his hopes and that nothing could be gained by sulking on the sidelines—many of the contributors to *Der Ruf* became conspicuous members of the irresponsible *Ohne Mich* ("Count Me Out") opposition to rearmament in the 1950's.

Of the once-famous publicist and Würzburg historian Ulrich Noack, head of the neutralist *Nauheim-Kreis*, Schwarz speaks more in pity than in anger. He considers him hopelessly fuzzy and romantic in his style of thought, qualities evidenced in his ludicrous proposal in 1946 that a new capital should be built on the Hoher Meissner, the mountain near Kassel where the youth movement had held its celebrated rally in 1913. Noack seriously believed that a neutralized, unarmed Germany could exist between the rival power blocs, failed to recognize the indispensability of Marshall Plan help in economic recovery, and wanted Germany to become a "world Switzerland" that might form part of a continental federation under the honorary presidency of France. (Schwarz's indictment could have been strengthened by reference to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Noack's earlier political follies, e.g., his contention in the 1920's that Bismarck became a coward in his old age, as proved by his unwillingness to fight a desirable "preventive war" against Russia.)

In presenting spokesmen for the Western integration of Germany Schwarz gives a very respectful account of émigré economist Wilhelm Roepke and F. A. Kramer, editor of the influential Catholic Conservative weekly *Rheinischer Merkur*. With uncanny accuracy, Roepke, a German professor living at Geneva, foresaw and approved as early as 1945 the subsequent course of development—a federalist, laissez-faire West Germany integrated into the Atlantic Community. The *Rheinischer Merkur* was guilty of some pharisaical anti-Prussian resentments and some romantic hostility to urban industrialism, but it consistently championed the creation of a federalist, anti-Communist West German state whose center of gravity would lie in the Rhineland and which would be integrated into Western Europe. Many of its contributors were contemptuous of the shilly-shallying hesitations shown by many German politicians about cooperating in the creation of the Federal Republic and the consequent hardening of partition—and they too easily (along with nearly everyone else) salved their conscience by subscribing to the "magnet theory."

Two prominent champions of a "socialist Germany as part of a socialist third force" were Richard Löwenthal and Carlo Schmid. Löwenthal, a German émigré journalist living in London, published a book in 1947 entitled *Beyond Capitalism*. It pleaded for Labourite Britain to assume the leadership of a "third-force bloc" embracing continental Europe (this side of the Iron Curtain) and the British Commonwealth and Empire—in fact, he wanted the vast area stretching from the North Cape to South Africa and from Gibraltar to Singapore to form a buffer state between capitalist America and Communist Russia. He believed that a socialist Germany would form a natural part of such a political structure. The utterly utopian quality of this proposal became quickly evident in view of the cold war, the weakness of socialism on the Continent, and the insularity of Great Britain. Carlo Schmid, an exceedingly intelligent and subtle Social Democratic politician who headed the constitution-writing committee of the *Parlamentarischer Rat* in 1948-1949, also believed in a third-force neutralist solution. Of all the leading socialists he was the most concerned about avoiding the creation of obstacles to national unity. While favoring a West European federation, he urged the temporary exclusion of West Germany from it lest reunification be imperiled; while favoring the creation of a West German "administrative entity" in 1948, he insisted that it must be denied several

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attributes of statehood and that the Allies must retain ultimate responsibility. Schmid had a moment of glory when his views prevailed at the conference of West German *Ministerpräsidenten* (the premiers of the *Länder*) meeting at Koblenz on July 8-10, 1948. The premiers followed Schmid in their refusal to cooperate with the Western proposal to set up a West German state, though they did not slam the door completely. Schmid suffered defeat, however, less than two weeks later when the premiers, at a second conference at Rüdesheim, reversed themselves for reasons that will be examined below. He unfortunately proved to be completely right in his fears that a West German state would contribute to Germany's partition, but it cannot be said that he ever suggested a constructive alternative.

V. The Settlement of the German Problem

It is time to pass from the analysis of theories to a few specific observations on the actual course of events. Inevitably, the Germans' initial contribution to the solution of the German problem was negligible since they were a defeated people in an occupied land without political rights or authorized voices. Besides, the primary concern of individual Germans was to keep alive in a desperate struggle against hunger, cold, and unemployment—matters far more urgent than the orientation in foreign policy of a future German state. When political voices were heard again in the winter of 1945-1946, their message was frequently bound by parochial loyalties. The collapse of central government and the convenient habit of blaming "Berlin" for the German catastrophe had activated many particularist sentiments (e.g., in Hannover and Schleswig-Holstein) that had earlier appeared doomed in the "Prussianized Germany" created by Bismarck in 1866. Particularism was also encouraged in West Germany by the establishment of local and *Länder* bodies long before zonal (let alone, interzonal) institutions were contemplated. Moreover, each military government expected a measure of zonal loyalty from "its Germans"; the Western military governments were naturally suspicious of the pretension to all-German influence claimed, with Russian encouragement, by the German East Zone party headquarters located at Berlin. The friction between the East German party leaders (like Kaiser of the CDU and Grotewohl of the SPD) and their Western colleagues was partly based upon personal ambition (e.g., Adenauer could not subordinate himself to Kaiser nor Schumacher to Grotewohl), partly upon the widespread anti-Berlin Prussophobia of the federalists of West and South Germany, and partly upon differing conceptions of foreign policy. (We have seen how Kaiser was a neutral-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ist who had to remain *persona grata* to the Russians, while Adenauer was an anti-Communist and believer in the creation of a West German state.)

The inevitable friction between West German and East German political leaders (even those who were not Russian stooges) was in fact but one aspect of the broader cold war that became the dominant reality of world politics in 1947. It made—so at least it appears today—the partition of Germany inevitable: Russia would not renounce control of its zone and abandon the Sovietization begun in 1945; America believed by 1947 that it needed German resources to promote the economic revival of Western Europe as part of the new policy of the containment of communism. Many West Germans, including Konrad Adenauer, were willing to go along with America's desire for a West German state. There was, however, a good deal of reluctance as evidenced by the premiers' rejection of the American program at Koblenz on July 10, 1948. Schwarz presents fascinating evidence that the reversal of this rejection within two weeks was the result of rather formidable American pressures. The masterful General Clay, whom Germans could scarcely afford to antagonize, expressed his sharp disappointment with the premiers' conduct at a conference with them on July 20. His subordinates did not hesitate to spell out some very specific threats. They told some Germans—for example, Willy Brandt, then Berlin representative of the SPD executive committee—that refusal to cooperate might mean the American abandonment of Berlin (then blockaded by the Russians, with the airlift less than three weeks old) and the curtailment of Marshall Plan aid (upon which German economic recovery was absolutely dependent). They added that the French, who had yielded to the American plan for a West German state only under American pressure, would probably reject any similarly favorable plan in the future; the implication was that the alternative to a West German state was the perpetuation of an occupation regime in which France, the most vindictive of the Western powers, would possess a major voice.

These arguments carried extra weight when they were supported by Berlin socialist leader Ernst Reuter at the Rüdesheim conference of premiers on July 21-22. At Koblenz, Louise Schroeder, the mayoress of still (formally) undivided Berlin, had pleaded with the premiers to refuse their cooperation in a West German state lest its creation further complicate the already complicated Berlin situation. At Rüdesheim, Ernst Reuter, soon to become mayor of West Berlin, when the city was divided by cold war, took the exactly opposite stand. He insisted that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the creation of a strong, free, West German state was in the best interests of Berlin because it would strengthen American support of the beleaguered city, and in the best interest of the East Zone in the light of the "magnet theory" (in which he was a fervid believer). There is considerable evidence that Reuter's stand had a decisive impact in changing the views of the thitherto reluctant West German premiers.

There can be no question, at any rate, that West Germany's support for a West German state was not *only* the result of the Germans' love of democracy, good Europeanism, and psychological desire to be accepted as partners of the free world. It was also promoted by solid economic considerations (the inducements of the Marshall Plan and the threat of its withdrawal) and American playing upon the Germans' fear of communism (for everyone knew that the abandonment of Berlin could easily set off a chain reaction ending in the communization of West Germany). The creation of the West German state proved justified in terms of promoting democracy, encouraging economic revival, permitting Germany to rejoin the Western world, and contributing to Western European unity and military security. All these gains were purchased, however, at the expense of freezing the country's partition and thereby perpetuating a source of constant international friction.

VI. The Responsibility for Partition

Who, it may be asked in conclusion, was ultimately responsible for Germany's partition? As suggested earlier, the obvious answer is Adolf Hitler, who launched an unnecessary war that ruined Germany and brought both American and Russian troops to the Elbe-Werra frontier dividing the Western zones from Russia's. Why was it, however, that an administrative demarcation line froze into a permanent state frontier? It appears that responsibility must be distributed, though scarcely in equal measure, between *both* the Russians and the Western Allies—though it is perhaps wrong to speak of "responsibility" (with its inevitable moral connotations) when describing a phenomenon made well-nigh "inevitable" by the general circumstances of the cold war and not deliberately "planned" by either side. The cold war between Russia and the U.S. after 1945 appears to have been inescapable in view of their conflicting ideologies, social systems, and power interests. The two nations confronted each other in the heart of Europe; each was eager (despite an initial preoccupation with purely vindictive policies) to impose its social system and ideology upon all of Germany if possible but, if the larger goal proved unattainable, upon its own zone as a minimum. There was, however, a major difference between Russian and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American policy: the former had to rely upon direct coercion in view of Germany's endemic hostility to communism, whereas the latter could count upon a broad basis of voluntary support since democracy and capitalism were what most Germans wanted. The application of drastic economic pressures in 1948 to induce initial German cooperation does not, of course, invalidate this generalization.

This difference gave and gives the American program a major moral and political advantage in the eyes of all believers in self-determination. By denying East Germany self-determination, a principle that presumably ought to apply in Central Europe as well as in the lands of Asia and Africa, the Russians are primarily responsible for the creation and perpetuation of Germany's partition. To justify Russia's imperialist conduct one is forced to argue that self-determination—though usually a good principle—must be overridden in this case by other arguments and considerations such as Russia's alleged security needs, the chronic untrustworthiness (and political nonage) of the German people, the necessity of coercing the Germans (for their own and the world's good) into a desirable social revolution that they have been unable to achieve for themselves, the maintenance of a European equilibrium that would probably be threatened by the unification of Germany, and "the general opinion of mankind," which rightly or wrongly does not look upon German partition as a major grievance requiring urgent remedy.

It appears significant, when looking at the development of partition in the years 1945 to 1949, that the Western powers did not consider the avoidance of partition to be a major goal of their German policy. On the contrary, they frequently opposed Russian plans (whether sincere or not) for maintaining or restoring administrative unity and promoted policies certain to lead to partition. The French vetoed all plans in 1945-1946 for creating the "centralized administrative bodies" contemplated during the Potsdam Conference and included in its final communiqué. Secretary of State Marshall showed no interest in negotiating about Molotov's detailed plan for centralized administrative bodies (to be followed by a provisional government, nationwide elections, and the drafting of a constitution) at the Moscow Conference in April 1947. The pressure of the Allied military commanders prevented the West German premiers from placing the question of German unity on the agenda of the Munich *Ministerpräsidenten* conference of June 1947, though the Russian Zone premiers had made this a condition of their participation and, rightly or wrongly, left the conference when their wishes were not met. The creation of Bizonia (January 1, 1947) and the Frankfurt *Wirtschaftsrat* (June 25, 1947) were two steps on the road to ultimate

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

partition, and the Anglo-American level-of-industries plan of August 29, 1947, though sensible and necessary, was undoubtedly a clear violation of the Allied Control Council decision of May 26, 1946 (a decision still influenced by the spirit of the Morgenthau Plan). The creation of the West German state, initiated at the London Six-Power Conference in March 1948 though completed only in September 1949, preceded in most of its phases the creation of the German Democratic Republic.

These regrettable facts, to which could be added the precipitate rejection of Russian reunification proposals in 1952-1953 without even any negotiation about their details, are not listed to "prove" primary Allied responsibility for Germany's partition. They indicate, however, that the Western Allies, then and presumably now, value other goals above Germany's reunification—a goal that is also felt to complicate other desirable objectives (for example, Western European unity and a détente with Russia). They indicate, furthermore, that the German policy of the Western powers, while remarkably successful in substance, has frequently failed to avoid an unfavorable public appearance. The Western powers (and the West German government they created) have often failed to exploit, if only for propaganda purposes, the basic strength of their position, what Schwarz calls the "convergence of German public opinion and Western Allied interests," a position of strength that suggests the desirability of frequent and imaginative initiatives in proposing reunification schemes. It is unlikely that any scheme will attain reunification in the foreseeable future, since the Russians (and their East German puppets) cannot desire a goal that necessarily threatens their present stranglehold over East Germany; but it is certain that Russian, or East German, rejection of a popular scheme would firmly place the onus of perpetuating partition where it basically belongs, a fact still ignored by much foreign and some German opinion. Schwarz's book contains much historical material calculated to support the more flexible West German policy toward the German Democratic Republic launched by Chancellor Kiesinger's "Great Coalition" government in the spring of 1967.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SCIENCE, GOVERNMENT, AND THE CASE OF RAND

A Singular Pluralism*

By PHILIP GREEN

Bruce L. R. Smith, *The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966, xiii, 332 pp. $7.95.

I

THE case study method, which despite the behavioral revolution is still the most popular method for studying political phenomena, continually confronts its practitioners with the necessity of solving the micro-macro, or levels-of-analysis problem. On the one hand, one can literally study a "case" in the most narrowly delimited way, risking no incautious generalizations but courting triviality. On the other hand, one can attempt to consider the implications of one's case for the total political system in which it is embedded, thus risking generalizations but avoiding triviality. The obvious difficulty with this latter course is the absence from most areas of political science of strong and generally accepted theories from which to generalize—i.e., theories providing causal or other connective links, preferably of a mathematical nature, between the performance of a system and the performance of units within a system.

The best resolution of this dilemma is hard to define rigorously. Put simply, it consists of formulating or borrowing the most sophisticated *approach* one can find to the particular aspect of the political system that is implicated in one's case study. (I hesitate to use the word "theory" where no operational, causal laws seem likely to be postulated —but perhaps this is too rigid.) Of course, what is meant by "most sophisticated" is exactly what is hard to state rigorously. In fact, this resolution merely substitutes one dilemma for another, "solving" the micro-

* Review articles in *World Politics* are ordinarily solicited, as was this article, by the editor primarily responsible for reviews. Solicitation complicates the decision about acceptance or rejection. At the time the editorial decision was due, the editors were sharply divided on the publishability of Mr. Green's article. The issue before the editors was whether or not the article was suitable for a scholarly journal such as *World Politics*. Mr. Falk definitely thought it was; Mr. Knorr thought it was not. The advice of four additional readers, the majority of whom favored publication, failed to resolve the issue. The editors agreed that it was best to publish the article and let each reader judge for himself.—*Richard A. Falk, Klaus Knorr*, Editors.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

macro problem at the price of conjuring up an even more painful one: how to differentiate between assertions, approaches, and so on, none (or few) of which seem to consist of hypotheses leading to testable predictions. Do we political scientists, in fact, have any firm systemic knowledge that enables us really to discriminate among the various generalizations our colleagues make when trying to establish links between specific institutions or events and political systems as a whole?

The most that can be offered here, probably, is a subjective guide: our explanation of events within a system should form a pattern with the fewest pieces missing or events remaining unaccountable.[1] To put it another way, we adopt the pragmatic test that that which makes further advances in understanding possible—i.e., enables us to see previously unexplained factors as now at least tentatively explained—may itself be viewed as something we "know." Of course this definition of "knowing" merely pushes off a little further the day of reckoning when the philosophers of science, or those who set the ground rules for deciding when statements become "knowledge," will insist that a testable prediction be made. But lacking the ability to do that with the rigor of the "hard" sciences (except rarely), we can only proceed as best we can. And if even the pragmatic test seems to fail, in that there is disagreement among those doing serious work in a particular field as to whether a given hypothesis really *does* add to our understanding, then we can only fall back in the end on the traditional method of stating our reasons for our conclusions as completely and undogmatically as possible and letting the reader judge.[2]

No doubt this is a strenuous program to be forced to follow when all we really wish to do is to explain, say, who runs some small town in Illinois or how the regional field office of some bureau works or why a congressional bloc is antilabor. Why not instead leave the field of general political theorizing to those with the appetite and time for it and merely add our own increment of data as grist for their speculative mill?

This alternative is certainly reasonable. Unfortunately it is neither invariably attractive nor easy to put into practice. It is not attractive because no one likes to be trivial when he could be profound, a cog in a machine when he could be the motor. And it is not easy to put into practice because the student of a case so often, merely in order to place his

[1] Cf. Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco 1964), Part IX, "Explanation."

[2] An excellent statement of what may be meant by "rational discussion" of this sort is to be found in Richard E. Flathman, *The Public Interest* (New York 1966), Part II.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

study "in a broader perspective," slides over—usually in his introduction or conclusions—into playing the role of political theorist. And when that happens we tend to get the worst of both possible worlds: the writer reaches into the existing collection of theories and speculations as into a grab bag and comes up with that "broader perspective" either most congenial to his own unstated bias or, simply, most currently conventional. Since personal bias does not necessarily guarantee relevance and since today's scientific convention can be tomorrow's folkish superstition, the field of study is not always improved by this kind of approach. It seems essential, therefore, if one cannot resolutely restrict the scope of one's investigations and comments, to play the political theorist as well as one can and to pay at least as much intellectual attention to that aspect of one's research as one pays to the empirical work itself.[3]

II

These reflections are prompted by Bruce Smith's recent study of RAND, which may itself be taken as a case study in the handling and not-handling of the dilemma described above.

At one level, *The RAND Corporation* is simply an intensive treatment of a new American form of enterprise, academia, and government action—the nonprofit research or advisory corporation, which Don K. Price has accurately described as "federalism by contract." At this level, Smith's work is excellent and of particular interest both to the student of public administration and to the public administrator himself. The broad question Smith asks is why RAND has been so successful—that is, why it has prospered according to its own outlook and has satisfied its sponsors according to theirs—in contrast to comparable but different types of research or advisory organization. The answer appears to be that RAND has succeeded so well because, both in its foundation and in its continuing operations, it "has been able to avoid a completely dependent status vis-à-vis the Air Force," its original and still primary sponsor. How RAND has managed this and what the most noteworthy particular aspects of its independence have been are the subsidiary questions to which Smith devotes the bulk of his study.[4]

The answers he gives are both informative and instructive; several are worth mentioning here. For example, the fact that RAND came into existence independently and *then* established its relationship with

[3] Compare David Easton's well-known remarks in *The Political System* (New York 1963), chap. 9.

[4] Smith's phrasing of the questions he wished to study may be found at p. 26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Air Force has given it its own raison d'être, its own primary tradition with which to generate high morale, loyalty, and a sense of self. Its location in California, away from "the hectic pace of Washington," has given RAND a freedom from the wearing demands of "crash projects," "task orders," and the like, demands that have seriously limited the intellectual independence of such comparable organizations as Analytic Services, Inc., and the Institute for Defense Analyses (pp. 74-76). Again, this freedom was furthered by the initial agreement of its founders that RAND be "neither conceived nor staffed . . . as an organization to provide quick answers for current problems." An example of RAND's determination to avoid this fate is seen in the history of the Systems Development Corporation, a "spin-off" of RAND which grew out of a personnel training project that RAND management recognized as being inconsistent with the desire to avoid doing routine work for the Air Force.

In addition, RAND's internal organization has also contributed greatly to its success, according to Smith. The aspects of that organization which he particularly notes are decentralization, which prevails to a high degree both between and within departments; emphasis on interdisciplinary work; broad support for "pure"—i.e., undirected—research; and maintenance of RAND control even over projects initiated from outside. Each of these organizational characteristics, like the aspects of RAND's history noted in the previous paragraph, has had something to do with RAND's ability to produce systematic, long-range, "creative" research rather than to engage in mere short-range tinkering with other peoples' ideas. Of course RAND has also had organizational problems and difficulties, which Smith does not slight; but in general his conclusion seems compelling: "The independent RAND 'atmosphere' in general seems more conducive for the emergence of truly creative ideas in policy research than the working atmosphere of the advisory unit closely tied to the sponsoring agency" (p. 107). At the level at which we have so far conducted this discussion—a level at which no embarrassing questions are asked about words like "creative" or "success"—comparisons between RAND's methods and other methods that have been developed to help science give service to government are helpful. This is so even though Smith seems to say that RAND's success in maintaining its independence has been largely the result of historical accident, for once we know what caused an accident, we can sometimes arrange similar "accidents" for the future, if we so desire.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III

Having said that much, however, we must return to the methodological question posed earlier: how do we go about relating such a study as this one to our knowledge of the political system of which RAND is a minuscule yet important part?

Of the available alternative approaches to resolving this problem, Smith has unfortunately adopted the worst. Given the subject matter, that was perhaps inevitable. Tentative generalizations about possible fruitful relationships between government agencies and nonprofit advisory corporations are useful but limited; almost as soon as one has made them one wants to go on and discuss the much more interesting question of whether and how such corporations ultimately contribute to or detract from the workings of a democratic polity. One could hardly write a book about RAND simply ignoring RAND's significance for the political system, for RAND has been the subject of much controversy on just that point. On the other hand, to focus full attention both on such a narrow yet complex subject matter *and* on larger issues of political theory would probably require years of effort. In any event, what Smith has done is to take what I have called the "grab bag" approach to the larger subject of science, government, and democratic politics. He has not, to be sure, come up empty-handed. Rather, as is indicated by the following remarks, he has come up with what is presently the most conventional and approved approach to American politics —the notion that there is some kind of pluralist political order in American democracy which checks particular institutions that might otherwise contribute to an imbalance of political power:

> . . . The pluralism of the advisory system, in which RAND is only one institution among many with access to persons in authority, helps assure that no one group will monopolize the attention of policy makers (p. 315).

> As developments in science and technology increasingly affect other areas of public policy, there can only be a growing need for the kind of advisory service that RAND has provided various defense clients. In general, it would seem highly desirable for similar advisory capabilities to be built up by nondefense agencies. . . . The way to assure that important alternatives are not neglected in the processes of policy formation is to develop the broadest possible advisory base (p. 317).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Used properly, the advisory institution like RAND can contribute to sensible policy decisions and can help to maintain the dynamism of America's pluralist governing system.
>
> In the net, the device of the RAND-type advisory corporation seems to reflect both the strengths and weaknesses of American pluralism. The presence of a number of advisory institutions like RAND helps to assure decision makers of a broad base of scientific advice and to guard against the dangers of a closed system with a narrow technocracy cut off from the healthy effect of outside criticism. There is very little danger that anything like a monolithic statism or a vast bureaucracy on Weberian lines will emerge, given a system which decentralizes expertise and influence throughout many different institutions in society. The real dangers of this system may not be what is commonly supposed. The chief danger may well be that familiar problem of American politics: keeping organizational pluralism within some sort of bounds so that a framework for coherent, unified, and sustained national policies can be maintained (p. 321).

What I shall try to show in the remainder of this discussion is that every one of these remarks about RAND is at best highly questionable and is indeed sustained not by any evidence that Smith offers—the contrary is the case, in fact—but rather by a kind of simple act of faith in "the system." First, however, it is necessary that we see just why it is that an uncritical acceptance of the notion of "pluralism" is such a poor basis for a serious discussion of the role of scientists in government. Not all of the difficulties with the pluralist description of the American political system are relevant to a full account of the operations of RAND. But as we shall discover, several of them are indeed highly relevant to that account.

On its face, the description of the American political system given by the pluralists seems self-evidently accurate.[5] Elections are claimed, more

[5] The literature of the pluralist approach to American politics is immense and continues to proliferate. The best recent work in the genre is Arnold Rose, *The Power Structure* (New York 1967). Other well-known examples of this approach are Robert Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago 1956) and *Who Governs?* (New Haven 1961); Nelson W. Polsby, *Community Power and Political Theory* (New Haven 1963); Daniel Bell, "Is There a Ruling Class in America? The Power Elite Reconsidered," in his *The End of Ideology*, rev. ed. (New York 1965); David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven 1950), Part II; Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York 1963), 318-48; Talcott Parsons, "The Distribution of Power in American Society," *World Politics*, x (October 1957), 123-43; John K. Galbraith, *American Capitalism* (Boston 1952); and David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York 1953). For an interesting and somewhat different viewpoint, see William Kornhauser, "Power Elite or 'Veto Groups,'" in Seymour Martin Lipset and Leo Lowenthal, eds., *Culture and Social Character* (Glencoe 1961).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or less, to determine the ultimate course of public policy in a very general way. At the more concrete levels of the legislative and administrative processes "the people" do not participate directly, but their desires are still felt through the operations of competing interest groups. Elites are formed by the leaders of these groups, but there is no single "power elite," for the elites, like the groups, are competitive. Some have a degree of control over policies that are closely related to their interests, but none has real control over a very wide range of policies. The system, in sum, runs on the basis of elections, influence, and persuasion; the first are free, and the sources of the latter two are both multifold and diverse. The government, formed on the basis of democratic elections, is capable of establishing "countervailing power" when the resultant of group pressures is skewed too far from the norm of equality.

I have said that this description of the American political system seems self-evidently accurate. As often, however, appearances are deceiving, for granting that there is no conspiratorial power elite, no monolithic "power structure," no absolute vertical hierarchy in American politics, certain very grave problems remain for pluralist theory as described above.[6]

1. With regard to the assumption that in a democracy numbers finally tell, it is true that many issues are technically subject to ultimate voter control. Often, however, especially in the areas of policy administration and policy formulation (as opposed to formal policy approval), as well as in the control of the political parties themselves, resources other than the vote are crucial, especially money, activism (participation), and education, all of which taken together give one the ability to persuade others. But money and education are not distributed equally, and though activism in theory can be, in practice the predisposition to be active is not independent of the possession of some combination of money and education.[7] Furthermore, the distribution of resources is affected by pub-

[6] Among the many works calling into question various aspects of the pluralist approach are the following: Theodore Lowi, "The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (March 1967), 5-24, and "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory," *World Politics*, XVI (July 1964), 677-715; Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism* (Boston 1967) and, with Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," *American Political Science Review*, LVI (December 1962), 947-52; Henry Kariel, *The Promise of Politics* (Englewood Cliffs 1966), esp. chap. 4; Robert S. Lynd, "Power in American Society as Resource and Problem," in Arthur W. Kornhauser, ed., *Problems of Power in American Democracy* (Detroit 1957); S. Ono, "The Limits of Bourgeois Pluralism," *Studies on the Left*, V (Summer 1965), 46-72; and Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York 1966).

[7] Intensity of preference, which also affects influence on outcomes, is also distributed unequally—at least with regard to the ability to *express* it in relevant ways. On the prerequisites and problems of participation, see Dahl, *Preface*, 71ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lic policy and can be shifted in any direction; no one has as yet observed a law of developing equality in the *outcomes* of legislation.[8]

2. In any event, complete majoritarian political party control over issues does not exist in the United States in its idealized English version (nor does it exist even in England). The formal processes of decision-making are fragmented, with varying degrees of authority being parcelled out to the appointive bureaucracy, the military, congressional committees, individual congressmen, and state and local governments (which may themselves be equally fragmented). Thus constituencies that are in no way representative of the whole electorate nor even democratically organized in themselves may have inordinate influence during the bargaining that goes on in the formal policy-making process.[9] All these special obstacles to majoritarian accountability, moreover, operate so as to make concerted action difficult and to reward desires for inaction or slow action. Those groups that *have* benefited from government action in the past or are for other reasons in relatively little need of governmental assistance tend to be favored over those that as yet have not been so favored. Furthermore, a special aspect of the fragmentation of political authority is that much *public* authority in the United States has been parcelled out to *private* persons or groups, on a highly inequalitarian basis.[10] Given the considerable importance of sheer inertia in any political system, it is highly probable that an immense and special effort would have to be made to reclaim this authority if it were to be redistributed on a more equalitarian basis.

To the extent that majority rule is admitted by the theorists of pluralism to be absent, that circumstance is supposed to be mitigated by the diversity of the multifold sources of influence within the system. But—

3. It is possible for large intellectual or ideological minorities to be

[8] For example, the cases of COMSAT or the 1962 tax cut or the continuing oil depletion allowance are evidence of this. It should be observed that even where access to decision-making processes is distributed equally, compromise *outcomes* may be highly unequal because the prevailing social context favors one group or another in bargaining. Some demands may simply not be made because a group sees no hope in making them or thinks of them as "illegitimate"; some demands may not have to be made because the desiderata contained in them are automatically granted by custom or long-settled law. On this point, see Bachrach and Baratz.

[9] And even when presidential or party leadership is most centralizing, voter control through representatives or parties is not always *technically* possible. Some of the technical problems of majority voting and voter control are discussed in Dahl's *Preface*, chap. 4. And see also Herbert McCloskey and others, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," *American Political Science Review*, LIV (March 1960), 405-27, on the divergence of interests and goals between political leaders and political followers.

[10] McConnell, *Private Power*, and Lowi, "The Public Philosophy," contain especially good accounts and critiques of this process.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

effectively ignored for long periods of time by both parties, given the kind of nonpolarized two-party system that exists in the United States. If such persons are either not numerous enough or not so strategically placed as to be potentially salient in the electorate for either party, or if "their" issue is not so absolutely salient in their minds that the parties cannot "buy them off" by rewarding other interests of theirs, then an agreement between party leaders not to compete may be unassailable for years or even decades. In certain of its manifestations this phenomenon is called bipartisanship; foreign policy during the cold-war era has offered, on frequent occasions, a typical example of its operation.

4. Even were we to posit an *overall* equality in influence among diverse political groups, equality does not prevail in specific spheres of decision-making; especially is this true of foreign and defense policy-making. As Arnold Rose notes at the end of his major effort to reevaluate and bolster pluralist theory, "The major area of small-group control of national policy remaining in the country [is] that of foreign policy. The most powerful arm of this small group—namely the President and his official advisers—are quite exposed to the public. But there are secret decision-makers operating in this area also—secret in that their influence and processes of decision-making are not accessible to the public."[11]

5. Finally, and perhaps most significant for our purposes here, no reason has been given by the pluralist theorists for believing that all *issues* are of equal weight in the polity. One does not have to accept C. Wright Mills' relegation of Congress to the "middle levels of power" to suggest that *some* decisions in any society dominate—determine, preclude—future decisions.[12] That being so, it becomes terribly important to know which if any of the competing elites is predominant in that particular area. And to the extent that policies for war and peace are surely of such a nature, one cannot make light of the fact that foreign policy is "the major area of small-group control."

Thus to say that there is no "power elite" running things is to make a fairly obvious (except to the conspiracy-minded) and very minimal claim. It is also true that all definable groups among the people do not have equal power, that "the people" as individuals do not have equal political power (even when their overlapping group memberships are taken into account), that "the majority" does not necessarily have power consistent with its numbers, and that rewards are not necessarily distributed on the basis of who holds or is granted formal political power.

[11] P. 488.
[12] Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York 1957), chap. 11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

That being so, it is quite inappropriate to use the assumed pluralism of the political system for reassurance that a given actor in the system is not too influential. On the contrary, we must begin our analysis of particular political actors with the assumption that democratic "pluralism" in any meaningful sense is completely problematical. Actors such as RAND must be assessed on the basis of whether they make a democratic plural order more or less likely of achievement. That they fit in well with and contribute to the system is matter for congratulation only if we assume that all the system's tendencies are equalitarian—as does Smith in his casual acceptance of the pluralist approach. Once vary that initial assumption—once assume, in other words, that some tendencies in the system may be inequalitarian—and a totally different approach to the case study is called for. We have now to ask not whether "our" case—our actor—fits into the system, but rather which among divergent tendencies of the system it fits into. And when discussing the role of scientists in government, specifically, we have to ask whether the activities of a particular group of scientists seem to increase or decrease the likelihood of the democratization of influence.

IV

When we ask, then, the question I have suggested immediately above, a picture of RAND's significance which is quite different from the one offered by Smith comes into focus. We can see this clearly by concentrating for a moment on one specific issue that is also central to his discussion and uppermost in the minds of those who are concerned about RAND's position in the political system: what effect has RAND had on the process of national security policy-making in this country and on the nature of influence in that policy-making process?

The essential point that emerges immediately when we ask this question is that although RAND is far from ideologically monolithic in the broad field of national security policy analysis, by Smith's own evidence it has been unquestioningly oriented toward the general *perspectives*, if not always the concrete policies, of the foreign policy elite (giving that phrase as wide a coverage as one wishes). And this orientation has had some profound consequences for American "pluralism."

To see this more clearly, let us consider the now famous overseas air bases study of Albert Wohlstetter and his colleagues, which Smith proposes, in his chapter "RAND in Operation: A Case Study," as an example par excellence of the RAND "systems analysis" method at work. This study, Smith tells us, "pointed toward the shattering conclusion that in the last half of the 1950's the Strategic Air Command, the world's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

most powerful striking force, faced the danger of obliteration from enemy surprise attack under the then-programmed strategic basing system" (p. 208). "The then-programmed system of advanced overseas operating bases . . . would, in consequence [of its vulnerability], have the least destruction potential of enemy targets of any of the systems. . . .The cornerstone of U.S. policy at the time—deterrence of aggression through the nuclear striking power of the Strategic Air Command and destruction of enemy industrial targets if deterrence failed—was thus seen to be jeopardized by the projected basing system. Indeed, the whole concept of deterrence as it was then conceived seemed in need of revision" (pp. 213-14). Smith adds that after Malenkov's announcement that the USSR had detonated a hydrogen bomb "Wohlstetter and his colleagues capitalized on this announcement in the late summer briefings to dramatize the dangers of an enemy first-strike against vulnerable overseas bases" (p. 225). And in summary he concludes, "Several previous studies had dealt generally with the problem of vulnerability, but none had drawn explicit attention to the need for developing a deterrent force capable of surviving an initial enemy atomic assault and still inflicting unacceptable damage on the enemy" (p. 232).

These passages, I think, adumbrate an uncritical conception of the role of scientists in government, which in turn clearly rests on Smith's uncritical conception of his subject matter itself. (In an earlier chapter Smith throws a decade of sometimes vicious interservice rivalry into the discard with the remark that "RAND's recruitment had benefited in the past from the broad Air Force mission which was almost equivalent to the whole of the nation's defense effort.") Thus he appears to have no interest in the validity of the many assumptions with which the passages just quoted are strewn or in the actual policy outcome itself and the continuing debate about deterrence strategies.[13] On the contrary, his argument is that what is important about RAND's studies is not their outcomes but the process that produced them—that is, RAND's methodological innovations in the field of systems analysis and operations research.[14] But it is not enough to say naively that a new method is "a contribution"; surely we want to know *to whom and to what purposes* it contributes. Such a question Smith never asks, apparently in the belief

[13] For an exhaustive critique of those assumptions and of deterrence policy itself, see Philip Green, *Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence* (Columbus 1966); and Amitai Etzioni, *The Hard Way to Peace* (New York 1962).

[14] It should be said that this is *sometimes* his argument. Especially throughout chap. 4, we can find examples of both viewpoints; on the whole, however, I think that celebration of the techniques themselves is Smith's dominant attitude. See, for example, his concluding remarks (pp. 315ff.).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the methods I have mentioned are "value-neutral" and have no particular purposes built into them.[15] And this is too bad, for as I have argued elsewhere, RAND's systems analyses have in practice been far from value-neutral, except in the sardonic sense that the systems approach applied to significant questions of public policy will betray, indiscriminately, the biases of whoever is doing the study.[16] Even RAND has not yet discovered a way to make interdisciplinary teams of social scientists see the world with any eyes but their own, and when the most valued objects in the human universe are at stake—life, liberty, happiness—those eyes rarely see with complete dispassion. Therefore we must surely ask if the bias with which RAND workers have seen the world has been a systematic one. If it has been, then the new methods of analysis may very well have had a systematic effect on RAND's work, and thus, since RAND has been an important actor in the political system, on the distribution of influence in government.

With this question now in mind, let us take a more careful look at the RAND overseas bases study. That study rested on two familiar propositions: that vulnerability equals provocation to an "enemy" and that the Soviet Union and the U.S. are (or were) engaged in an undeclared war, with Western Europe as one of the stakes to be defended at all costs. The first proposition purports to stand on a solid evidential base, but is in fact usually asserted, or rather deduced, as a logical corollary of the second.[17] As for that latter proposition, it is simply the root assumption behind the "official" American position in the cold war. Where this

[15] Examples of Smith's approach to the methodological question may be found on pp. 10-11, 24-25, 64-65, and 316, among many other instances. The language he uses in describing the adoption of innovative techniques is invariably the language of necessity, e.g., "The 'analytic' style in defense decision making is probably an inescapable concomitant of the growing complexity of defense issues" (p. 316).

[16] See Green, *Deadly Logic*, esp. chaps. 2-4 and 7, and "Method and Substance in the Arms Debate," *World Politics*, XVI (July 1964), 642-67. Smith expresses one caveat on the question of value-neutrality: "There have doubtless been occasions when analytic studies have made unrealistic assumptions, drawn false or misleading inferences from empirical data, and failed to take into consideration vital aspects of a broad problem. But this is not an argument against the advisory function in principle; this is an argument for more and better analysis and an increased professionalism in the advisory ranks" (pp. 315-16). Unfortunately, the notion that professionals are especially adept at avoiding unrealism, falsity, and narrowness is one for which little evidence has ever been offered, at least with regard to the social sciences. Indeed, in the complicated area of national security analysis only Laplace's Demon will ever know what is "real" and "true" before the fact. What is needed is not truer assumptions but an analytic method that generates *varying* assumptions about the political world and calls forth the full range of its practitioners' political wisdom and moral judgment. The RAND technique of systems analysis does none of these things.

[17] The more we look back at the development of deterrence theory, the harder it becomes to tell whether these propositions were ever really empirically separable. On this point, see my comments in *Deadly Logic*, 106ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assumption came from is a matter for the historian; for our purposes what is most important about it is how all-pervasive it can be, and has been, as a "given" in scholarly analysis.

For example, in a footnote on page 108, Smith recites a long list of RAND-supported projects in the field of Soviet studies. Of those with which I am familiar, none puts that basic assumption to any kind of test. Most of them are indeed meritorious pieces of research—but wholly within the framework of the cold-war perspective. Thus we see that RAND's work strengthens the policy-makers' intuitions about the "enemy," which become in turn the grounding for other RAND work —such as the bases study—in the field of military strategy. This is a familiar pattern of affairs and not necessarily one without value in a policy context; but it also has its dangers.

To take but one instance, several of the works on the Soviet Union listed by Smith—especially those of Leites, Mead, and Selznick—treat Soviet political (and thus, by implication, diplomatic) behavior as taking place within an attitudinal framework marked by extremes of hostility and ideological rigidity. (Like many other Soviet studies in this nation, RAND's seem to have undergone a "thaw" in recent years.) Such studies obviously provided intellectual strengthening for American fears in the cold war; yet in the context of that conflict they are sadly deficient. After all, RAND has never undertaken similar studies of the psychology of its own employers, namely, the U.S. Air Force and important American elected and appointed officials.[18] What might Nathan Leites have made of General LeMay, who has recommended that we should bomb the North Vietnamese "back to the Stone Age"? When asked about the contribution RAND makes to the power of such men, a high RAND official replied that " 'LeMay has the same kind of human qualities that the average man has, just like a teacher or a doctor.' " No doubt he has; and no doubt so do those Russians who engage in "The Ritual of Liquidation," who formulated "The Operational Code of the Politburo," who created "The Organizational Weapon."[19] I am not suggesting that RAND should necessarily undertake analyses of its employers (though if its various analytic techniques are really as sophisticated as they are supposed to be, such work might be helpful). The absence of such studies on our side does not demonstrate that we may be in the hands of paranoid ideologues or that the Soviet "missile

[18] This point was made first by Sol Stern in his "Who Thinks in a Think Tank?" *New York Times Magazine* (April 16, 1967), 28. The quotations cited here are taken from p. 122 of Stern's article.

[19] These are, of course, the titles of RAND-sponsored works by Leites and Selznick on Soviet ideology and politics.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gap" is the real danger to world peace; it only demonstrates the peculiar nature of RAND's vaunted intellectual "independence."

Realistically, rather than multiply information bearing on the attitudes and "operational codes" of world leaders—or even on their strategic theories, about which we owe almost everything we know on the Soviet side to RAND—we might do better to concentrate more on their actual behavior in world politics and on some hard thinking about what that behavior may signify. Can the meaning of the cold war to the USSR be deduced by quotation-mongering from Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Sokolovski, from attitude studies, and so on? Or should we not primarily ask what the USSR and the U.S. have actually *done* to create and carry on the cold war? I think that this is obviously the case—and it then becomes important to note further that RAND, to my knowledge (and Smith gives no examples to the contrary), has produced no important contributions to the ongoing study of the cold war itself.

Thus, although RAND has been intellectually independent to the extent of strenuously questioning its employers' concrete policies, it has *not* been "independent" to the extent of questioning either the nature of the jobs they are performing or their basic values[20]—a point that we can see only if, unlike Smith, we pay attention to the substance of what our subjects do, as well as to how they do it. This point having once been seen, it follows that the "success" of RAND's work in the area I have been discussing does not demonstrate how fortunate American society is in its intellectual pluralism. Rather, RAND's "success" shows how flexible part of our military bureaucracy is, in that it is capable of actually buying the most sophisticated weapons systems available; and this is a far different matter.

Of course, it is not self-evident that this criticism—that the relationship of particular scientists and government agencies is made more problematical by such a sharing of values and perspectives between the two—is at all noteworthy. With regard to RAND, for example, we can think of several reasons why what has been said here need not be taken as a criticism of even a minor aspect of the American political system. (Some of these reasons are mentioned by Smith; none is discussed at length. Thus a reviewer is left in the position of setting up straw men

[20] Apparently RAND personnel are able to live with the following passage from an internal Air Force study, written about 1952, and quoted by Smith: " 'The lawyer-client relationship of RAND to the Air Force places upon RAND certain restrictions. It is inevitable that the three Departments of the National Military Establishment will compete for budgets, facilities, and military responsibilities. As a result, it is inappropriate for RAND to "represent" more than one of the services' " (p. 83).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rather than dealing with real arguments.) These are, first, that RAND has produced work of a more genuinely critical nature than is suggested by my remarks and has had an opportunity that might otherwise have been lacking to convey its critique to policy-makers; second, that RAND researchers have contributed to the nation purely technical advances with which no one could possibly quarrel, from "fail-safe" procedures to new modes of mathematical analysis to new uses for titanium and beryllium;[21] third, that on the subject of military policy vis-à-vis the USSR both RAND and its employers merely reflect the will and the preferences of the American people themselves; and finally, that in any event RAND is in fact only one among plural *and* pluralistic sources of influence employing social scientists and generating usable research in the U.S. These points deserve consideration, for together they cast some additional light on the theory and practice of "democratic pluralism."

The first statement is certainly true. It is no secret, for instance, that some present RAND personnel disagree with American policy toward China and have produced work that can be read as calling into question certain basic American values in this area, rather than mere policy preferences. At the same time, it is impossible to believe that those agencies that fund RAND's work—especially the Air Force—will continue to support research that does not give them any payoff and is not likely to do so in the future. In a society that values the "free" intellect (at least rhetorically), a sophisticated employer will tolerate, even welcome, large amounts of eccentricity and deviation; that is merely a subsidiary cost to be charged against the overall gains. Smith himself testifies to how great the Air Force has found these gains to be, as in the overseas bases study; RAND has surely paid its way to support a few critics of China policy.

In fact, it is paying its way now, since it has under way several projects supportive of the military effort in Vietnam, one of which is designed to help the Air Force find out how it "might use tactical air support more effectively in combat against the Vietcong."[22] In any event, however, it is not the integrity or the subjective freedom of RAND that is under discussion, but rather the policy process into which RAND fits. That process is one in which government agencies (by now, it should be noted, not the Air Force alone as far as RAND is con-

[21] Smith's list of RAND "contributions" begins at p. 109.

[22] The quotation is from Stern's article, p. 119, and is apparently based on an interview with Amron Katz of RAND. Stern also mentions other RAND studies related to the war effort, at least one of which has generated useful scholarly data that are being kept secret for political reasons.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cerned) are the chief source of funds for a research organization that is supposed, among other things, to provide information affecting agency policies: payment for value received. And the really important question is whether this special relationship should be viewed as adding an increment of strength or an increment of weakness to the pluralist tendencies in the political system.

The answer is not difficult to find. A clue to it can be found in Smith's remark that, in attempting to "sell" the results of the bases study, "Wohlstetter gave 92 briefings (most of them during the period from March [1953] to the end of October)" to the Air Force. One need only ask how many scientists *not* in a special relationship with a government agency get a chance to lobby for the adoption of their proposals *ninety-two times* in a period of less than a year? And with the cachet of being professionally intimate with high officials in that agency? And known, additionally, to have asked no embarrassing questions about that agency's primary mission itself: the deterrence of a supposedly expectable Communist attack on Western Europe or the U.S. itself?

Generally speaking, in any political system the kind of access to decision-making responsibility that RAND obtained in this case depends on the possession of relevant resources. In essence, by supporting RAND the government through the Air Force paid for the recruitment of a new member to the political elite in the area of national security policy-making. But that is only one aspect of what actually happened, for money is only one resource for access. The most relevant resource for access to national strategy councils has always been agreement on fundamentals. This agreement indeed helps define what is meant by "expertise," which then refers to the possession not only of relevant skills but also of acceptable attitudes.[23] In this instance there was a positive payoff for both parties to the transaction because and only because of the compatibility of their attitudes, chief of which was a desire, not to put too fine a point on it, to provide military security as perceived within the intellectual confines of the cold-war perspective. I think it is fair to doubt that any other fundamental attitude would have been acceptable to the Air Force; and even now, were RAND to become known as a prominent lobbyist *against* the administration's Asian policy, as it was *for* deterrence policy, it would surely lose its favored position. Be that as it may, my proposition is certainly not put to the test by the mere fact of RAND's being hospitable to diverse viewpoints. Research embarrassing to the client can, after all, be ignored (as, there is every evidence, work emanating from RAND which is critical of our

[23] I have remarked on this point at more length in *Deadly Logic*, chap. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China policy is being ignored). On the other hand, research deemed helpful by the client has a special chance to be influential—a chance not vouchsafed the work of an ordinary American social scientist, who thus is deprived of equal access to his government. If this form of inequality were distributed randomly, the result would perhaps offend only the most dogmatic of populists or anti-intellectuals. But it is not distributed randomly; it is distributed *by the Air Force*—and even the most sanguine portrayals of the American political system do not mention the military sector as a strength of pluralism, whatever other virtues it may have.[24]

Similar considerations apply to the argument that RAND is only one of many, or at least of several, similar organizations in a plural society, some public, some semipublic, some private.[25] Once again the statement is true but irrelevant. To speak of a meaningful pluralism in this connection we would have to believe, first, that independent research groups with no built-in bias toward the military have as effective an access to government as does RAND, and second, that the agencies they have access to—say the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency—are themselves nearly as influential *and* well-financed as the Air Force. Neither of those propositions is credible.

Furthermore, it should be noted that RAND's access to important loci of power in government is even more special than the story of Wohlstetter's briefings reveals. Smith's account on occasion seems less a history of RAND than a case study on interlocking directorates for an antitrust textbook. The RAND board of trustees in 1965 (p. 185, n. 29) reads like a burlesque of Mills' notions of the "power elite," not merely in who is included—great universities and scientific research centers, public utilities and the monopolistic mass media, big oil, defense industry—but in who is excluded—labor unions or federations, the small liberal arts colleges, public power and rural electrification associations, independent small business or media operators, independent

[24] Arnold Rose takes a qualifiedly hopeful view of the growing military role in American politics (pp. 134-52), but at one point (p. 141) he writes: "There is evidence to support the view that the United States is moving in the direction of the garrison state—the already mentioned use of military 'expertise,' placement of military men into civilian posts, and the increasing trend toward secrecy in government. There is also some evidence to support the thesis that science, technology, labor, and industry are becoming increasingly dependent upon the military." Later (p. 142) Rose says: "If the garrison state should develop in the United States the trends suggest that the political elite would dominate it here also, rather than an economic or military elite." It is not clear if Rose thinks that such an eventuality would be preferable to the alternatives, or, if so, why.

[25] At p. 143 Smith offers a long list of research institutes in the field of national security that have been inspired by RAND's success.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organizations of scientists and scholars. The categories of representation on the board are themselves a study in the new elite: Industrial Trustees, Academic and Scientific Trustees, and "Public Interest" Trustees (whose identity, at least on the 1965 board, is hard to discover).[26] This pattern holds true for all of RAND's history, moreover, from its founding under the auspices of the Douglas Aircraft Company to its later financing by the great foundations. Smith's innocent remark that the "original decision to fill the Board with men of high standing has paid off handsomely for RAND over the years" is certainly true—and is also certainly destructive of any naive ideas about the "pluralism" of the research community, since "men of high standing" are not available to just *any* group of scientists or scholars.

In the end, the only analogy we can find for RAND's operations is Robert Engler's description of "the permeability of oil."[27] Like the oil industry giants (who are themselves incidentally represented at RAND), RAND is everywhere, maintaining "informal contacts" with congressmen and congressional committee staffs, serving on "advisory committees, boards, and consultant groups" of the government, and in general having "a number of friends in high places and a voice in important policy decisions difficult to imagine a decade earlier" (p. 140). And all this political access, in addition, is supported by a tax exemption that, despite Smith's careful defense of it, is quite obviously indefensible except by legalistic appeal to a defective law. Groups such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the Sierra Club have been threatened with loss of tax-exempt status for attempting "to influence legislation," and this fact leads Smith to ask whether "carrying on policy-oriented research [is] 'attempting to influence legislation'" (p. 192). He does not answer the question, but since it repays close study by answering itself that does not matter.[28] Plainly, the propaganda activities of, say, the FOR are pitifully thin compared to the intensive lobbying of Wohlstetter and his associates for the bases study or of Herman Kahn and his

[26] It is important to note that Smith never questions whether the words "academic," "university," and such, are done justice by the close ties between such scientific research centers as M.I.T.—which has a retired Air Force general as its vice-president—and the government. One must at least ask whether the presence on the RAND board of such men as the presidents of Rice University and Case Institute, the provost of M.I.T., the director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, or the vice-president of the Brookings Institution actually adds to the Board any viewpoint unique to academia.

[27] *The Politics of Oil* (New York 1961), chap. 12.

[28] At p. 97, Smith does emphasize RAND's attempt "to avoid identification with partisan causes." The apparent assumption that "nonpartisan" causes, whatever they may be, are somehow free of the taint of politics is an assumption that can be supported only by the most narrow, Bentleyan view of what constitutes political life and political action. On this point, see below, p. 322.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

associates for civil defense. No doubt the law tacitly distinguishes between administrative lobbying and legislative lobbying, but the distinction is maintained not by a realistic assessment of the legislative process in America but by the careful tailoring of most of our lobbying and tax laws to the requirements of big business. The very fact that RAND can cohabit peacefully with a provision that systematically discriminates against political outsiders and systematically favors political insiders is itself the most telling point one can make about RAND's place in our plural political order.

And thus the proposition that RAND contributes an unquestionably positive good to that order becomes itself not entirely credible. The root notion behind all pluralist theory is that somewhere there is a countervailing power for every source of independent power one discovers. If one cannot point to groups or institutions that truly countervail, then pluralism as a descriptive category has become rhetoric rather than analysis.[29] If, keeping this in mind, we return to the criterion suggested earlier for linking case studies of this kind to the macrosystem, we are led to the following conclusion: the RAND Corporation, by making the Air Force a more effective instrument of national policy and by strengthening the Air Force's links with the corporate sector, without making any attempt to help establish *countervailing powers* within or outside of the government, is in fact contributing to the *anti*pluralist tendencies in American politics.[30]

V

At this point, we clearly must deal with the two remaining arguments suggested above in defense of RAND's value-sharing with government. Some of RAND's technical and technological innovations, I said, can be seen as having contributed to the *national* security, as its military advice has to *national* strategy; and has there not been a *national* consensus on the cold-war values to which I have been continually referring? If all this is true, surely we do not need to seek the establishment of countervailing powers against the very interest of the whole nation itself; that would be an absurdity.[31] If it is true, then Smith's happy

[29] Thus the invocation of the institutions referred to in n. 25 above is rhetorical rather than analytic, since the nature of their work, support, and power is left totally unexplored by Smith.

[30] The concept of "countervailing power" seems to me to be at the core of the pluralist approach; see Galbraith for the original formulation of this notion.

[31] For an expression of this viewpoint, see Glenn H. Snyder, "The Politics of National Defense: A Review of Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense*," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VI (December 1962), 368-73. A cogent reply to Snyder, and indeed the most cogent handling of the "national interest" question that I know of, is Bernard

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conclusion is correct: everyone has gained and no one has lost by RAND's performance of its special role. Or, as he puts it: "From its position as friendly critic, RAND injected heretical ideas into the Air Force hierarchy which stimulated needed change. . . . As defense-policy choices become ever more complex, there can only be a growing need for some set of institutions to help serve as a bridge between the realm of 'closed politics' and the larger public. . . . The advisory corporation like RAND can serve a vital function in tapping the intellectual capabilities of people outside the government for work on public problems and in generally promoting the public understanding necessary for the successful functioning of modern democratic government" (pp. 236, 240).

Unfortunately the viewpoint expressed in the paragraph above is either tautological—"needed change" is change needed by those with the power to make it; the national interest is that interest that national leaders pursue—or else it has a secret meaning discernible only to the mystical nationalist. We can, if comprehensible communication between informed citizens is our aim, often make distinctions between policies aimed at a national interest and those clearly directed to parochial or class interests.[32] But we can do no more than that, except by arbitrary assertion. Where there are competing policies designed to promote "the national interest" we can argue more or less persuasively in favor of our own proposals, but unless our opponents violate the rules of sensible discourse (e.g., engage in self-contradiction, misrepresent the evidence), we cannot establish that ours is *the* policy "actually in" the national interest. That it is eventually chosen by majority rule, or in some cases by a tacit consensus somewhere short of unanimity, would be beside the point, for these are only rules of fairness in decision-making, not criteria of "truth" or "rightfulness."[33]

To return then to our problem, the overseas bases study inspired

C. Cohen, "Military Policy Analysis and the Art of the Possible," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VI (June 1962), 154-59. As the dates suggest, Cohen's article is not actually a reply to Snyder's; rather, it is a review of Snyder's book *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton 1961).

[32] Compare the remark of Walter Stein, "It is common, indeed usual, to be uncertain of a boundary but quite certain of what lies well to the east or west of it . . ." (in Stein, ed., *Morals and Missiles: Catholic Essays on the Problem of War Today* [London 1959], 25).

[33] Some discussions of democratic theory have seemed to suggest that what is meant by "pluralism" is contention over particular policies, but consensus on basic beliefs; when one attempts to act outside that consensus, one can only expect to be ignored or thwarted. (See, for example, Dahl's *Who Governs?*, chap. 28.) It may be that Smith, Glenn Snyder, and others have some such view in mind with regard to the "foreign policy consensus," as Gabriel Almond calls it in his *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York 1950). However, I do not think that point is applicable to this discussion. Descriptively, no doubt, the proposition about consensus is unexceptionable and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"needed change" and promoted "public understanding" if and only if the conception of national security forwarded by it happened to be one's own and was in need of greater sophistication. Effectively this means that that study was unquestionably in *the* (one and only) national interest only if there was at the time national *unanimity* on what *the* national interest was.

But of course there was no such unanimity about the national interest, not even at the time of the Korean War. The premises of the cold war itself—that a major nuclear deterrent is (or rather, was) desirable; that the Soviets posed a genuine military threat to Western Europe; that in various corners of the globe an American military presence is necessary to halt Communist expansionism; that, in sum, a struggle for the world has been under way since the end of World War II—have never been seen as beyond debate in the intellectual community.[34] It is (or was) possible to argue with conviction and intelligence one of the following propositions in response to the overseas bases study: (1) Eventual nuclear disarmament should be the desideratum of American national security policy; the only real military threat to Western Europe was the threat of unintended conflict during a crisis over Berlin or Germany; vulnerable forces would indeed make catastrophe more likely in such a circumstance, but would be, on the other hand, much more adaptable to any proposed disarmament scheme; therefore the risk of accidental war should have been taken at least in the short run, the energies of the government then being devoted not to a build-up of military security but to extrication from the area of potential crisis through some kind of disengagement scheme. (2) Alternatively, the potential destructiveness of accidental war being too great to make such a risk bearable, the rationalization of our nuclear deterrent should have proceeded only to the extent of creating a secure *minimum* deterrent, not (as the RAND study came to signify)[35] as a first step toward the creation of

even tautological—depending, however, on what one means by "basic beliefs." My own suggestion is that such a phrase becomes highly normative if it is taken to mean anything more than the *words and symbols* that are considered legitimate as descriptions of the goals one seeks or the actions one undertakes. The "democratic creed" thus refers to no particular (i.e., operational) ends—except for those for whom the word "un-American" has an intimate meaning.

[34] Perhaps they have been beyond debate at RAND, for as I mentioned earlier, RAND has published no works calling any of those premises into question. And it has certainly sponsored no contributions to the growing literature of "cold-war revisionism," as represented by, for instance, Gar Alperovitz's *Atomic Diplomacy From Potsdam to Hiroshima* (New York 1965).

[35] The ultimate significance of the RAND bases study only became obvious to outsiders with the publication of Albert Wohlstetter's "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII (January 1959), 211-34, which made quite clear that RAND theorists envisaged a secure deterrent as being both immense and multipurposed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a nuclear force large enough to be an instrument of threats and policy in every cold-war (or hot-war) situation.[36]

If we assume now that by "public understanding" Smith refers to the understanding of those who belong to what Gabriel Almond calls the "attentive public"[37] and that "needed change" refers to change that history has made clear to *all* observers had to be undertaken, then we immediately see that by these standards RAND's contribution to the general welfare has been more questionable and controversial than Smith is willing to allow.[38] Nor is it a blessing under these circumstances that RAND's work has been free from "identification with partisan causes."[39] On the contrary, partisanship in social science may often be constructive, in that it immediately generates its own opposition and qualification, whereas a deep-rooted intellectual bias so broad and so pervasive that it is not even recognized may come to act as a damper on critical thought.

These remarks are not, of course, intended as a complaint about the sponsoring of "controversial" research by government; almost all research would so qualify by the standards implied above. Any government agency will and should do whatever it can (within certain bounds) to defend itself from attack and to improve its performance of its charged duties. What is at stake here are rather the attitude and responsibilities of scientists and scholars themselves: What should they do? What mode of participation in government is it appropriate for them to adopt?

Thus, RAND has chosen not to notice what is questionable in the work it is doing, rather than to ventilate thoroughly all the assumptions that go into its work; that choice in the end has helped narrow the range of options open to policy-makers. Returning to some of the

[36] Writers as diverse as James Warburg, Frederick L. Schuman, Walter Lippmann, and George F. Kennan disagreed with American European policy in whole or in part and questioned the premises on which it was based. On "minimum deterrence," see J. David Singer, *Deterrence, Arms Control, and Disarmament* (Columbus 1962). It must be remembered, incidentally, that Smith has chosen as his example of RAND's contribution what is certainly the best major RAND study; if he had chosen instead the work of Herman Kahn and his colleagues on civil defense—work that quite obviously took its logical cues from Wohlstetter's study—he would have had to defend the indefensible rather than merely ignore the controversial. (For an extended critique of the civil defense study see my *Deadly Logic*, chap. 2.)

[37] See Almond, 138.

[38] This is true even though one notes RAND's successes in the completely noncontroversial areas I have mentioned earlier. From a critical standpoint these successes would be viewed as residual benefits that do not balance the general costliness to American pluralism of RAND's operations; furthermore, there is no reason to believe that RAND or any similar organization was the *only* potential source of all the innovations that Smith attributes to it.

[39] See n. 28 above.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

points I made earlier, we see, similarly, that RAND chose to operate under the auspices of the Air Force rather than, say, relevant congressional committees; that choice has affected the distribution of knowledge and know-how between democratically responsible (at least in part) and nonresponsible arms of the national government. RAND has chosen to lobby administratively rather than legislatively for its proposals; that choice has affected the distribution of power over national policy between those same arms of government. RAND has also chosen to do its work and its lobbying privately, rather than to thrash out its assumptions and analyses in the relevant intellectual community before presenting them to the Air Force; that choice has narrowed rather than extended the range of citizen participation in policy-making. And especially, RAND has chosen to do much of its work in a secrecy removed from all critical eyes in that intellectual community (Smith tells us in a footnote on page 158 that in the 1950's about half of RAND studies were classified); that choice has promoted an imbalance in know-how and knowledge between the military and the intellectual community.[40]

In the end, therefore, we must take as ironic Smith's comment that "the military services themselves, in sponsoring organizations like RAND, have greatly strengthened the civilian's role in defense management and policy formation" (p. 25). The price of that strengthening has been, as is often the case, the co-opting by government of a potentially independent group in the community. In 1947 the president of the Rockefeller Foundation remarked as follows (as quoted by Smith): "They [the military] were quite willing to accept civilians on a certain service level in the past. They used to say 'We like to have you around, and if you are awfully smart we will ask you questions and you will answer them as well as you can; but then we will go into another room and shut the door and make our decision.' That, in the past they were quite willing to do. Now, however, they want us in the backroom with them. They want to talk over the really fundamental questions, and they are actually admitting civilians at the planning level. That, I think, is very significant" (p. 35). To be admitted to "the backroom"—that

[40] I have not emphasized this point, but in a way Smith's refusal to deal with it is astonishing. Are scholarship and "creative research" at all compatible with secrecy? Are we to consider classified work a contribution to knowledge or simply, until it is made public, a fiction? Can a scholar or scientist accept the military's rationalizations for secrecy and remain true to his vocation? Perhaps there is a responsible argument to be made for mixing military secrecy with civilian research (though I have never seen one that was not merely self-serving on the part of the military), but surely the whole question deserves a chapter in a book such as Smith's, rather than relegation to a footnote.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has always been the carrot dangled in front of those whose services the proprietors of that room have wanted to co-opt. Perhaps this trade of independence for participation has been worthwhile from the perspective of a problematical democratic pluralism; perhaps not. In any event, Smith offers no aid toward the answering of that question.

We must also, finally, take as ironic Smith's comment about RAND's "long and arduous struggle" to sell its ideas to the Air Force: "The decision maker does not emerge here in the passive and largely reactive role that Sir Charles Snow portrays in *Science and Government*. Nor is it evident, if the present case is at all typical, that the cardinal decisions are always or even usually made by a 'handful of men.' There is opportunity for laborious dissection of advisory recommendations at various policy levels" (p. 238). Smith's own data show that the bases-study recommendations—and thus the outlines of American nuclear strategy for perhaps decades to come—were adopted through a process in which independent opinion elites and publics and democratically elected representatives had at best a token presence.

Finally, it bears repeating that such criticisms as these are not answered simply by postulating a beneficently working adversary system in social research and political influence. The adversary system in the courts has come under attack on the ground that its operations may hide a gross imbalance of resources between the opposing sides in a legal dispute. The same reasoning applies in the arena of power, and with even more stringency. There is no invisible hand; power is what people make of it, and RAND has helped to strengthen one kind of power in American society. If the host of imitators that have flourished in the wake of RAND's success have had the wherewithal or the opportunity or the will to balance that power, no evidence of their success is forthcoming in *The RAND Corporation*; nor has that essential question even been asked by Smith.

Looking back, then, on our earlier discussion, we can see that although RAND as an organization has had no effect on some of the obstacles to a genuine political pluralism in the United States, in other respects its effect has been considerable. The result of its activities has been to lessen (slightly) democratic control over policy; to aid in the continued parcelling out of public authority on an inequalitarian basis and in the exclusion of a substantial part of the intellectual community from access to the policy process; and in sum to narrow rather than enlarge the foreign policy-making elite, "the major [remaining] area of small-group control."

There have been, of course, extensive gains resulting from RAND's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

activity. Determining their exact extent depends on one's perspective; but in any event they must be set against the political costs of that activity before a real appreciation of them is possible. And it must also be observed that there is as yet no reason to believe that the diversification of RAND's sources of support which is presently under way will correct all these tendencies of its operations. As far as we can tell, the private relationship with the Air Force has merely been replaced, where it has been, by the market test. Those who are capable of financing an expensive interdisciplinary study can hire RAND to do the work; neither Smith nor any spokesman for RAND has given reason to believe that some other criterion is being used to dispense RAND's services in the nongovernmental sector.[41] But the market test simply replicates in the economic arena what interest-group bargaining accomplishes in the political arena: a commitment to a spurious equality of opportunity that rewards the most those who possess the most of those resources on which political participation is based. Who will pay RAND to study how growers might be persuaded or coerced into recognizing a union of farm workers? Not, I think, the Ford Foundation.

The relationship of science and scientists to government—which is but one aspect of the broad question, How is social research actually financed?—is extremely complicated; so, therefore, must be the criteria by which that relationship is to be judged for appropriateness and propriety. If we reject, on the one hand, the uncritical notion that scientific work is morally and politically neuter and thus poses no problem and, on the other hand, the equally uncritical notion that science and government must or can maintain an absolute hands-off relationship, we then confront some extremely difficult questions about the proper role for scientific research to play in a democratic social order. The main task of those who study the activities of scientists in government must surely be to clarify those questions and to begin the search for answers. Al-

[41] For example, a recent major interdisciplinary study at RAND, published as *The Urban Transportation Problem*, by J. R. Meyer, J. F. Kain, and M. Wohl (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), was financed chiefly by a grant from the Ford Foundation. That study itself happens to be another excellent example of the limitations that seem built into the sophisticated methods RAND has developed. Meyer *et al.* compare auto and rail transportation and find the latter wanting on the whole; but they do not consider urban *air* transportation, which is especially important in the northeastern urban corridor. Thus they take no notice of the tremendous social and economic costs that air travel is causing; and they therefore fail to make the obvious observation that the auto can never compete with the airplane as a mode of interurban transportation, but the high-speed railroad can, and may be much cheaper. And as with RAND's strategic studies, I think the fault lies not so much with the practitioners of systems analysis but with the spurious value-neutrality of the method itself. One would have to *feel* the destruction caused by the auto and the airplane in combination—one would have to have that specific bias—in order to be led to that observation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

though that task cannot be accomplished unless the study of this narrow subject matter goes hand in hand with the larger study of democratic government, there is certainly a place for the detailed case study in this program: theory-building cannot proceed without data. But such studies will be less useful than they might otherwise be if, like *The RAND Corporation*, they allow the search for data to be dominated by an approach to the political system that obscures as much as it reveals.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TWO BOOKS ON SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY

By GEORGE ENTEEN

John Keep, with the assistance of Liliana Brisby, editor, *Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror*, New York and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964, 331 pp. $7.50.

M. V. Nechkina, editor, *Istoriia i Istoriki* [History and Historians], Moscow, Nauka, 1965, 464 pp. 2 rubles.

WESTERN observers of Soviet life have been apt to construe Soviet historiography as a political barometer. The character of statements rather than the events purportedly described by them has been the object of study. The tendentiousness of Soviet historical writing —its distortions and its employment of such elusive concepts as "relations of production"—have been not so much obstacles to investigation as they have been its subject matter. Only in recent years has this writing gained attention for what it shows about the past. Now a scholar is increasingly liable to impoverish his own work by failing to take Soviet findings into account. This observation holds not only for orientology and Byzantine studies, fields traditionally congenial to Russian scholars, but even for such new fields as Latin American studies.[1] But precisely at the moment when assessment of Soviet historiography has become more urgent and rewarding, it has become more difficult.

The profusion of Soviet scholarship is one of the stumbling blocks; between 1956 and 1963, 140 volumes of documents and 25 historiographical articles on the Russian Revolution were published. Most likely a count of monographs and popular works on the Revolution would illustrate the same point. This profusion might be considered an instance of convergence with Western scholarship, but while it establishes more points of common reference, it inhibits evaluation by greatly enlarging the task. Often the Western specialist finds himself merely making inferences about how Soviet historians make inferences, and his opinions about Soviet society as a whole impinge upon his judgment of particular problems.

Two overlapping works have appeared that constitute an important commentary on Soviet historiography and provide a shortcut into the

[1] See Edward B. Richards, "Marxism and Marxist Movements in Latin America in Recent Soviet Historical Writing," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XLV (November 1965), 577-90; and J. Gregory Oswald, "Contemporary Soviet Research on Latin America," *Latin American Research Review*, 1 (Spring 1966), 77-96.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

field. *Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror* is the edited proceedings of a conference of Western scholars held at Geneva in 1961, when the Berlin problem was in a state of crisis. The conference met under the auspices of the Congress of Cultural Freedom and was probably financed by the CIA. *History and Historians* is a collection of twenty articles prepared by the Group on the Study of Historical Scholarship of the Academy of Sciences' Institute of History. Each volume illuminates the other, and, taken together, they provide a basis for some generalizations.

Four of the papers in *Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror* describe the evolution of the Russian historical profession from 1954 to 1957. Three of these trace the changing relationship between historians and party authorities. The author of the fourth, S. V. Utechin, in what is undoubtedly one of the most noteworthy papers of the conference, seeks to characterize the profession as a whole by bringing to bear determinants other than the demands of authorities. In addition to these four contributions, George Katkov and Bertram Wolfe survey work in the subdisciplines of archival science and the history of the Communist party. Soviet interpretations of particular events, reported with a mind to illuminating the post-Stalin period, make up the largest body of facts in the volume. Some of the papers treat interpretations of a relatively narrow range of facts or even of a single event: George Kennan's report of how one Soviet historian has comprehended America's role in the Allied intervention, Marc Mancall's presentation of Soviet views on the Sino-Soviet alliance (against the background of a brief survey of Soviet orientology), John Keep's paper on Western history of recent years in the Soviet mirror, Matthew Gallagher's study of Soviet writings on World War II, and Max Beloff's paper entitled "Soviet Historians and American History." These efforts are balanced by papers that draw attention to the concepts employed by historians and show how Soviet writers perceive broad areas of modern history: Walter Laqueur, by explicating the term "national bourgeoisie," presents the Soviets' evolving understanding of the underdeveloped world; Vernon Aspaturian, by setting forth the concepts that govern the thoughts of Soviet diplomats and historians of international relations, comments upon Soviet methods of testing reality.

The summaries of discussions that took place at the conference are a distinctive merit of *Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror*. They subject the data presented in the papers to interpretation from numerous standpoints and pose an array of engaging questions that provide an excellent point of departure for evaluating the Soviet work in *History and*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Historians, published a year later. More than anything else the volume represents an attempt to describe on the highest level of generality possible the post-Stalin phase of Soviet historiography.

In the Introduction, Mr. Keep summarizes the major changes that the participants in the conference agreed had taken place since Stalin's death. First, "new institutions and university faculties have mushroomed whose works have flooded from the presses thanks to an increase in the outlets for research." Second, access to source material has been made easier: "Today historians are not only permitted but strongly encouraged to search the archives for evidence with which to buttress their arguments." Third, "the scope of historical study has been greatly broadened." And finally, "closer links have been established between Soviet and non-communist historians." This is a welcome event, though "except on a very limited plane nothing resembling a genuine dialogue between East and West has as yet become possible" (pp. 11-12).

These emerging characteristics do not, according to most of the discussants, override important continuities with the previous period. The most comprehensive statement seeking to balance change with continuity was formulated by Adam Ulam, who sees the Soviet system and the Communist bloc as a whole in a state of crisis. The disinclination of the rulers to rely on direct control has put greater burdens on ideology as an instrument of mobilization. This has taken place precisely at the moment when ideology is losing its force and relevance: "The Soviet historian now is certainly not free to arrive at any conclusions to which his researches might lead him. . . . Nevertheless there has been a change. The historian is not only supposed to restate and repeat, he now engages in active argument, both with his confrères in the West and . . . with the non-communist socialists of the past" (pp. 213-14).

The historian is urged to write factually, dramatically, and argumentatively, but the nature of his enterprise is such that he cannot follow the command to be relevant without infringing upon old orthodoxies: "The testimony of 1955-7 is fairly instructive. When it appeared safe to write a more professional type of history, even on subjects as perilous as that of the history of the Communist Party and of international socialism, there was no shortage of historians who both in their conclusions and in their use of materials demonstrated their ability and willingness to be genuine historians. To be sure, they were fulfilling what they assumed to be the new directive, but their example shows how imperfectly even the most efficient dictatorship can stamp out the scholarly state of mind" (p. 214).

Mr. Utechin, in considering the same events and many of the same

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

writings as Mr. Ulam, seeks the basis for a more optimistic conclusion. Striving to broaden the framework of the discussion, he distinguishes between the comparatively stable organization of the historical profession and the volatile demands of the party. He demonstrates, moreover, that distinctive national traditions, the continued existence of rival schools of interpretation, have an important bearing on the quality of writing. The demands of the state represent only one of the sets of facts determining the character of the historical profession. An examination of selected works on the social history of the Soviet period and on the history of Russian thought leads him to his main conclusion that many current writings enhance our knowledge of the past (pp. 144-46). Although the question, Has the party loosened its controls? is exhaustive for the political scientist, he argues, it is only a preliminary consideration for the historian. The chief question for him is, Did the works produced add to our understanding of history? (p. 40).

If Mr. Utechin considers the findings of the conference too cautious in their optimism, others, most notably Mr. Katkov, Mr. Keep, Leopold Labedz, and Mr. Wolfe, consider them too extravagant. Mr. Katkov poses the main problem so sharply that it dominates the entire volume: "The discussion would be vitiated if the Conference concerned itself with establishing the degrees of veracity in the Soviet picture of the West, rather than its basic institutional mendacity" (p. 111).

Institutional mendacity—not all participants use the phrase, yet all of them touch upon the distinctive features of Soviet historiography; and if they do not talk about an inherent tendency toward distortion they are concerned with particular instances of it. For Mr. Kennan, at least as concerns Soviet treatment of the intervention, falsification does not reflect a major principle; it is not itself a problem that requires investigation, but merely "ideological coloration" (p. 286), i.e., propaganda such as exists and distorts in some degree in all societies. Mr. Beloff, writing on Soviet views of American history, asserts that Soviet misunderstanding is, in part, a result of naiveté (pp. 306-9). For Mr. Labedz the matter is at once simple and complex; it is related to mankind's widespread penchant for myth and to the particular Soviet approach to facts, that is, the tendency to do violence to them (pp. 16, 114). Mr. Wolfe, who considers the Stalinist era less distinctive than do most of his colleagues, devotes correspondingly more attention to Lenin's historical writings and finds in their approach the principal characteristics of the Stalinist era (pp. 44-47). The source of mendacity is the subordination of scholars to politicians and the notion that scholarship is intrinsically an instrument of political conflict. By implication, one

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

could not expect significant changes to occur while Lenin's canons continued to govern the profession.

The notion of institutional mendacity proved elusive, but the liveliest discussion at the conference attended the efforts to clarify it. All the participants quoted seem to agree with Mr. Wolfe that the mode of organization of the historical profession that magnifies its responsiveness to political commands has imparted a distinctive character to Soviet scholarship. But not all agree that this institutionalization need result in mendacity. What is involved, beyond a vague organizational approach or emphasis, remains unclear. Isaiah Berlin suggests that institutional mendacity may be rooted in Marxism itself, a philosophy of history defective in its basic assumption that the study of history yields knowledge of laws: "If one really believed that Marxism is a science, then the Soviet system would appear not absurd, but perfectly coherent: for in that case it would be quite logical to have party experts to tell others what to do and to assume the role of spiritual directors. The belief that the whole art of government consists of being engineers of human souls could be deduced from the purest Marxist doctrine unadulterated by Stalinism" (p. 89).

The most elaborate statement seeking to locate the distinctive traits of Soviet historiography in ideology is made by Mr. Aspaturian: "It was not enough to establish the falsehoods or the occasional glimpses of truth in Soviet ideology, it was equally important to ask how effective it was as a theory of reality and to evaluate this effectiveness in terms of Soviet purposes and not in terms of ours" (p. 116). While the method of both Soviet historiography and diplomacy is "far from being as scientific as it claims," it is "an effective system of analysis and strategy, in terms of Soviet objectives. . . . In fact, the entire Soviet picture of reality and international politics rests upon a dialectical analysis which furnishes Soviet decision-makers and diplomats with analytical categories; it creates for them an integrated ordering of events, relating them to each other, no matter how widely dispersed in time and space, and coordinates the effects of the various and sundry conflicts within individual countries as well as the world as a whole" (p. 251).

Marxist-Leninists employ a method that is more than a mode of cognition; it is "a framework for the analysis, mobilization, and manipulation of social and political power . . ." (p. 251). Mr. Aspaturian sees "institutionalized deception," which "was personalized by Stalin," employed in diplomacy and historiography.

Many participants balked at the suggestion that Marxism—or the employment of any ideology—need result in falsehood. Leonard

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Shapiro, in a rejoinder to Mr. Berlin, argues that Marxism was not really applicable to Russia; consequently, "certain features of Marxism had to be repressed in writing Party history because they did not fit the conditions" (p. 91). Mr. Laqueur draws attention to what might be considered the sounder aspects of Soviet methods: by demonstrating the instability of the concept "national bourgeoisie," he brings out how its various meanings reflect the changing needs of policy-makers. This instability of meaning notwithstanding, the concept resides at the center of a comprehensive and, in some respects, persuasive description of underdeveloped societies in the contemporary world. Jane Degras suggests, in effect, that the attempt to define institutional mendacity leads to placing exaggerated emphasis on distinctive elements in Soviet historiography. Everyone could "think of books which showed that in the West too historians could be guilty of selecting facts which fitted their theses and ignoring others. But the question went deeper than that. . . . No historian could really be more than a chronicler of events unless he approached his facts with some idea or purpose in mind. . . . Historians had to have theoretical criteria . . ." (p. 114).

The most striking comment on the distinctiveness of Soviet historiography is made by Marc Raeff and endorsed by Peter Scheibert of the University of Marburg. Mr. Raeff raises the question of whether "in talking about history in the West and in the Soviet Union, we are not dealing with two very different conceptions (history being used here in the sense of discipline and of mental activity). The Western conception had two main components: the first one was historicism, not in the sense the Soviets used the term, but in Meinecke's sense, which regarded historical events as unique because humanly meaningful in themselves; the second component was to find a rational explanation for the sequence of events, the causes and their consequences" (p. 148).

Mr. Raeff sets forth his remarks forcefully, but he scarcely elaborates them; his listeners at the conference seemed mildly astonished and, like the reader, at a loss as to how to interpret them. Are they merely the suggestion of a significant cultural difference, or do they suggest a divergence as profound as that between mythical and rational thinking? A number of the participants balked at accepting such a radical distinction. They upheld the view that the distinctive element in Soviet historiography, the source of institutional mendacity, resides either in the ideological framework or in the power structure of the Soviet Union.

Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror faithfully reflects tendencies in Western historiography. It is rich in data. It seeks to interpret a small range of facts (a decade of Soviet historiography) but pushes

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

beyond these limits and poses questions about Soviet intellectual life, the Soviet state, and ideology in general and finally strives for formulations about the interaction of conscious life and brute circumstance. To be sure, some of its formulations of questions engender a certain confusion and vitiate the efforts to phrase answers; although the book echoes some cold-war phraseology and testifies to the enduring influence of Stalin, it would be unwise to reduce any of the positions it presents to political equivalents. It is on the whole admirably objective.

Just before the Western scholars assembled at Geneva in 1961, Academician M. V. Nechkina called upon her colleagues to investigate the history of Soviet historical scholarship. Her challenge provoked one of the liveliest debates to occur since 1931, and the history of their own craft emerged as the major theme for Soviet historians in the 1960's. Its distinctiveness for our age is marked by the fact that nonspecialists joined the debate and even some who were not historians participated in it. Apparently, the same events that were to bring the Western scholars together to discuss Soviet historiography had created an acute self-consciousness among their Soviet counterparts. While no single system of periodization was adopted, numerous facts came to light, and a host of themes were introduced that either echoed the 1920's or were entirely fresh.

At the close of the debate on periodization, the historians kept up the discussion by writing monographs and reminiscences. They found themselves with the tasks of plotting, against the background created by the debate, the evolution of particular historical interpretations and of depicting the roles of individual historians. These newer tasks proved more difficult than the writing of discursive essays: executing them required not only greater technical prowess, archival research, and so on, but also the discussion of ideas no longer countenanced. Most difficult, it required the description of relations among historians—the course and outcome of rivalry among competing schools of thought and scholarly institutions, on the one hand, and the relations of historians with party authorities, on the other. Unless handled properly, this information might convey an impression other than that the prevailing interpretations of Russian and world history were the outcome of accumulated experience interpreted through the agency of a superior method. *History and Historians* is a product of this second stage of discussion.

The volume comprises three sections: the first, "V. I. Lenin and Historical Scholarship," numbering three articles, is the smallest; the second, "Historiography of Individual Problems of Major Significance"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is the largest section, containing ten articles. Two of these articles describe the activity of a number of early research and pedagogical institutes. Most of the others evaluate Soviet writings on such matters as industrialization from 1926 to 1934, partisan warfare in World War II, the Moscow Uprising in 1905, and Russian populism. One article concerns a problem of pre-Soviet Russian historiography—the origin of the liberal understanding of the Decembrist movement. Still another article, quite distinctive in its approach, considers one body of source material, early Bolshevik brochures, and surveys its treatment by various schools of historians. The third section is entitled "Historians and Their Works." The lead article, treating the historical conceptions of M. N. Pokrovskii, is an important statement in the current reevaluation of him. Still another article rehabilitates V. I. Nevskii, an old colleague of Pokrovskii who perished in the purges. Such pre-Soviet luminaries as Kliuchevskii and Chicherin and a lesser known populist, I. A. Khudiakov, are the subjects of other articles. The final one is an example of historical virtuosity entitled "Who Was the Author of the Article Against Pisarev in 'The Contemporary' of 1865?"

The second section, "Historiography of Individual Problems," begins with the two long, highly informative articles on leading scholarly and pedagogical institutions: G. D. Alekseeva's "The Founding of Centers of Soviet Historical Scholarship and Their Activity, 1918-1923" and L. V. Ivanova's "Communist Universities and Their Role in the Training of Marxist Historians, 1918-1929." These factually rich, well-documented works, which resemble Western organizational studies, seek to describe the institutional framework, the material facilities, and the professional mores of Marxist historians, i.e., to describe the existential base of historical interpretation. For the foreign specialist they are a windfall of data and a fund of impressions about such luminaries as Pokrovskii and Tarle, about lesser figures hitherto known only by their initials and titles, and about events in the early lives of such institutions as the Communist Academy, the Marx-Engels Institute, the Lenin Institute, Istpart, the Institute of Red Professors, and the Communist University named for Sverdlov. If the presentation is kaleidoscopic, it achieves verisimilitude. One gains a clear sense of the humble origins of Marxist historical scholarship and pedagogy. The value of the articles is not in their stated conclusions but in the unscrubbed data they offer.

The tone of the articles conveys a sense of striving for truth and differs radically from the ritualistic speeches by historians about their craft that posed as research in the Stalinist era. Progress is marked, if one evaluates these articles by comparison with Stalinist efforts. But by the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conventional standards one applies to other works, these articles cannot be considered objective. Although the authors do discuss historians who were once disgraced, purged, and unmentionable, they fail to discuss Stalin's rivals, Bukharin and Trotsky, and their followers, such as Preobrazhenskii and Slepkov, who were active in the institutions considered. While it would be inaccurate to say that the authors select facts to accord with preconceived conclusions, it is evident that they are constrained with respect to the facts that they can present to their readers.

Still another shortcoming of these articles is their theoretical impoverishment, which is betrayed, in comparison with most American writings of this sort, by the fact that there is no agreement about or even discussion of the elements of an organization which require a description. It would indeed be shortsighted to reprove the authors for failing to employ such concepts as "role" and "structure," but the articles are diminished by the absence even of rival concepts. Although Ivanova's article reflects some striving for this kind of formulation, the reader gains only a sketchy view of the problems the institutions confronted, the information and the immediate goals in the light of which the problems were resolved, and the way the decisions affected the character of the institutions. It is difficult, therefore, to make judgments about the role of these institutions in society or in the intellectual life or to evaluate their success or failure apart from the general consideration that they contributed to the building of socialism and the popularization of the Marxist-Leninist world view. In short, one loses sight of the evolution of the organizations. Alekseeva and Ivanova are Marxists; their works are avowed instances of Marxist scholarship; yet the reader fails to encounter anything distinctively Marxist about them. One is informed about specific institutions, but not about how their experience verifies or refutes any particular assertions of Marxism. It would seem that the articles are Marxist only in the sense that they examine Marxist organizations. But, clearly, these institutions can be investigated from any number of standpoints. One might conclude, therefore, that Marxist theory itself accounts for this impoverishment, but Marxist theory does set forth a series of questions that the investigator should address to his sources, as well as guidelines for his presentation. In her Introduction to this very volume, Academician Nechkina makes some suggestions about elements in the milieu relevant to an understanding of evolving historical interpretations.

If Marxist theory does not account for the low theoretical level of these two articles, then our attention is drawn to the political context. A clear account of particular institutional decisions would require a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Coming in April—

International Regionalism

Readings

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., Harvard University

This is an important and unique collection of articles on an increasingly important topic in discussions of the current international system: the role, value, and prospects of today's many international regional groupings.

Paper $5^3/_8 \times 8^1/_4$ Approx. 400 pages

Also Available—

United States Policy and the Third World

Problems and Analysis

CHARLES WOLF, JR., Senior Economist, The RAND Corp.

This book raises questions about vital relationships between the United States and the "third world" which are misunderstood or taken for granted. The author makes a deliberate — and rare — effort to combine political, military, and economic factors, and, by focusing on fundamental questions about the American interest, he clarifies policy issues for the student.

Paper $5^3/_8 \times 8^1/_4$ 208 pages $2.75

The United Nations and U. S. Foreign Policy

Revised Edition

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Thoroughly updated, this book includes much new material on contemporary developments such as international peace keeping, outer space, arms control and disarmament, and the problem of Communist China.

Paper $5^3/_8 \times 8^1/_4$ 288 pages $2.95

LITTLE, BROWN and COMPANY
34 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass. 02106

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Also Coming in April—

International Law and Political Crisis

A Casebook

LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN and DAVID O. WILKINSON, University of California, Los Angeles

This unique approach to international law analyzes how law is actually used by states in situations of major tension and high politics. The book as a whole both asserts and demonstrates the real and actual political relevance of international law.

Paper $5^3/_8 \times 8^1/_4$ 384 pages

Now Available for Courses in Comparative Politics—

Aspects of Political Development

An Analytic Study

LUCIAN W. PYE, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

This basic introduction to the political development of the emerging nations focuses on the general issues of political and economic change as well as on the specific relevance of the democratic process to these underdeveloped countries.

Paper 5 x 8 205 pages $1.95

Cases in Comparative Politics

JAMES B. CHRISTOPH, Ohio State University

This flexible casebook illustrates the workings and main elements of political power in five major countries — Great Britain, France, West Germany, the U.S.S.R., and India.

Paper $5^3/_8 \times 8^1/_4$ 502 pages $3.95



LITTLE, BROWN and COMPANY
34 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass. 02106

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REFERENCE WORKS

Bibliographie Courante d'Articles de Périodiques Postérieurs à 1944 sur

LES PROBLEMES POLITIQUES, ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIAUX

(Index to Post-1944 Periodical Articles on Political, Economic and Social Problems)

Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris

Some 1,500 periodicals from all over the world are currently received and indexed by the Center for Contemporary Documentation of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. Cards are classified by countries or geographic areas, and within these, systematically according to the Center's own decimal plan. The published index will include a detailed "Classification Scheme."

Estimated 304,000 cards reproduced in 17 volumes

Prepublication price: $950.00; after January 31, 1968: $1,190.00

To be supplemented

Catalogs from the Library of the INSTITUT für ZEITGESCHICHTE

(Institute for Contemporary History), Munich

Principal holdings of this library are on the history of National Socialism, the Third Reich and the Weimar Republic, with additional materials in related fields and contemporary history. One of the largest specialized collections of its kind, the library has approximately 50,000 volumes.

Alphabetischer (Alphabetical) Katalog
Estimated 62,200 cards reproduced in 5 volumes ***Price: $250.00***

Sachkatalog (Subject Catalog)
Estimated 94,500 cards reproduced in 6 volumes ***Price: $330.00***

Länderkatalog (Regional Catalog)
Estimated 24,000 cards reproduced in 2 volumes ***Price: $80.00***

Biographischer (Biographical) Katalog
Estimated 16,000 cards reproduced in 1 volume ***Price: $65.00***

10% additional charge on orders outside the U.S.
Descriptive material on these titles and a complete catalog of publications are available on request.

G. K. HALL & CO. 70 Lincoln Street, Boston, Mass. 02111

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more elaborate description of the leading personnel; such a presentation might unwittingly enlarge the role of Pokrovskii or necessitate a restatement of Trotskyite proposals. Further, it might unveil unfortunate consequences of some decisions and thereby suggest that other paths of development were possible and might perhaps have been preferable. In more general terms, such an account would necessitate a consideration of the immediate consequences of decisions, their impact on the work of individuals, and so would vitiate the customary narration of only the long-term consequences of acts in such value-laden terms as "the building of socialism."

Insofar as articles by Alekseeva and Ivanova reflect on *Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror*, they throw into relief one of the definitions of institutional mendacity and at the same time show its limitations. The exclusion of embarrassing names and events is a result of the authors' sensitivity to political commands. The same sensitivity imparts to the articles a tendentiousness, which cannot, however, be equated with mendacity. It is, nevertheless, their foremost quality. The historians must work within the framework of an official interpretation of Soviet society. Assertions contradicting the view that Soviet history is the "law-governed" process of building a socialist society and that the basic plan foretold the event are not countenanced. Historians evaluate all persons, acts, and ideals exclusively on the basis of their contribution to socialist construction and the propagation of the Marxist-Leninist world view. If these factors are not relevant in this context (as constructive or destructive agents), they are not treated as historical phenomena. Soviet historians who adhere to the official interpretation cannot be charged with mendacity merely because their minds are closed to other interpretations. But their tendentious adherence does impart a distinctive character to their work.

In some of the articles of *History and Historians*, one can discover traces of the mentality described by Mr. Raeff in his statements, quoted earlier, about the possibility of two very different conceptions of history. An article by A. A. Kurnosov, entitled "The Struggle of the Soviet People Behind the Lines of the German-Fascist Occupation: The Historiographical Problem," is, in part, an instance of this mentality. A clearer and more readily demonstrable instance is N. N. Iakovlev's "The Moscow Uprising of December 1905 in Historical Literature."

Mr. Kurnosov's article is an incisive commentary on the literature of the partisan movement. He aptly characterizes and classifies the forms of literature; he describes the changing base of source material and its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

McGRAW-HILL BOOKS

EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT, ***Fourth Edition***

ROBERT G. NEUMANN, University of California, Los Angeles.

McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science. ***Available spring***

A revision of the successful comparative government text known as EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT in previous editions. It maintains the focus on the four major European countries—Great Britain, France, the German Federal Republic, and the Soviet Union. A new section provides insightful analyses of the so-called *supranational* communities such as the European Economic Community (Common Market). The author's experience as a high-level government consultant is reflected in the book's emphasis on the *actual operations* of the governments discussed. All sections of the book are *completely updated* to account for the enormous changes in Europe, especially in France, Germany and the Soviet Union.

GOVERNING URBAN AMERICA, ***Third Edition***

CHARLES R. ADRIAN, University of California, Riverside; and

CHARLES PRESS, Michigan State University. McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science. ***Available spring***

This thorough revision presents a realistic introduction to urban government emphasizing the political process rather than institutions.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, ***Sixth Edition***

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, Williams College (with maps by George D. Brodsky). 745 pages/$8.95

Introduces international relations in terms of the origins, forms, forces, and prospects of the world-wide community of nations. An unusual amount of attention is given to the continuing problems in Latin America, Africa, the Mid-East, India, China, and the Soviet Union.

THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM, ***Second Edition***

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, University of California, Santa Barbara.

Series in Foundations of American Government and Political Science.

160 pages/$3.75 (clothbound), $1.60 (soft-cover)

Describes the constitutional foundations of the American political system as it operates under the Constitution. Recent developments in the areas of individual and civil rights are included.

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE, ***Second Edition***

CARLTON C. RODEE, TOTTON J. ANDERSON, and CARL Q. CHRISTOL; all of the University of Southern California. McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science. 704 pages/$8.95

Provides a comprehensive and balanced introduction to political science as a whole. This text is especially notable for the broad, thorough treatment of both leading political theories and contemporary political institutions and issues. The style is crisp and lucid.

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE: Toward Empirical Theory

Edited by ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 276 pages/$7.50

What is the relevance of the heritage of political theory for modern political science? Addressing themselves to this question in the main Plenary Session of the 1966 American Political Science Association meeting were the following contributors: GABRIEL A. ALMOND, ROBERT A. DAHL, KARL DEUTSCH, HARRY ECKSTEIN, HEINZ EULAU, ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, LUCIAN W. PYE, EDWARD SHILS, and HERBERT A. SIMON.

McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY

330 West 42nd Street, New York, New York 10036

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bearing on particular problems of interpretation; and he shows how exterior events, most notably the overcoming of the "cult of personality," impinged upon research. It is his treatment of the general conclusions that is troublesome. By failing to reveal how the authors he is studying arrived at conclusions about the role of party organizations behind enemy lines, the struggle of the people to maintain Soviet values and institutions such as collective farms, he betrays a tendency to confuse statements about the literature he is examining with statements about the subject matter of that literature.

This tendency or practice is even more evident in Mr. Iakovlev's treatment of the literature on the December Uprising of 1905. In considering the writings of the leading historians of the 1920's and 1930's—Pokrovskii, Iaroslavskii, Nevskii, Chernomordakh, and Gorin—he fails to describe the various aspects of their works or to judge their contribution to an understanding of various aspects of the subject matter. He concerns himself solely with conclusions and primarily with only one of them—the leading role of the Bolsheviks in organizing the Uprising. The works are judged by their degree of conformity with this conclusion, and the evolution of interpretation is noted almost exclusively with respect to this same point. The article consists of two sorts of statements: first, those about the historical literature, the writings of Pokrovskii, Iaroslavskii, and others, which constitute the subject matter of the article, and, second, those about the December Uprising itself, which constitutes the subject matter of the historical literature being examined.

The first body of statements is supported by conventional means of documentation. The second is apparently unsupported. It might be suggested that this is merely an appearance, that the author's conclusions about the Uprising rest on facts in the writings he is examining. But if that were so he could not employ these conclusions as a standard to evaluate the works themselves. He would be bound in fact, like most of us, to evaluate the works by methodological criteria. His statements about the Uprising, though empirical in form, function as *a priori* propositions. They represent knowledge of the subject matter gained somehow by means other than investigation. This is not merely a matter of technique. The author's procedure differs from the widespread and often fruitful practice of looking for facts to support a preconceived hypothesis. At issue is not the origin of hypotheses but the mode of verifying them.

How might the author defend the standard he employs and refute the allegation that at the heart of his entire construction lies a dogma?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Columbus, Ohio 43210

Ohio State University Press

Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence

By Philip Green A searching and devastating examination of the premises of deterrence theory that exposes the faulty base of a logic proceeding from highly questionable, unsupported assumptions. $6.00

The Common Aid Effort: The Development Assistance Activities of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

By Milton J. Esman and Daniel S. Cheever An appraisal of a recent attempt on the part of the rich nations of the world to co-operate in giving economic and technical assistance to less-developed areas. $7.50

Nuclear Weapons Safety and the Common Defense

By Joel Larus An investigation of the at least twenty nuclear accidents in which the United States has been involved since Hiroshima, and of the desperate need to remove the threat of accidental nuclear disaster in the face of arms proliferation. $6.50

Congress and the Citizen-Soldier: Legislative Policy-making for the Federal Armed Forces Reserve

By William F. Levantrosser An examination of the problems confronting the reserve forces at a time when elements in the Congressional policy-making process have tended to weaken civilian control of the military. $6.00

Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958

By Stephen G. Xydis An account of the Cyprus crisis of the mid-1950's, and of Greece's five recourses to the United Nations, that assesses the effectiveness of the world organization as an agency for conciliation in disputes among nations. $15.00

The OAS and United States Foreign Policy

By Jerome Slater An examination of the basis of the remarkable effectiveness of the OAS as a collective-security system, and of the causes behind its frequent failure as an anti-Communist or anti-dictatorial alliance. $6.00

The Law of the Sea: Offshore Boundaries and Zones

Edited by Lewis M. Alexander An investigation of possible means by which the resources of the seas may be protected from exploitation, the territorial waters of sovereign nations safeguarded, and free international use of the high seas guaranteed. $12.50

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Surely he would not claim that Marxism-Leninism informed him directly about the Uprising. Historical materialism does not make statements about specific events; rather it is a guide to particular investigations. The author might argue that his fault is one of presentation, that he erred, owing to lack of space, in not citing recent and highly conclusive investigations. To this we would assent; his statements about the Uprising are in principle verifiable. They are not treated, however, like contingent generalizations of the same sort as the conclusions of the authors he investigates. By employing his conclusions about the historical event as a standard to evaluate the other works, he behaves as though they had some special sanction—as though they themselves were not dependent upon fallible sources and the result of a whole array of inferences, as though they were not directly connected with the earlier conclusions he is investigating. The actual source of his body of statements is in his ungoverned feelings. One need not dignify unbridled dogmatism by calling it a method.

Were we to consider this operation an example of a new method, we might feel that we had achieved an ordering of the various explanations of institutional mendacity suggested in *Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror*. But to us Mr. Iakovlev's article merely embodies one of the forms through which dogmatism can express itself. Elements of dogmatism can be found in many of the essays of *History and Historians*, but certainly Soviet historians have no monopoly on this quality of mind and to consider it the defining characteristic of Soviet historiography would itself be dogmatic.

The name of Stalin is mentioned infrequently in the pages of *History and Historians*, yet only a reader thoroughly unfamiliar with present-day Soviet life would fail to recognize his importance in the volume. With only a minimum of reading between the lines, one perceives that the "cult of personality" is a major theme. The essays of Mr. Iakovlev and Mr. Kurnosov already mentioned refer to Stalin as an obstacle in their fields of study; a similar significance, perhaps even more consistently and forcefully expressed, is attributed to Stalin's acts by V. S. Lel'chuk in his article "The Study of Socialist Industrialization, 1926-1934." Stalin's intervention is judged to have been harmful because it led to the silencing of individual historians and closed off whole areas of life from investigation. It is now entirely fashionable to mention this aspect of the cult of personality. Combining such remarks with affirmations that the remnants of the cult have been overcome is a standard formulation, almost a formal incantation. The theme of de-Stalinization

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ASIAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Readings on China, Japan, India, and Pakistan

Betty B. Burch, Tufts University; and Allan B. Cole, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Available Spring, 1968.

This is a book of selected readings for undergraduate and graduate students of Asian politics and comparative politics in general. A unique feature is that the selections are drawn exclusively from writers native to each country.

THE SOVIET CRUCIBLE

The Soviet System in Theory and Practice, *Third Edition*

Edited with introductory notes by Samuel Hendel, The City University of New York. 1967, 480 pages, $5.95 (paper).

"*The Soviet Crucible*, edited by Samuel Hendel, provides a uniquely valuable selection of original Marxist and Soviet sources, together with substantial selections from many of the most penetrating analysts of Soviet power and society. This well-chosen compendium is an extremely useful supplement to courses on Russian history or Soviet politics." *Philip E. Mosely, Columbia University*

PRELUDE TO NATION-STATES

The French and German Experience, 1789-1815

Hans Kohn, formerly The City University of New York.
1967, 432 pages, $5.95 (paper), $9.75 (cloth).

In this comparative study of the origins of French and German nationalism, the author focuses on the common and distinctive features of the nation-state as a prerequisite to understanding nationalistic activities. The text is recommended for courses on Nationalism, Modern European History, French or German History.

THE STRATEGY OF FOREIGN AID

Lloyd D. Black, Northern Illinois University. Available Spring, 1968, about 256 pages, about $2.75 (paper).

The Strategy of Foreign Aid summarizes the problems and needs of the developing nations and relates these needs to the motivations and strategies of the donor countries. While emphasizing the U.S. effort in economic assistance, the book also discusses the programs of Western European and other bilateral donors, the United Nations and other multilateral agencies, and the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Send for your on-approval copies. Write College Department,

Van Nostrand

120 ALEXANDER STREET
PRINCETON, N. J. 08540

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

intrudes itself into the volume in still other ways. Academician Nechkina addresses herself to it not only in specific references (pp. 9, 22), but also in her discussions of the "Leninist stage of historiography" (p. 8) and the crisis of bourgeois historical scholarship (pp. 15-17). The mere mention by some of the contributors of the surname Gorin is a similar manifestation. Pavel O. Gorin was Pokrovskii's chief lieutenant on the historical front and one of the most notorious figures in the "so-called school of Pokrovskii." The presence of an essay on V. I. Nevskii, another historian who was closely associated with Pokrovskii and who, like Gorin, suffered repression, is also evidence of the theme. The most direct treatment of the problem is the essay on Pokrovskii himself. While it would be crude to say that when Pokrovskii is up, Stalin is down, and vice versa, the statement is not entirely misleading.

The author of the article "The Development of the Historical Conceptions of M. N. Pokrovskii" is A. E. Lutskii, a professor at the Historical Archive Institute in Moscow. As a young man, he participated in the slanderous posthumous denigration of Pokrovskii, and now he has made a major contribution to the current reevaluation of him. Lutskii's cautious approach to the problem suggests how delicate are the interlocking themes of Pokrovskii and Stalin. His restrained, undramatic presentation of Pokrovskii's early biography stresses his subject's close relationship with Lenin and the latter's approval of Pokrovskii's writings. Although he vouches for the authenticity of Pokrovskii's revolutionary credentials, he tends to diminish his role in the historical profession. Lutskii depicts him merely as one historian among others, a significant figure to be sure, but not the peerless leader of the Marxist historians. This interpretation carries the implication that the historians educated in the 1920's (now the leading figures in the profession) were not instructed by Pokrovskii alone. Perhaps most noteworthy about Pokrovskii's activity, in Lutskii's view, is his ability to accept criticism and to engage in self-criticism—a compliment both to Pokrovskii and to his students who criticized him. An approach such as Lutskii's is apt to divert attention from Pokrovskii's historical ideas and almost precludes the necessity of discussing their merits and defects. Certainly this approach forestalls any allegation of rehabilitating Pokrovskii's ideas. In keeping with the practice of the entire volume, Lutskii commends only those of Pokrovskii's ideas that approximate current interpretations.

The author's sober, factual approach breaks down as the narrative comes to the year of Pokrovskii's death, 1932. Considerable detail about Pokrovskii's final battles is presented, and the reader is even treated to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws

by Douglas W. Rae

The author defines the effect of a country's electoral system on its politics in precise and empirical terms, drawing his data from elections in twenty countries over a period of twenty years. His measure of party fractionalization and his categorization of various kinds of electoral laws represent important advances over the existing literature. $5.00

Party Democracy

Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation

by Samuel H. Barnes

Through an intensive empirical study of a single political party in an Italian province, Mr. Barnes investigates some broad theoretical questions of participation and democracy in political parties. The author brings to data analysis both the statistical tools of contemporary social science and the perception of a sensitive, informed scholar. His book provides many leads for future research. $7.50

Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change

by Robert H. Dix

Mr. Dix characterizes the various regimes which have evolved in Colombia to meet the challenges of modernization, beginning with Alfonso Lopez' "revolution on the march" of 1934. The book constitutes a thorough, up-to-date analysis of the political dynamics and recent history of an important Latin American nation. $10.00

Beyond the Cold War

by Marshall D. Shulman

"A lucid account of American-Soviet relations and the considerations that favor a new look at the Cold War. . . . Eloquent and thoughtful."—**Saturday Review.** "Brief, plain, and sensible survey."—**New York Times.** cloth $4.50; paper $1.25

available through your bookstore

Yale University Press YA LE
New Haven and London

in Canada: McGill University Press

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quotations from Central Party Archives. But there is a peculiar unclarity: Who are Pokrovskii's antagonists? What are the implications they attribute to his ideas? What practices of his do they object to? None of these questions is answered. The reason for this is that these battles raged in 1931 and were resolved by Stalin's notorious letter to the historical journal *Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia*.[2] The letter, which was reproduced in a score of scholarly journals and was read and discussed in all party units, was not Stalin's first intervention in historical scholarship, but it was a decisive one. It was an important event in the then current cultural revolution and in the development of the cult of personality. Lutskii's unwillingness to describe and evaluate this intervention accounts for his obscurity. His inability to present Stalin's act as it influenced the actual configuration of ideas prevents his clarifying Pokrovskii's activity. The evolution of Soviet historical scholarship at one of its most critical turning points is thereby left in obscurity.

Stalin's pretensions to scholarship may not have been all vain. If such were the case, could his role be the object of so much attention in both the East and the West? We can say at least that his acts continue to influence scholarship more than a decade after his death. Lutskii's dilemma lays bare a major defect of historical scholarship and a major obstacle to de-Stalinization. Soviet historiography suffers from a certain rationalism or intellectualism. Historians wish to think that conclusions affirmed during the years of Stalin's influence rest solely upon established fact and sound reasoning. They concede that his intervention had harmful consequences; it impeded investigation of important problems and destroyed numerous careers. Harm done individual historians, personal consequences, are stressed above all. But these same historians do not concede that Stalin's intervention could have affected the findings of investigations that were carried out. The political and ideological struggles of the era are seen as obstacles to but not a condition of scholarship. The inclination of foreigners to explore the politics of scholarship —relationships among institutions and personal rivalries of historians— is taken not as a legitimate reconstruction of the milieu but rather as gossip-mongering. Theoretical utterances to the contrary notwithstanding, Soviet historians view the development of their craft as having taken place within a vacuum.

Many Soviet historians argue that the vestiges of the cult of personality have been completely eliminated from scholarship and that the historical craft is practiced in conformity with the norms of a socialist society, i.e., it is as it ought to be. They are disinclined, however, to enter-

[2] Translated in J. V. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow 1953), 483-97.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRAEGER

Announcing the paperback publication of Raymond Aron's masterpiece



PEACE AND WAR

A Theory of International Relations

Raymond Aron

"A more impressive discussion of the nature of war has not been written since Clausewitz."—Golo Mann

"It is curious that a century dominated by international conflict should be so lacking in theories of international affairs. Now this deficiency has been remedied by Raymond Aron in his profound, civilized, brilliant and difficult work: PEACE AND WAR.... Henceforth, international theorizing will require reference to Aron.... This volume is indispensable for the specialist." — Henry A. Kissinger, *The New York Times Book Review*. 838 pages.

U-640/$4.95

POLITICAL PARTIES IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES

LEON D. EPSTEIN. Professor Epstein's major new book is the first to examine the American party system in the perspective of the historical development of parties in Europe—and the first to compare in detail party politics and power in the U. S. and Europe. His exhaustive analysis includes discussion of such factors as party organization, suffrage extension, mass membership, and federalism. ca. 448 pp. U-636/ca. $3.50

INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

PIERRE RENOUVIN and JEAN-BAPTISTE DUROSELLE. "A learned and systematic contribution to the historical sociology of international relations. No other text like it is available in America."—Stanley Hoffmann, *Professor of Government, Harvard University*. "This brilliant book is valuable for its sound historical analysis of international relations and for the insights of historical scholarship applied to the subject."—*Library Journal*. 444 pp.

A Praeger Paperbound Text/$3.95

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND ELECTIONS

Parties and Voting in Great Britain

PETER G. J. PULZER. This concise, thorough, and well-written book — an ideal text for British politics, comparative government, and American parties courses — makes possible for the first time a true comparison of the party systems of the U. S. and the U. K. Incorporating the latest research on political behavior in Great Britain, with special emphasis on work that has important parallels in the U. S., Dr. Pulzer provides a lucid analysis of all major developments from early suffrage extensions to the current "one man, one vote" controversy. January. 168 pp. U-644/$1.95

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER

111 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tain the possibility that the role assigned to historical scholarship derives from Stalin's own definition of socialism. The perils of de-Stalinization do not stem wholly or even mainly from political circumstances, nor is the only other side of the question that of morality. The problem is a complex intellectual one even for those to whom Stalinism is morally abhorrent. It requires recognition that many of one's own opinions are rooted in Stalin's actions and are not merely the product of study and reflection. Surely no community in the world enjoys surfeit of self-criticism.

While *History and Historians* confirms many of the assertions in *Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror*, it has, along with a variety of both faults and merits, a richness not foretold by the latter. In general, *Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror* is guilty of misplaced emphasis. It lays too much stress on what is distinctive in Soviet historiography. Perhaps we should say that it fails to reveal the context and limits of this distinctiveness and that its authors take too seriously Soviet claims to possess a special method. Soviet historians avowedly derive their hypotheses from one particular theory—or what we might call a model of social development—but Western historians, because they employ numerous models, also have recourse to this one. In practice, moreover, both Soviet and Western historians seeking to answer questions give scant attention to explicit models. Most significant, both employ the same empirical techniques to establish facts and draw conclusions. Dialectics—the disposition to be mindful of the context of events and to seek their interrelationships—is the state of mind of any good historian and not a Marxist monopoly. Similarly, the claim of Soviet historians to know the future has little bearing on their validation of statements about particular events in the past, except as a possible source of dogmatism. While the origins of their hypotheses are somewhat distinctive, they do not employ a unique model of validation.

Political circumstances as expressed in the concept *partiinost'* (party-mindedness) do impart to Soviet writings a distinctive character, but this character cannot be equated with mendacity or deceit, although these do occur. Perhaps, in conclusion, we can make a few observations about how political circumstances affect Soviet historians today. *Partiinost'* is a notion tirelessly discussed in the Soviet Union but only faultily explicated even at this late date. It represents an effort to blur the distinction between two assertions. First, the Soviet historians assert that the mind of the investigator, shaped by its vantage point in society, affects his findings. Thus, very much in the spirit of the new history,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COLUMBIA  COLUMBIA

CANADA AND THE QUEST FOR PEACE

PAUL MARTIN

Since World War II Canada has played an increasingly important role in international affairs. This book is an examination of her efforts and policies in three important areas—The United Nations and its peace-keeping efforts, the search for a solution to the Vietnamese conflict, and the economic development of underdeveloped countries.

This is the first of the Jacob Blaustein Lecture series. $3.95

DEFENSE OF THE REALM: BRITISH STRATEGY IN THE NUCLEAR EPOCH

R. N. ROSECRANCE

Great Britain's defense posture, by any measure, has grown absolutely since 1945. But today, her influence is much reduced from yesteryear. This study, drawing on extensive interviews with top American and British officials, surveys the strengths and weaknesses of Britain's defense in the contemporary period, with special emphasis on the first postwar decade. Today, the author concludes, Great Britain is stronger than she seems, and could yet seem stronger than she is. $7.50

STRATEGIC PERSUASION: ARMS LIMITATIONS THROUGH DIALOGUE

JEREMY J. STONE

The greatest hope for the resolution of the problems of arms and war, in this author's view, is the preservation and improvement of meaningful communication between the two major powers of the world, the Soviet Union and the United States.

This dialogue can be more than a necessary preliminary to formal agreements—in many cases it can substitute for treaties by arriving at tacit agreements or informal understandings. The book analyzes the nature of the exchanges, including the problems of bureaucracy and human persuasion that are not peculiar to arms race management. It suggests direct and indirect approaches to arms control discussions, and treats such diverse issues as the problem of announcing one's strategic successes without exacerbating the arms race, the problem of staffing quiet United States-Soviet discussions (such as the Pugwash conferences), and the prospects for "breakthroughs" in the dialogue. $6.95

HOW COMMUNIST CHINA NEGOTIATES

ARTHUR LALL

As chief negotiator from neutralist India present at the Geneva Conference dealing with the Laotian question, Mr. Lall was often sought out and cultivated by the Chinese Communist delegates to the Conference. Since that time he has had contact with Chinese Foreign Service officers. From these experiences he has had a unique opportunity to observe the manner in which the Chinese Communists develop their strategy and tactics in negotiations with other nations. This book is an examination of their approach to international negotiation and their use of negotiating tactics to achieve their ends. $7.95

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

440 West 110th Street, New York, N.Y. 10025



COLUMBIA COLUMBIA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they deny the contrary notion that the investigator faithfully reproduces the past as it was. They equate this first assertion with what is actually a second and separate assertion that all scholars serve some vested interest and that they themselves serve the interest of the proletariat. They employ arguments for the first easily demonstrable and almost universally accepted insight to justify the second statement, which is essentially an exhortation. And they have succeeded in creating a state of befuddlement.

To discuss the operation of the concept of *partiinost'*, one is compelled to distinguish among various sorts of historians. First and easiest to characterize are those who reject the notion of *partiinost'* altogether and who, abhorring any tendentiousness, strive to confine it to their prefaces. The second group is old-fashioned in a different sense. They are the self-proclaimed Stalinists who are scandalized by the new interpretations issuing from the Institute of History. Fresh interpretations represent to them reconsideration of questions long since answered and, in their eyes, serve to revive Trotskyite and other contraband ideas. These historians most of all spurn the downgrading of Stalin. *Partiinost'* in its most strident formulation is their watchword, and they strive to reimpose it in its classical form as the dominant professional guideline. They have been cheered by the call for "objectivity" that accompanied the ouster of Khrushchev and feel that prospects are favorable for curbing the Institute of History. They view the future more optimistically than does the first group.

These two groups probably constitute a majority of historians, but they are less influential than a third group. These are the individuals who stand closest to the Central Committee and who dominate the editorial boards, the scholarly councils, and the special commissions. It would be amiss to consider them all "party hacks," for they include some of the most talented and forthright individuals in the historical profession. What they share is the conviction that existing arrangements within the profession are the most desirable ones and that they conform to socialist principles. To be sure, they favor minor modifications such as the enlargement of the profession, readier access to archives, greater freedom of travel, and more independence in the selection of topics. But the notion of *partiinost'* remains at the core of their professional ethics. They do not interpret it to mean serving a particular faction in the party, and they abjure distorting and suppressing facts. They see their task as employing the best means of scholarship to vindicate Marxism-Leninism itself, which they consider a method of thought and a world view that expresses mankind's highest aspirations. They adhere to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Enemies and Friends

THE UNITED FRONT IN CHINESE COMMUNIST HISTORY

Lyman P. Van Slyke. Traces the theory and practice of an important instrument of Chinese Communist political strategy, with emphasis upon three important manifestations: the Kuomintang-Communist alliance of the 1920's, the military alliance against Japan in 1937-45, and the Party's post-1949 campaigns to transform China's society and economy. $8.50

The China White Paper, August 1949

With a New Introduction by Lyman P. Van Slyke. Reissue of the original State Department publication, with an extensive index prepared for this edition. A 400-page summary of American China policy down to the summer of 1949 and over 600 pages of official documents, formerly highly classified.

Paper, 2 vols., $5.95 a set; cloth, 1 vol., $15.00

Capitalism and Nationalism in Prewar Japan

THE IDEOLOGY OF THE BUSINESS ELITE, 1868-1941

Byron K. Marshall. This is a study of how the new elite of Japanese business leaders justified their acquisition of a considerable degree of political as well as economic power as Japan became more highly industrialized. Includes a discussion of the influence of the West on the formation of business ideology. $5.75

Islam and Imperialism in Senegal

SINE-SALOUM, 1847-1914

Martin A. Klein. This study, concentrating on the Serer states of Senegal during a period of transition, is one of the most detailed histories yet written of the processes of political change in Africa. One of the very few works in English based on local French West African archives and making extensive use of oral tradition. *Hoover Institution Publications.* $7.95

Order from your bookstore, please

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

official interpretation of their nation's history and of world history and seek to validate it honestly. But their systematic opposition to other interpretations denies them the benefits of criticism. Scholarship remains warfare carried on by other means. Since these historians are able to recruit like-minded colleagues into their leading ranks, it is likely that Soviet historiography will retain its present characteristics for a considerable length of time.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For Courses in International Politics—

Coming in April —

Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System

EVAN LUARD, St. Anthony's College, Oxford University

This book vividly examines contemporary national behavior, the motivations inspiring it, and the restraints inhibiting it. It systematically surveys types of behaviors that have caused international conflict, especially since World War II, and analyzes the principal methods used to secure peace: disarmament and arms control.

Paper $5^3/_8 \times 8^1/_4$ 352 pages

Revolutionary Change

CHALMERS JOHNSON, University of California, Berkeley

Professor Johnson offers an introductory analysis of revolutionary resorts to violence in society. He utilizes a model of the social system to analyze the causes of revolution and draws upon political theory, anthropology, and social psychology to describe how public actions promote or retard revolutionary conditions.

Paper $5^3/_8 \times 8^1/_4$ 208 pages $2.50

Contemporary Military Strategy

MORTON H. HALPERIN, Harvard University

This stimulating supplemental text examines some of the basic concepts that American strategists apply in studying how policy is formulated and in analyzing contemporary international politics.

Paper $5^3/_8 \times 8^1/_4$ 156 pages $2.50



LITTLE, BROWN and COMPANY
34 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass. 02106

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For Courses in Foreign Policy —

Coming in March —

United States Foreign Policy

An Introduction with Cases

SHELDON APPLETON, Oakland University

This text is a unique approach to understanding how American foreign policy is made and implemented, using actual case studies of policy issues to illustrate and illuminate key analytic concepts.

Cloth 6 x 9 640 pages $8.00 (tent.)

Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics

The American and British Experience

KENNETH N. WALTZ, Brandeis University

This is a genuinely comparative study of United States and British foreign policy. The author systematically explores the structures of the two political systems, as well as their processes and performances.

Paper 6 x 9 352 pages $3.95

French Foreign Policy under de Gaulle

ALFRED GROSSER, University of Paris

First published by Editions du Seuil, Paris, in 1965, this revised English edition offers a vivid and penetrating analysis of the foreign policy of the Fifth Republic. Professor Grosser's analysis of de Gaulle's policy in Algeria is relevant for comparison to American policy in Vietnam.

Paper $5^3/_8$ x $8^1/_4$ 192 pages $2.50



LITTLE, BROWN and COMPANY
34 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass. 02106

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROUSSEAU

ROGER D. MASTERS

Professor Masters provides here a thorough analysis of *Emile*, the *First* and *Second Discourses*, and the *Social Contract*. The aim is not to present a subjective interpretation but to expose Rousseau's "system" as he himself envisioned it. The commentary is arranged so that chapters on each of Rousseau's major writings can be consulted separately. *$12.50*

THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY, 1927-1932

LOREN GRAHAM

Professor Graham concentrates on the period of the Soviet Union's first five-year plan to gain an understanding of how the Soviet Academy of Sciences was transformed and how it in turn transformed Russian science. He describes the eventually successful effort of the Communist Party to gain control of the Academy. *Studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia University.* *$6.50*

SOUTH ASIAN HISTORY, 1750-1950

A Guide to Periodicals, Dissertations, and Newspapers

MARGARET H. CASE

This is a major bibliographic research guide designed to assist scholars of South Asian history (India, Pakistan, and Nepal) in finding materials relevant to their research. It offers an annotated and indexed list of articles from periodicals, lists English and bilingual English-vernacular newspapers, and vernacular papers published in South Asia, and provides an extensive unified list of dissertations for degrees in modern South Asian history from South Asian, European, and American universities. *$17.50*

Princeton

UNIVERSITY PRESS

PRINCETON, N. J. 08540

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COMMITMENT TO RESPONSIBILITY

By C. P. KINDLEBERGER

Theodore Geiger, *The Conflicted Relationship: The West and the Transformation of Asia, Africa and Latin America*, The Atlantic Policy Series, published for the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1967, xiv, 303 pp. $7.95.

Jacob J. Kaplan, *The Challenge of Foreign Aid: Policies, Problems, and Possibilities*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967, 405 pp. $8.50.

IN reading the two books under review, I was reminded of Senator Fulbright's book *The Arrogance of Power*—or at least of the title. Each of these two works, also dealing with the relationships of the United States to the less developed world, but each making a different point, can be summed up in a similar substantive phrase: Geiger's thesis would be "The Humility of Ignorance"; Kaplan's, "Commitment to Responsibility."

An apocryphal story of a decade back dealt with the plight of a Department of Agriculture civil servant who retired after thirty-five years of service and received a foundation grant to distill the wisdom of his experience into a book on American agricultural policy. The outcome was unhappy. It emerged that a man who had spent his life writing two-page memoranda was able to write only two-page memoranda. His foundation sponsors found to their sorrow that 150 or 200 two-page memoranda do not add up to a book.

These works are counterexamples. Messrs. Geiger and Kaplan did not serve in government as long as thirty-five years, but twenty years for Kaplan is roughly the same order of magnitude. Both have been "aidocrats," at the game since before the Marshall Plan, both in and out of government. Whereas Geiger is a hardened book-writer, Kaplan, I believe, is a first offender. The books deal broadly with the same subject, yet they could not be more different. At a number of points they are tangential to each other and complementary. But Geiger is interested in the less developed countries and the ambiguities and ambivalences within them and within the West in its attitude toward them. He wants to apply to them the insights of social science, and in particular those of Benjamin Nelson of N.Y.U., whom he thanks in the Preface and quotes throughout. Kaplan, on the other hand, is a no-nonsense one-time government economist who, *qua* bureaucrat, is disenchanted with the drift of academic economics in its relations with the aid question, its insistence on quantification, and, frequently, its search for rationales.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COLUMBIA COLUMBIA

BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF REPUBLICAN CHINA, VOLUMES I AND II

HOWARD L. BOORMAN, EDITOR
RICHARD C. HOWARD, ASSOCIATE EDITOR

Over ten years in preparation, the BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF REPUBLICAN CHINA will provide a massive reference work, at once systematic and comprehensive, for all organizations, libraries, and individuals concerned with twentieth-century China. In addition to political and military leaders, the work includes detailed biographies-in-brief of individuals prominent in diplomacy, business and banking, literature, the arts, scholarship, social reform, education, the press and publishing, science, religion, aviation, medicine, and other fields.

These volumes are the first two of four that will furnish the most comprehensive and objective life stories in any language including Chinese of some 600 Chinese, many still living, of this century. Volume I contains 150 biographical articles of Chinese with surnames Ai through Ch'ü. Volume II covers surnames Dalai through Ma.

Volume I—$20.00
Volume II—Spring, '68—approximately $20.00

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
440 West 110th Street, New York, N.Y. 10025

COLUMBIA COLUMBIA

The Strategy of World Order:

A set of Materials, edited by Richard A. Falk, Princeton University, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, Rutgers Law School. World Law Fund, 1966. Four-volume set, paperbound, $10.00; hardcover, $14.00. Volumes I and II, $2.50 each. Volumes III and IV, $3.50 each. 2,296 pp.

Vol. I.

Toward a Theory of War Prevention
Foreword by Harold D. Lasswell

Vol. II.

International Law
Foreword by Wolfgang Friedman

Vol. III.

The United Nations
Foreword by Oscar Schacter

Vol. IV.

Disarmament and Economic Development
Foreword by J. David Singer

"There now exists an excellent set of teaching books—not on international law, not on the United Nations, not on war prevention, or disarmament, but rather on the overall, interrelated strategy of world order." —*Michigan Law Review*

Vol. V.

Regionalism and World Order

Vol. VI.

The Role of the Individual and World Order

Projected for 1968 publication. Research for Volumes V and VI supported by The Carnegie Corporation.

The World Law Fund, 11 West 42nd Street, New York City 10036

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Opposing growth models, cost-benefit analysis, and, occasionally, country-programming, he embraces the style of the diplomat, searching for national interests and using such antiacademic words as "sound," "unwise," "skillful."

Geiger's book is deliberately not on aid. On this subject, the Atlantic Policy Series commissioned a different book by John Pincus, called *Trade, Aid and Development.*[1] But as an "economist, historian, psychologist and sociologist" (to quote the jacket of another volume in the series), Geiger has chosen to investigate the complications of the economy, society, and polity in the less developed countries, whereas Kaplan focuses specifically and in detail on aid.

Like most economists, I am suspicious of the broad social scientist, especially when he dips his pen in sociologese. Geiger claims he is writing for the general reader, but he is less than friendly to that benighted soul in beating him about the eyes with words like "paradigmatic," "prepotent," "prefigurement," "mimetic," "mediatory elites," and "eschatological." His thesis is that the West suffers from technocratic positivism, combined with a sense of mission and a sense of guilt, and that this ambiguity runs into very different ambiguities in Asia and Africa, on the one hand, and—a very different culture, though it is not always recognized as such—in Latin America, on the other. In Asia and Africa, transitional societies are changing rapidly, running the risk of alienation and anomie, searching for identity. They strive toward nationalism, as a means of conceptualizing independence, and toward socialism, since it explains their previous colonial status. Strong particularist relationships (to use a Parsonian word) inhibit the development of a new sense of identity; authoritarian elites and the inertia of the traditional sector inhibit political development, which is the crux of development. In Latin America, instability of government stems from the particularistic character of society, with its strong local and family loyalties, its shifting alliances among elite groups, and the lag between aspirations, on the one hand, and institutions and attitudes for realizing them.

I confess that I failed to catch the distinction being made between the traditional societies of Asia and Africa and the Western society of Latin America: both particularistic, both regulating governmental succession by coups, both with frequent military dictatorships. In the one case there is alienation, anomie, and crises of identity; in the other, a lag between aspirations and institutions and attitudes for realizing them. But Kaplan concedes that the values of the less developed countries are

[1] (New York 1967).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

the quarterly journal of the World Peace Foundation offering the most inclusive and up-to-date account of the activities of international organizations

Presents

THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

a Special Issue edited by Richard N. Gardner and Max F. Millikan

WINTER 1968

A comprehensive analysis of the role of United Nations agencies, regional organizations, and other intergovernmental bodies in the economic and related political processes of development. Topics covered include UNCTAD, problems of food supply and population, the IMF, the role of trade in economic development, and private foreign investment.

CONTRIBUTORS

Robert E. Asher
Edward M. Bernstein
Henry S. Bloch
Roy Blough
Frank M. Coffin
Robert W. Cox
John W. Evans
Isaiah Frank
Richard N. Gardner
Sherman Katz
Walter M. Kotschnig
Karl Mathiason
Stanley D. Metzger
Max F. Millikan
Goran Ohlin
Roger Revelle
Paul Rosenstein-Rodan
Rául Sáez
Jan Tinbergen

$6.00 a year
$16.00 for three years

$2.00 a copy
Student rate: $4.00 a year

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION
40 Mt. Vernon Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02108, U.S.A.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

different from those of the West, "with the possible exception of Latin America" (p. 83). Latin America is more susceptible to violent revolution than Asia and Africa because strong pressures for rapid social change are frustrated by major economic and political rigidities. The failure of the United States to focus its attention on Latin America contributes to a sense of cultural and social inferiority. The United States is handicapped by unrealistic expectations and neurotic rigidities. The transitional process in Asia and Africa and the modernization process in Latin America (presumably different) are more complex, slower, more erratic and uncertain than is assumed in the West. The needed response is the incorporation of more knowledge of cultural, political, psychological, and social factors in foreign-aid programs. The relevance of economics has long been clear, but other social sciences have failed to make their appropriate contribution.

As noted earlier, Kaplan's thrust is otherwise. He wants not more anthropology, politics, psychology, and sociology in the aid business, but less economics, or less formal economics. Aid got off to a good start in the Marshall Plan, which was relatively easy, but when it ran into trouble with the less developed countries, it started looking for gimmicks—some, like P.L. 480 and the 50-50 shipping clause, to acquire constituents (because the foreign agencies of the U.S. government suffer from lack of political support at home such as is enjoyed by all other agencies of government); some to provide the intellectual rationale for what is essentially a simple process. The project basis for loans and the Development Loan Fund (DLF) of the aid agency were such, patterning U.S. aid after the successful but limited activity of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development just as that institution was going into the soft-loan business. Burden-sharing, country-programming, concentrating aid by countries, private guarantees, transferring aid to multilateral agencies constitute others. The gimmicks diverted attention from the essence of the development process, viz., whether the recipient country was making progress in policies aimed toward fiscal and monetary stability, reallocation of resources away from wasteful expenditure, cooperation with its neighbors in the region, and so on. Kaplan rejects quantitative indications such as growth rates and wants to know simply whether the country is becoming more viable.

He also rejects one major gimmick, probably born of the Millikan and Rostow book in 1957,[2] that aid should be limited exclusively to

[2] Max F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow, *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy* (New York 1957).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Quarterly Journal of the Indian School of International Studies, Sapru House, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi 1 (India)

International Studies **contains articles on International Politics, Economics, and Law as well as on political, economic, and social developments in practically all parts of the world.**

Contents of the January 1968 Issue

The Emergence of the Demand for the Partition of India	Bimla Prasad
India as a Factor in Sino-Pakistani Relations	Mohammad Ayoob
The Commonwealth Secretariat	B. Vivekanandan
Notes and Memoranda	
The Korean War and US-Pakistani Relations	Harish Chandra Arya
Bibliography	
Commonwealth Africa, from Colonial Status to Nationhood: A Bibliography of Source Material	S. Ansari
Book Reviews	

Annual Subscription: Rs 40.00; $9.00; 72s
Single copy : Rs 10.00; $2.25; 18s

ASIA PUBLISHING HOUSE
Bombay • London • New York

THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

A Quarterly Published by The University of Notre Dame

The January issue includes the following articles:

Ernest W. Lefever: The Limits of U.N. Intervention in the Third World

Ali A. Mazrui and G. F. Engholm: Rousseau and Intellectualized Populism in Africa

David Nicholls: Few Are Chosen

Leonard Opperman: Aid for the States: Is Revenue-Sharing the Answer?

Thomas V. DiBacco: The Political Ideas of American Business: Recent Interpretations

Robert Strausz-Hupé: The Uninvited Guests

Annual Subscription $5.00 **Single Issue $1.50**

Address: THE EDITORS, THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
Notre Dame, Indiana 46556

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

maximizing economic development, with the criterion for allocation being to equalize the contribution of the marginal dollar in each country program to growth in income (or income per capita). Millikan and Rostow saw one weakness in this formula: it would require that most aid go to the Dominions, Japan, and Western Europe. They set a cutoff level, beyond which the formula would not operate. Kaplan wants no part of it at all. As between his intuition and economic analysis as applied to growth, he prefers the former. The United States concern is not with building economic development for the purpose of building peace. The United States is interested in peace directly: rebuffing Communist aggression, building bases for U.S. military protection of the less developed countries, minimizing conflicts among the less developed countries, and building governments and societies congenial to United States ideas. Aid should go hand in hand with security guarantees. Europe is in good shape; what it requires from this country is patience and inactivity. In the rest of the world, however, the United States has been reluctant to accept the responsibility it must shoulder. It has shown restraint and even reluctance in meeting its responsibilities. Accepting such responsibilities is not intervention, domination, or colonialism but United States self-interest in preserving peace.

There is a good deal to the view that the allocation of aid is a political process, rather than one that submits to the calculation of economic equalities at the margin. In trying to describe the allocation of Marshall Plan aid, I once suggested that it was based on an amalgam of the historical, the desirable, and the feasible. Kaplan strongly resists more theoretical precision than this. Be pragmatic, he suggests, and treat foreign governments pragmatically by observing what they do rather than listening to what they say.

Kaplan's specific recommendations include two about which I have serious doubts, resting in one case on a difference with his analysis, in the other on what he says in yet another connection. The first recommendation concerns the balance-of-payments deficits of the United States, which he feels are due, to the extent of $1.5 billion a year on the average, to the failure of economic tying of aid and the use of United States aid to bail out European capital seeking escape from Asia and Africa. It is true that there was a large capital outflow from Algeria to France in the years after 1958 and some small return flow of French capital from Vietnam. To ascribe the major weakness in the balance-of-payments position of the United States to the use of U.S. aid funds to supplement French aid in these respects is highly fanciful, however, and the remedy of further tying down of U.S. aid, of requiring aid

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Journal of

conflict RESOLUTION

A quarterly for research related to war and peace

DECEMBER 1967 ISSUE (XI-4):

Interorganizational Conflict: A Labor-Management Bargaining Experiment ..... *William M. Evan and John A. MacDougall*

The Economics of Peace and War ..... *John Baldwin*

Understanding Factor Analysis ..... *R. J. Rummel*

Other articles; gaming section; book reviews

$7.00 per year for individuals; $8.00 for institutions; single issues $3.00

Published by The Center for Research on Conflict Resolution
The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION (Act of October 23, 1962; Section 4369, Title 39, United States Code). 1. Date of filing: September 27, 1967. 2. Title of publication: *World Politics*. 3. Frequency of issue: Quarterly. 4. Location of known office of publication: Corwin Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, Mercer, New Jersey 08540. 5. Location of the headquarters or general business office of the publishers: William & Charlton Streets, Princeton, Mercer, New Jersey 08540. 6. Names and addresses of publisher, editor, and managing editor: Publisher, Princeton University Press, William & Charlton Streets, Princeton, New Jersey 08540. Editors, Cyril E. Black, Richard A. Falk, and Klaus Knorr, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08540. Managing editor, Mary Cox, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08540. 7. Owner: Princeton University Press (a nonprofit corporation without stockholders). 8. Known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities: None. 10. A. Total number of copies printed (net press run): Average number of copies each issue during preceding 12 months, 3800; single issue nearest to filing date, 3900. B. Paid circulation: (1) Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors, and counter sales: None. (2) Mail subscriptions: Average number of copies each issue during preceding 12 months, 3437; single issue nearest to filing date, 3439. C. Total paid circulation: Average number of copies each issue during preceding 12 months, 3437; single issue nearest to filing date, 3439. D. Free distribution by mail, carrier or other means: Average number of copies each issue during preceding 12 months, 162; single issue nearest to filing date, 176. E. Total distribution: Average number of copies each issue during preceding 12 months, 3599; single issue nearest to filing date, 3615. I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete. Herbert S. Bailey, Jr., Director, Princeton University Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

recipients to pay for "normal non-aid exports" from the United States, is unattractive. Kaplan is right when he says that tying aid works slowly at best and is readily evaded by diverting normal imports to aid. But the remedy of more and more thoroughgoing control of trade is probably worse than the disease, which seems to have run its course. The United States cannot manage the foreign-exchange controls of the less developed countries, which means it cannot prevent all capital outflows of repatriate foreigners or even of native capitalists. But to ascribe the United States balance-of-payments deficits to this once large and now narrowing leak implies that the capital returned to Europe is kept liquid and not reinvested. Since this position is extreme, the bulk of the deficit must be the result of monetary and fiscal policies in the United States and Europe which have nothing to do with foreign aid.

The other suggestion about which I have doubts is that of further congressional participation in the regional and functional allocation of aid. This suggestion is qualified by provision for discretionary reallocations, but to me it looks like a political gimmick on the part of the man who rejects economic gimmicks. And its inutility is suggested by the pipeline, on which Kaplan's analysis is fascinating. AID has to prepare a budget for the President a year in advance. In calendar 1967, for example, the budget for 1968-1969 is put together. If all goes well it is passed in the fall of 1967, and the funds are committed between this period and the end of the fiscal year. Recipient governments have their cycles for proposing and adopting legislation. Following commitments come expenditure and delivery. Between appropriations and delivery several years ensue. This fact is cited by Kaplan as a reason why aid cannot be turned on and off, like a faucet, to suit the short-run twists and turns of United States foreign policy. A riot or a burning of a U.S. Information Center today may not lead to halt in the flow of supplies for three years, at which time, as in the cobweb theorem in economics, United States interest may be strongly in support of such a country. But the length of the pipeline also precludes, I would think, Congress's taking a major hand in allocating aid on a political basis, especially as its views (cf. the East-West trade proposals of President Johnson) lag behind events by a number of years.

But suppose we grant the contentions of both Geiger and Kaplan and admit that social science generally needs to be added to economics in the aid decision-making process and that formal economic models and other gimmicks need to be supplemented by (give way to?) pragmatic and intuitive decisions, based on long-run acceptance of responsibility for developing viable societies. Where is the rationale for eco-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS FROM THE

Center of International Studies

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL
AND THE
MAINTENANCE OF PEACE
BY LEON GORDENKER
Columbia University Press 380 PAGES $8.50

THE INTERMEDIARIES
Third Parties in International Crises
BY ORAN R. YOUNG
Princeton University Press 428 PAGES $10.00

DOMESTIC SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY
EDITED BY JAMES N. ROSENAU
The Free Press 340 PAGES $7.50

SOUTHEAST ASIAN TRIBES, MINORITIES,
AND NATIONS
EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY PETER KUNSTADTER
Princeton University Press 2 VOLUMES, 932 PAGES $22.50

THE REVOLUTIONARY PERSONALITY:
LENIN, TROTSKY, GANDHI
BY E. VICTOR WOLFENSTEIN
Princeton University Press 340 PAGES $7.50

Order from any bookseller

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nomic aid, as opposed to the normal weapons of diplomacy—the establishment or withholding of friendly relations, political and commercial, and international diplomacy, both bilateral and through multilateral agencies? Both books fail to address this central point. Aid must continue. To spell out the conditions for terminating aid is to live in a dream world. Ten years hence aid will be bigger and better—not *much* bigger, since enlargement should go slowly, but bigger nonetheless, and still bringing occasional loss and failure. As in baseball, .300 is a good average and .400 is remarkable. But why play the game?

Geiger's answer is found in the West's technocratic positivism, which leads to utopian expectations, and perhaps in the West's guilt, which seeks atonement. Kaplan's is less explicit. It is clear that United States economic interests are not involved. They are minimal in the less developed countries. In part, Kaplan's answer is that aid is effective as an instrument of foreign policy, although it is grossly premature to think that communism has been contained. But, again in part, the United States has built up expectations of help in economic and social development, which, once aroused, must be satisfied or the United States loses. Aid gives us a right to be heard. (The corollary that countries like Britain, India, and Argentina, which refuse to listen, may be doing badly economically on this account verges on the arrogance of power.) But we have to speak because the world is so small that we are one community, a community in which sharing through budgets must parallel production for and distribution through markets. Isolation is not immoral but impractical. We cannot get the less developed countries out of our hair. Let us forthrightly, says Kaplan, undertake a commitment to responsibility, with our aid officials working with other governments to build stable and viable societies in our mutual interest.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Center of International Studies

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

AN ECOLOGICAL PARADIGM FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

BY HAROLD AND MARGARET SPROUT

A proposal for reorienting the study of international politics to give greater emphasis to (1) the human substance of politics, (2) the pervasive significance of space and resources, (3) the secular trend away from necessity to conform to conditions beyond human control, toward increasing ability to manipulate, modify, and control them, (4) the accelerating rates of technological and other change, (5) the resulting increase in interdependence, and (6) the conditions for future human occupancy of the earth.

Research Monograph No. 29 $1.25

OTHER RECENT TITLES

Walt Rostow, Vietnam, and the Future Tasks of American Foreign Policy: Two "Second Generation" Dissents, by A. Michael Washburn and Willard H. Mitchell (Policy Memorandum No. 33) $1.25

The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model, by Ted Gurr, with Charles Ruttenberg (Research Monograph No. 28) $2.50

Order from the Center of International Studies
Corwin Hall, Princeton, New Jersey 08540

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED